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Abstract
With the increasing birth rate of new viruses and the rise in interConnectivity and
interoperability among computers, the burden of detecting and destroying computer
viruses is severe. This research integrated four different domains: computer virus
detection, human immunology, computer immunology and constructive induction. First,
a Computer Health System, based on the public health system, was defined that could
possibly improve the current "global" approach to computer virus protection. Second, a
computer immune model, based on the human immune system, was defined that could
possibly improve the current "local" approach to virus detection. Third, the detection
component of this computer immune model was developed, represented by the prototype
MERCURY. This model utilized the machine learning concept of constructive induction
to capture the human immune characteristics of detection, self-adaptation and memory.
The results of analyzing MERCURY demonstrate a lack of representational
power of computer virus byte patterns using selective induction. Therefore, constructive
induction is needed to provide new, potentially powerful, and often necessary
representations. However, the results confirmed constructive induction's main
deficiency, the explosion in the number of hypotheses generated. The effects of this
deficiency can be improved by utilizing key pieces of knowledge to guide construction.
Process optimization through statistical techniques, provides direct insight into these key
pieces of knowledge. Knowledge about the virus domain, such as characteristics of
typical viruses and regularities in the byte patterns, also provides guidance for effective
construction.

Xlll

A CONSTRUCTIVE INDUCTION APPROACH
TO COMPUTER IMMUNOLOGY

1.

1.1.

Introduction

Motivation

The vision for the 21st Century Air Force includes aggressively expanding the
efforts in information warfare, both offensively and defensively. The top priority is to
defend capabilities in this arena by continuing to build up the defense of computer
systems and improve our tactical and operational information warfare capabilities. With
the Air Force's increasing rate of computer dependency, the threat of computer viruses is
a rapidly growing concern.
Computer viruses have been a growing concern since the early 1980s [FHS97].
To combat this problem, various antivirus programs have been created; however, the
burden of detecting and destroying viruses is still severe. Two trends are inhibiting the

effectiveness of current antiviral techniques: the increasing birth rate of new viruses and
the rise in interconnectivity and interoperability among computers [Kep94]. Current
techniques are reactive, labor intensive for virus researchers, have a slow response from
time of discovery until the cure is prescribed, and require user intervention to update the
virus signature database. Improving current antiviral techniques can combat these
problems [Kep94].
Based on several properties of the human immune system, computer scientists
hope new techniques to fight computer viruses will emerge. They believe that the human
immune system has several useful characteristics for detecting computer viruses. These
properties provide a robust, flexible and scalable system resilient to attack and a fresh
perspective on computer viruses and other security problems [FHS97].
Human immune systems are unique, meaning individual immunity is derived and
adapted differently; this is a desirable and applicable property of a computer system, as
well. The immune system uses a decentralized and distributed detection process, also of
interest in the virus detection domain. The human system is very flexible and does not
require the absolute detection of every invader; instead, partial detection allows for
quicker recognition of multiple invaders. In a computer system, this is similar to the use
of byte pattern signatures as partial detectors for locating an infected file on a computer
system.
Another very important feature of the immune system is its ability to detect and
react to invaders, or "nonself," while not inappropriately detecting what belongs in the
body, or "self." This property applies to invaders that have been previously seen, as well
as those previously unseen. The human system can learn the structures of these

previously unseen invaders and remember them, so that the body's future responses to the
same invader can be faster.
These last three human immune properties of detection, adaptation, and memory
are the most important throughout this research. These strengths of the human immune
system are the foundation for the development of a new antivirus detection method,
investigated in this research.
Drawing on some of the strengths of the human system, other researchers have
proposed computer immune models. These computer immune models incorporate many
of the positive aspects of current antiviral techniques while introducing improvements
such as automatic distribution of viral prescriptions, automatic recognition and removal
of viruses, and protection of self [MVL98]. These models each provide an overall
approach to an aspect of computer immunology, but do not always give a full picture that
includes virus detection on an individual system.
The research conducted in our investigation presents two computer models. The
first model provides a "global approach" to computer health by incorporating individual
computer systems through a computer health infrastructure. The second model provides
a "local approach" to computer health by utilizing a method of virus detection, based on
the properties of the human immune system.
To properly model this individual detection system after the human immune
system, a learning mechanism is required for the adaptation property. This mechanism
provides an automated method for distinguishing between positive and negative instances
of self that defines the overall concept of self. This learning mechanism is adaptive since

it allows the definition of self to change; it "learns" by incorporating new viruses,
representing nonself, into this definition.
The specific learning mechanism utilized in this research is based on a form of
machine learning called constructive induction. This mechanism derives knowledge
from the observation of positive and negative examples of a concept, in this case, self.
This type of learning attempts to characterize the concept by creating a description that
captures the essence of the concept while distinguishing it from the counterexamples.
This is accomplished by carefully selecting from the original attributes describing the
examples and, when necessary, constructs new, more useful, attributes. This form of
learning provides a mechanism for learning meaningful descriptions of complex data,
such as distinguishing between self, those components authorized as part of the system,
and nonself that does not belong on a computer system.
Analogies between the human immune system and the computer immune system
can be derived through constructive induction. Both systems create potential detectors
for identifying invaders. There are differences, though. The body can afford to retain
billions of detectors for "future use," and the inherently parallel nature of cellular activity
allows constant testing against substances without performance degradation. The
computer cannot maintain and test a large number of detectors without a loss in system
performance. To create a practically useful system, complex detectors must be induced
through the selection of byte patterns and the application of operators defining their
interrelationships. Unsuitable or repetitive detectors are filtered out through testing.
Other machine learning approaches, such as evolutionary algorithms and neural
networks, also entail the necessary properties of construction and induction. Since they

can be shown to perform "limited" construction based upon their sets of operators, this
research focuses on the more general and deterministic learning program known as
constructive induction.

1.2.

Problem

Due to the lack of an adaptation mechanism, many virus detection methods are
insufficient at the individual system level. In addition, the global approach to computer
health is inadequate. Though several immunological approaches have been studied,
many lack a mechanism for the adaptive detection of viruses on an individual computer
system. This research proposed utilizing the machine learning mechanism of
constructive induction for the adaptive detection. However, the most difficult issue faced
by constructive induction, as a field of machine learning, is the selection of the most
useful operator-attribute combinations. These combinations create a computational
explosion, necessitating the use of a priori knowledge to make the learning process more
efficient.

1.3.

Research Objectives

This research integrated four different domains, depicted in Figure 1: computer
virus detection, human immunology, computer immunology and constructive induction.
First, a Computer Health System, based on the public health system, was defined that

could possibly improve the current "global" approach to computer virus protection.
Second, a computer immune model, based on the human immune system, was defined
that could possibly improve the current "local" approach to virus detection. Third, the
detection component of this computer immune model was developed, represented by the
prototype MERCURY. This model utilized the machine learning concept of constructive
induction to capture the human immune characteristics of detection, self-adaptation and
memory.
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The work accomplished as part of this investigation tested the following primary
hypotheses:

Primary Hypotheses
1. The public health system is a useful model for a Computer Health
System for the global protection of computer system against viruses
2. The human immune system is a useful model for a virus detection
system on an individual computer system
3. Constructive induction provides a suitable learning mechanism
for the virus detector system of an individual computer system

The first two objectives of this research were to test the first two hypotheses to
determine if the public health system and the human immune system were useful models
for a Computer Health System and computer immune system, respectively. To
accomplish this objective, research in the areas of public health and human immunology
was conducted. The requirements, objectives and components of the models were also
evaluated. Both computer models are informal, explanatory models based on some
essential qualities of their respective systems. Due to the models' informalities, though,
not all of their aspects were explicitly stated.
The third objective of this research was to empirically test the third hypothesis.
This objective investigated whether constructive induction was suitable for virus
detection in a computer immune system. Testing was conducted utilizing MERCURY.
While MERCURY captures the essence of constructive induction, it does not fully

employ all the characteristics of a complete inductive engine. Therefore, based on the
empirical analysis of MERCURY'S results, the hypothesis that constructive induction
provides a suitable learning mechanism for the virus detector system of an individual
computer system can not be accepted or rejected. Rather, the results of these tests
provided empirical evidence and analytical knowledge that could make the learning
process more efficient. Since the main disadvantage of constructive induction is its
computational explosion, these results provided mathematically based methods which
could decrease its computational complexity. These methods could improve the
capabilities of a fully developed constructive induction based virus detector, by providing
knowledge about the problem domain and the system parameters a priori. To confirm
these findings, a process optimization simulation was conducted to demonstrate the
effectiveness of a priori knowledge applied to the virus detection problem.
The third hypothesis was decomposed into smaller, more manageable, subhypotheses. The first sub-hypothesis was the Virus Feature Hypothesis:

Virus Feature Hypothesis
Byte patterns can be used as the basis of a
constructive induction based computer virus detector.

This hypothesis captured the belief that byte patterns extracted from computer
files are "adequate" features for distinguishing between positive and negative instances of
self, defining the overall concept of self, and adapting to a changing definition of self.
Current virus knowledge [KeA94] concludes that the use of byte patterns is an effective

method for detecting a broad variety of conceivable mutations for a particular virus with
a low false positive probability. To confirm this, MERCURY'S learning component was
programmed to extract, manipulate, and test byte patterns from various files. Testing
concluded that the learning component, using features composed of byte patterns, was
able to distinguish between self and nonself files with varying degrees of accuracy.
Therefore, it can be concluded that byte patterns can be used as the basis of a constructive
induction based computer virus detector.
The second sub-hypothesis was the Constructive Operator Hypothesis:

Constructive Operator Hypothesis
Logical and spatial operators can be used for
constructing new attributes for the computer virus detector.

This hypothesis validated that the choice of operators was "adequate" to construct
new features, better distinguishing between infected and uninfected data. Current virus
knowledge [KeA94] confirms the applicability of using relative and absolute locations of
virus characteristics in a file, and the presence of multiple virus characteristics throughout
one file to detect viruses. To confirm this, MERCURY'S learning component was
programmed to manipulate the byte patterns from various files based on two types of
operators, logical and spatial. The logical operators AND, OR and XOR accounted for
multiple, or restricted virus characteristics, whereas the spatial operators BEFORE and
DISTANCE accounted for the positions of virus characteristics. Testing concluded that
the learning component, using logical and spatial operators, was able to distinguish

between self and nonself files with varying degrees of accuracy. Therefore, it can be
concluded that logical and spatial operators can be used for constructing new features for
the computer virus detector.
The two sub-hypotheses are not independent. A stable definition of self, and the
ability to distinguish between self and nonself are dependent on a combination of virus
features and constructive operators. The difficulty of this problem is large due to the
complexity caused by increasing the number of operators, features or both. The
combination of these system parameters results in a large number of constructed
attributes; therefore, some limitations were established. Evaluating these two subhypotheses separately and together resulted in a more effective basis for supporting the
primary hypothesis. More importantly, the results of these sub-hypotheses provide the
empirical analysis needed to improve the effectiveness of the overall learning process.

1.4.

Approach

This research contained three phases: model building, prototype development, and
testing and analyses. The first phase built two computer models, the Computer Health
System and the individual computer immune system. This modeling derived, by analogy,
the important properties, functions, and requirements for the two computer models from
the public health system and human immune system, respectively. The relationship
between the two models is depicted in Figure 2.
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Once modeling phase was complete, the second phase designed and developed the
prototype MERCURY, capturing the essence of the individual computer immune model.
MERCURY encompasses the human immune properties of detection, adaptation, and
memory, and is comprised of three components: the virus scanner; the learning engine,
HEC; and the knowledge base.
The third phase included the testing and analyses of MERCURY. This system
was trained on several computer files representative of self and nonself files on a
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computer. The expected output was a set of byte patterns that could distinguish between
self and nonself files. Testing of MERCURY was accomplished through two groups of
test cases. The first group tested whether byte patterns, the rules combining the byte
patterns, and the constructive operators used to construct new features from these byte
patterns were applicable in the constructive induction approach to virus detection. The
second group tested whether constructive induction provides a suitable learning
mechanism for the virus detector system of an individual computer system. Additionally,
the overall results were studied in order to focus this learning method, reducing its
computational complexity.

1.5.

Scope

There are two methods of infection in the human body, intracellular and
extracellular. Intracellular infections in the body are similar to abnormal byte patterns in
a file since determination of an infection requires the "extraction" of information from a
computer's version of a cell, the file. Conversely, extracellular infections, which are not
attributed to a specific cell, are analogous to the detection of viruses through heuristic
tests and analyses of system calls and abnormal system activity. MERCURY focused on
the intracellular type of infection in the computer immune system, based on the method
in which the virus infects the file, and the system's response to the infection.
Instead of focusing efforts on implementing a fully operational virus detection
component, the focus of this research was the application of constructive induction to the
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virus detection domain. This research investigated the design and initial development of
the adaptation mechanism based on this from of machine learning. This initial
development included the choice of distinguishing features, selective induction rules, and
constructive induction operators. Additionally, this research focused on improving the
computational complexity of the learning process, in order to increase the applicability of
this form of learning.
This research recognized specific machine learning improvements that could be
applied to current methods of virus detection, in order to improve performance. It also
presented the incorporation of this constructive induction component into an individual
computer's immune system, and further incorporated this system into an overall global
picture of computer health.

1.6.

Thesis Overview

During this investigation, two computer immune models were presented: the
Computer Health System and the computer immune system. MERCURY, the virus
detection component of an individual computer immune system, was prototyped by
integrating a constructive induction engine, HEC, with a virus scanning program, and a
knowledge base.
This document provides a discussion of this research effort, beginning in Chapter
Two with a literature review of viruses, virus detection methods, constructive induction,
and machine learning applications. Chapter Three provides an overview of the human
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immune system and the public health system, presents previous research in the area of
computer immunology, introduces the models of the Computer Health System and the
computer immune system, and presents the virus detection component, MERCURY.
Chapter Four provides insight into MERCURY'S design methodology, followed by a
detailed discussion of its design and implementation in Chapter Five. Chapter Six
presents the results of the system testing. Finally, Chapter Seven presents the conclusion
that a constructive induction approach to computer immunology could improve computer
virus detection. Additionally, Chapter Seven presents the conclusion that a computer
immune system should be recognized and incorporated as a valuable component in a
higher-level Computer Health System. This chapter also provides areas for future
research within the various domains of computer immunology, machine learning, and
virus detection.

14

2.

2.1.

Literature Review

Overview

This chapter presents the background knowledge needed to develop the
constructive induction based computer virus detection component, MERCURY. The first
section introduces computer viruses by describing their function and structure, and
reviewing the different types of viruses known to infect computer systems today. The
next section elaborates on the current methods used for virus detection and pinpoints
some of their inadequacies. The last sections describe various machine learning methods,
specifically the method of constructive induction used by MERCURY, as well as current
research trends, which use other types of machine learning in computer security and
intrusion detection applications.
Chapter Three provides additional background knowledge in human immunology
and public health needed to build the two computer models. It presents the Computer
Health System, and the computer immune system of which MERCURY is a component.
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2.2.

Computer Viruses

Solid technical knowledge is the foundation for all viral defenses [Lud98]. To
build an effective virus detector, an understanding of virus structure, function and
behavior is needed. The following sections describe computer viruses by classifying the
different types commonly encountered today, defining their functions, and examining
their different structures and infection methods.

2.2.1. Definition and Structure

A computer virus is a block of executable code that attaches itself to, overwrites,
or replaces another program in order to reproduce itself without the knowledge of the
user [NCSA96]. Computer viruses replicate by attaching to a host, usually a program or
computer, and utilizing the host's resources to make copies of themselves. Computer
viruses spread from computer to computer, in the same way that biological viruses spread
among individual members of society [KSCW97].
A typical computer virus performs two functions. First, it copies itself into
previously uninfected programs or files. Second, it executes the payload, or the intent of
the virus. Common viral payload effects include deleting files, modifying files,
displaying messages on-screen, or updating programs. Payloads can be damaging,
amusing, or possibly even useful, but nevertheless unwanted and uncontrolled. A virus
may cause damage by replicating itself and taking up scarce resources, such as disk
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space, CPU time, or network connections [WCC89]. A virus requires manual
intervention to begin its infection, but will continue to automatically infect programs
once it is started [Che97].
Every computer virus contains must contain at least two routines, search and copy
[Lud98]. The search routine locates new files or disks as targets for infection, determines
which resource to infect and how often infection will occur. The virus' copy routine
copies the virus into the resource, located by the search routine. There is a size vs.
functionality tradeoff, though; the more sophisticated these routines are, the more space
they will take up, easing detection.
In addition to these two routines, some computer viruses contain anti-detection
routines. These routines vary in complexity, from keeping the date in a file the same
upon infection to camouflaging the virus completely. Most viruses may contain
destructive routines, which carry out the possibly malicious "intent" of the virus. [Lud98]

2.2.2. Classification Methods

Viruses can be classified according to the following characteristics: environment,
operating system, different algorithms at work, and destructive capabilities. The
following table provides a cursory overview of these types.
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Table 1 - Classification of Viruses

a
§
s

.2

C

1

Infect executables in various ways, create file doubles, or use file
system specific features.
Save themselves in the disk boot sector or to the Master Boot
Record, or change the pointer to an active boot sector.
Infect document files, spreadsheets and databases of several
Macro Viruses popular software packages
~
Use protocols and commands of computer network or email to
Network
spread
themselves.
Viruses
Infects a computer and leaves its resident part in RAM, which
TSR Capability interrupts system calls to target objects and incorporates into them.
Allows viruses to completely or partially cover their traces inside
the operating system. The most common use is the interception of
Stealth
operating read/write calls to infected objects; stealth viruses
Algorithms
"substitute themselves with uninfected pieces of information.
Hard
to detect due to absence of signatures; none of their code
Self Encryption
fragments
remain unchanged. This may be achieved by encrypting
and
the main body of the virus and making modifications to the
Polymorphic
decryption routine.
Capability
Used to hide viruses deep within the operating system kernel;
Non-standard
protects against detection and more difficult to remove.
Techniques
Have no effect on computing, except for a lowering of free space
Harmless
because of propagation and reduction in CPU utilization.
Limit their effect to lowering free disk space and a few graphical,
Not Dangerous sound or other functions.
Can seriously disrupt the computer's work.
Dangerous
Contain routines that may lead to the loss of data, data destruction,
Very Dangerous and erasure of vital information in system areas.

File
Infector Viruses
Boot
Sector Viruses

2.2.3. Types

Further classification of computer viruses can be accomplished according to the
types of programs they infect and the method of infection employed [Lud98]. One such
classification is between boot sector infectors and file infectors. Other viral types include
macro viruses, stealth viruses, and polymorphic viruses. The following sections describe
some of these common viruses. The file infector viruses are explained in detail, since
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they are the type of virus MERCURY was developed to detect. This is information is
needed for determining the best methods for extracting byte patterns from the files, the
best operators for combining the byte patterns, and the overall knowledge needed for
applying constructive induction to this domain.

2.2.3.1.

File Infector

File infector viruses affect the program files that a system must load in order to
make software function. When the program executes, the virus code executes and infects
more files [Lud98]. According to this method of infecting files, viruses are divided into
overwriting, parasitic, companion and link viruses [Kas99].
The overwriting method of infection is the simplest; the virus overwrites the
contents of a target executable with its own code, destroying the original contents of the
target file. The executable file stops working properly and can not be restored.
Parasitic viruses are file viruses that change the byte ordering within target files
while transferring copies of themselves, but the files themselves remain at least partially
usable. These parasitic viruses can be "prepending," by saving themselves at the top of
file; "appending," by saving themselves at the end of file; "inserting," by inserting
themselves in the middle of file; or "cavity," by copying of its own code to such parts of
the file which are known to be unused. [Kas99]
Virus incorporation at the top of a file is the most widely used method of insertion
into DOS *.bat ,*.com and *.exe files [Kas99]. There are two known methods of
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inserting a parasitic file virus at the top of file. The first involves copying the top of the
target file to the end of file and then copying the virus body to the free space at the top of
file. In the second method the virus creates a copy of itself in RAM, appends the target
file and then saves the resulting concatenation to disk.
Another common method of virus incorporation into a file is appending the virus
to the end of file. In this method, the virus must also change the top of file so that the
virus code is executed first. In DOS *.com files, this is achieved by changing the first
several bytes to the instruction codes or to the address of the routine passing control to
the body of virus.
The final method of insertion into a file involves incorporating the virus into the
middle of the file. In the simplest case the virus "spreads" the file by moving fragments
of the file to the end and then writes its own code into the free space. Some viruses will
even compress their inserted fragments so that the file size remains unchanged. A more
difficult method is called "cavity" insertion, where a virus copies itself to unused areas of
the file.
The last two file infector viruses are companion and link. Companion viruses are
another type of file infector virus that do not change the infected files. They operate by
creating a copy of the target file and replacing the original with itself. When the target
file executes, the virus gets the control instead of the original file. Link viruses, like
companion viruses, do not change the physical contents of files. However, when an
infected file is executed, they "force" the operating system to execute their virus code by
modifying the necessary fields of the file system.
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2.2.3.2.

Boot Sector

Boot sector viruses infect the boot sector of a disk, affecting the computer system
during the start-up process. The boot sector is a small area on a disk that is read by the
computer when it is booted. This virus' operating principal is based on the algorithms of
starting an operation system upon power on or reboot. After the necessary hardware tests
for memory and disks are run, the system loader routine reads the first physical sector of
a boot disk and passes the control to it [Kas99]. These viruses are difficult to deal with
because they are executed during the start-up process, before the system is able to load its
antivirus software [Lud98].

2.2.3.3.

Macro viruses

Macro viruses are programs written in macro languages built into some
application programs, for example, spreadsheets. To propagate, these viruses use the
capabilities of macro languages to help transfer themselves from one infected document
or spreadsheet to another. Macro viruses for Microsoft Word, Microsoft Excel and
Microsoft Office are the most common. A macro virus is possible if the macro language
built into a system has the following capabilities: a macro program must be tied to a
particular file, macro programs must have the ability to be copied from one file to
another, and a macro program must be able to receive control without user intervention.
[Kas99]
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They are the first viruses to infect data files, rather than executables. Data files, to
which macros are attached, provide viruses with a more effective replication method than
executable files. The effects of macro viruses are growing; data files are exchanged far
more frequently than executable files, through e-mail and the Internet.

2.2.3.4.

Network

Network viruses utilize networking protocols and the capabilities of local and
global access networks to multiply. Their main operating principle is the capability to
transfer viral code to a remote server or workstation. "Full-scale" network viruses also
have the ability to run their code on remote computers and "trick" users to run the
infected files. [Kas99]

2.2.3.5.

Other Types

Other viruses are not as well understood as the types mentioned previously. They
are trickier in their methods of avoiding virus detection, and present great problems to
antivirus analysts and programmers. These types of viruses would not be recognized by
the current scanning and analyzing techniques of MERCURY.
One of these more complicated viruses is the stealth virus. A stealth virus
attempts to evade detection by concealing itself in infected files. To achieve this, the
virus intercepts system calls that examine the contents or attributes of infected files. The
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results of these calls are altered to correspond to the file's original uninfected state. For
example, a stealth virus might remove the virus code from an executable when it is read,
instead of executed, so that an antivirus program will examine the original, uninfected
host program. [Lud98]
Another tricky virus is the polymorphic virus. These viruses are programmed to
change their internal code each time they replicate, making them more resistant to
detection. Their main component is the polymorphic generator, which is responsible for
creating varying encryption and decryption routines. These routines are used to hide the
existence of the virus by constantly changing the byte signature of the virus [Kas99].
Since the most common method of virus detection is scanning for viral byte patterns, as
in MERCURY, the detection program would likely be easily defeated. If you take two
instances of the same polymorphic virus, there are no bytes in common between them.
MERCURY, like most viral scanners would not be able to capture a unique byte pattern,
in order to detect this ever-changing virus.

2.3.

Antivirus Programs

Antivirus programs are the most effective means of fighting viruses, but there are
no antivirus programs that guarantee 100 % protection from viruses [AAV97]. Such
programs do not exist because for each antivirus algorithm, it is always possible to
suggest a virus "counter" algorithm; however, the opposite is also true. For any virus
algorithm, it is always possible to create an antivirus; the cycle never stops! Furthermore,
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the impossible existence of the absolute antivirus program has been mathematically
proven by Fred Cohen, based on the theory of finite slot machines [AAV97].
As futile as it may seem, it is important to study viruses in order to uncover their
weaknesses. Once these vulnerabilities are discovered, antivirus methods can be
exploited, and virus detection improved. The following sections describe detection
issues, current antivirus methods, their functions and their deficiencies.
When speaking of virus detection methods, it is necessary to understand some
terms used in this discussion. A "false positive" is defined as an uninfected object, in the
case of MERCURY, a self file, that triggers the antivirus program inadvertently.
Conversely, a "false negative" is defined as an infected object that remained undetected
by the detection system. "On-demand scanning" refers to virus scanning that starts on
the user's request; if fully implemented, MERCURY would exhibit this characteristic. In
this mode the antivirus program remains inactive until the user invokes it from command
line, batch file or system scheduler. "On-the-fly scanning" methods, however, are
constantly checking for viruses. In this method, the antivirus program is always active; it
resides permanently in memory and checks objects, without the user's request. [AAV97]

2.3.1. Purpose

Computer viruses are detected by antivirus programs through the exact or "fuzzy"
pattern recognition of a sequence of bytes called a signature, suspicious changes to files,
or heuristic monitoring of "normal" viral activity. A powerful antivirus program would
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likely use a combination of these techniques. In addition to detecting the existence of a
virus, some antivirus programs are responsible for repairing the damage caused by
viruses [Kep94].
Typically, a "virus expert" obtains information about a particular virus by
disassembling it and analyzing the assembly code to determine the virus' behavior and
the method used to attach it to a host program. When the analyst has precise knowledge
of the virus' attachment method, he can construct repair algorithms for a large class of
similar viruses. This implies the virus has probably already infected files, possibly
destroying data. Additionally, this reactive, labor intensive process requires manual
intervention.
This research builds a computer immune model as part of a larger computer
health model, and hypothesizes that constructive induction may offer an approach to
detecting computer viruses that is both proactive and automated. Machine learning
potentially provides the automation, while focusing on the self that belongs on the
computer. Suspicion of the nonself may provide the insulation against the invaders.
Since this research is only concerned with detection of viruses and not the repair of the
damage, the following sections address the methods of detection currently used.

2.3.2. Requirements

The effectiveness and efficiency of an antivirus program is determined and can be
measured by its reliability, quality of detection, and speed of completion. [AAV97]
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The reliability of antivirus programs is the most important criterion, because even
the best detector becomes useless if it cannot finish the scanning process. Reliability
measures the ability of the program to finish the scanning process without unnecessary
technical intervention from the user. If the program is unable to finish, parts of the disks
and files will remain unchecked, possibly leaving a virus in the system undetected. Since
MERCURY is not a fully functional virus detection system, this requirement could not be
fully assessed.
Virus detection quality is the next requirement, since the main purpose of an
antivirus program is to detect and remove viruses. Any antivirus program is useless if it is
unable to catch viruses, or does it with low quality. The "perfect" detector would have a
very high detection rate, accompanied by low false positive and false negative rates. If
an antivirus program causes many false positives errors, then its level of usefulness drops
significantly. This situation would cause the user to either delete uninfected files or
analyze suspicious files, triggering frequent false alarms.
MERCURY was designed to favor detectors that classified a large number of files
correctly. Additionally, the overall set of detectors was evaluated to ensure that the entire
set of files was classified. The quality measures for each detector are supplemented by
the quality measures for the set of detectors, which rate the percentage of files classified
by the entire set of detectors. Due to the MERCURY'S "infancy," assumptions about the
quality of detection would be premature. The detailed results of the testing are presented
in Chapter Six.
The next important criterion is working speed. If a full system check requires
several hours to complete, it is unlikely that most users are going to run it frequently.
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Currently, a disadvantage to MERCURY is its time to completion. However, several
optimization methods are presented in Chapters Six and Seven that could attenuate this
deficiency.

2.3.3. Types

The most popular and effective antivirus programs are scanners. They are
followed by integrity monitors because of their effectiveness and popularity. Most of the
time, though, both of these methods are combined into one versatile and more powerful
antivirus program [AAV97]. The following sections describe these different methods.

2.3.3.1.

Scanners

The principle operation of antivirus scanners is based on checks of files, sectors
and system memory, and search for known and new, unknown viruses [AAV97]. A
scanner recognizes viruses through an exact or fuzzy match of a relatively short sequence
of bytes occurring in the virus called a "signature." Matching a small portion of the virus
is more efficient in time and memory, and it enables the system to recognize variants.
The signature is determined through a manual and tedious analysis of the viral code by
virus experts. In addition, once the new signature is determined, the database of
signatures is updated, requiring each user to manually update the local copy of the
database on a regular basis. Between updates, though, users may be left exposed to
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spreading viruses. Researchers at the High Integrity Computing Laboratory [KeA94]
investigated methods for automating this process. Their computer immune system
generated byte patterns that detected nonself and stored them for the scanner. MERCURY
also uses this method ofantivirus detection. Scanning was chosen over the other
detection methods due to its programmability, modifiability, simplicity, and functionality.
This research recognizes that signature scanning is only a part of a robust virus checker;
the scanning method was utilized as a tool for the proof-of-concept of constructive
induction applied to the virus detection domain.
Scanners are divided into resident programs that work on-the-fly; and nonresident programs that check the system only on request. In most cases, resident scanners
provide better system protection, because of their immediate reaction to the appearance
of virus, whereas nonresident scanners can only detect viruses when executed [AAV97].
Scanners, including MERCURY, have the common advantage of versatility, and
common disadvantages of large virus databases and relative slowness of virus search.

2.3.3.2.

Integrity Monitors

Integrity monitors operate by calculating checksums for disk files and system
sectors. These checksums are saved to a database along with data about file sizes and the
dates of last modification. On subsequent runs integrity monitors compare database
information with currently calculated values. If the database entry for a file differs from
the file's current characteristics, the integrity monitor reports file modification or possible
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virus infection [AAV97]. While this method can determine if a file is changed, it
provides no information on the legitimacy of the change.
Integrity monitors cannot catch a virus immediately after its infiltration. Rather, it
detects after a period of time, when the virus has already spread throughout the computer.
Additionally, this method cannot detect viruses in newly arrived files, like e-mail
attachments, since these files do not have a baseline checksum.

2.3.3.3.

Behavior Blockers

Antivirus behavior blockers are memory resident programs that intercept potential
virus danger and warn the user about it. Virus danger may be detected during write calls
to executable files, boot sector writes or during operations that may be conducive for
viruses to spread. [AAV97]
Blockers are able to spot and block the virus at the earliest stage of infection,
which is useful when a virus repeatedly launches surprise attacks. However, the
challenges to this method are virus algorithms that override a blocker's protection and a
possibility of a large number of false alarms. There are some improved versions of
blockers with greater versatility, but they also have problems of compatibility with
standard hardware configuration of computers, and are difficult to set up and configure.
All these reasons make behavior blockers extremely unpopular compared to other
methods of antivirus protection.
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2.4.

Machine Learning Methods

An important issue in artificial intelligence is machine learning, which enables
machines to adapt, in order to improve their performance [ABKS94]. Machine learning
research can be divided into five areas: neural networks, genetic algorithms, instance
based learning, analytic learning and inductive learning [LaS95]. Neural networks
attempt to model the structure of the brain by representing knowledge as a multilayer
network of units that spreads activation from input nodes through internal units to output
nodes [LaS95]. Genetic algorithms model the process of chromosome mutation through
a series of rules generated by combining and/or mutating aspects of existing rules.
Instance based learning uses a database of specific cases and experiences that are
matched to general problems. Analytic learning uses logic to solve a problem by proving
it from the supplied background knowledge. Collections of these proofs are then
compiled into rules used to solve similar problems. Finally, inductive learning attempts
to search for the combination of rules and attributes that best describe the problem that is
represented as a series of examples, both positive and negative.
The following sections focus on inductive learning, specifically constructive
induction, since this method of induction will be used as the learning mechanism for
MERCURY. The application of this learning method, and the components and processes
of constructive induction used for the design, development and implementation of
MERCURY are detailed in Chapter Five.
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2.4.1. Inductive Learning

Induction is a form of automated machine learning that derives knowledge from
the observation of positive and negative examples of a concept. It attempts to
characterize this concept by carefully selecting attributes, which are characteristics
describing the examples, and, when necessary, constructing new, more useful, attributes.
By characterizing the concept, this type of learning explains the given examples and is
useful for predicting the class membership of subsequent unseen examples. The goal of
the constructive induction process is either characteristic learning or discrimination.
Characteristic learning is the ability to describe the examples. Discrimination is the
ability to distinguish between positive and negative examples [Gun91]. MERCURY'S
learning component uses the discrimination form of induction to distinguish between self
and nonself files on a computer system.
Inductive learning performs a series of manipulations that determines the best
attributes needed to describe the current example set and distinguish between positive and
negative examples. The end result of inductive learning is a description known as a
hypothesis, a statement relating descriptive attributes of a concept to values those
attributes assume in examples of the concept. A hypothesis indicates an approximation
of the concept, subject to change, should future examples indicate it is incorrect.
Collectively, these hypotheses form a rule base to describe the concept.
There are two forms of inductive learning: selective induction and constructive
induction. For example, age, height, and weight can be the attributes to describe an
instance of a person. To characterize the concept of "AFIT students," students would be
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used as positive examples and non-students as negative examples. Based on the attribute
values of both the examples and counterexamples, a hypothesis could be made which
separates students from non-students. If this can be accomplished by carefully selecting
from the original attributes, this process is known as selective induction. If the original
attributes are insufficient for this task, then new, more useful attributes are constructed;
hence, the term constructive induction. In the previous example, if weight and height
were insufficient attributes to characterize the concept of AFIT students, a new attribute
could be constructed by combining one or more of them. For example, the new attribute
could be BMI, Body Mass Index, which is calculated using weight and height. The final
collection of hypotheses that best describes the concept forms the rule base. The
following sections describe the components of an induction system and the two forms of
inductive learning.

2.4.1.1.

Components of Induction

An induction system is composed of several components: a representation of the
problem, a set of examples that are described by the representation, rules that are used to
construct new hypotheses, and background knowledge called bias. Selective and
constructive induction differ by the process each uses to generate hypotheses. Selective
induction is highly limited and the construction occurs in the build up of the final
representation.
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Representation is how the world is presented to the system. There are two key
components of a representation: attributes and representation structure. Attributes are
normally defined by inspection of the problem domain and information gained from
experts. For example, the attributes used in this virus detection domain problem are bytes
from a file. Determining the "best" attributes that allow the induction to work properly is
the most important representation issue for inductive systems. This can be a complicated
process, since the proper attributes may not be readily apparent to either the system
developer or domain experts. There are varieties of different representation structures
that can be used for maintaining the attributes inside of the system. Common methods
include predicate calculus, decision trees, semantic networks and frames. [DiM81]
The importance of choosing the right attributes in the early stages of learning is a
crucial concept in the implementation of MERCURY. Though not a fully developed
constructive induction engine, MERCURY should benefit tremendously from prior
knowledge of the virus domain, as well as the performance of features and operators used
for the construction of new attributes.
An example set is used to initially train the system. Since induction relies upon
examples to test if the system has generated an appropriate hypothesis, the types of
examples used are important. The example set can normally be divided into two
categories, each with two subcategories. The first division should divide the examples
into a category used for training and a category used for testing. Training examples are
used to perform the induction process. Testing examples are utilized to analyze how
effective the process really was. Both training and testing example sets should include
positive and negative examples. Negative examples should include examples that are
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both very different from and very close to the positive examples, in order to "fit" the best
rule for defining the concept.
The number of examples needed is an important decision. The probability
distribution describing the problem space is often difficult to determine for several
reasons. The experimenter may have limited knowledge of the concept; the number of
possible examples may be limited; or there may be an improper division of the example
set, resulting in a statistically different distribution than the problem space.
Selecting the induction rules utilized by the system is also an important factor.
These rules guide the selection of appropriate hypotheses, which form the best rule base.
The varieties of inductive rules are subsequently discussed in the hypothesis generation
section.
Bias is any factor that influences the hypotheses that are generated and evaluated.
This factor is intrinsic to the inductive process, based upon the incorporation of the
representation and the inductive algorithms utilized. Bias is information developed
through common sense or derived by expert knowledge about the concept domain; it can
decrease the time the system spends working with hypotheses that are later discarded.
Bias is a domain specific issue and can rarely be generalized to all systems. [Pro92]
A bias can affect the learning time, space usage and accuracy of the system.
Therefore, when choosing a bias the developer must make certain tradeoffs among the
factors of the system. One tradeoff is the accuracy of learning versus the learning time.
For example, as the number of attributes available to the system increases, so does the
induction learning time. Another tradeoff is accuracy of learning versus the efficiency of
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space usage. A bias, such as a limiting the number of hypotheses, may inadvertently
discarded the correct solution. [Pro92]

2.4.1.2.

Selective Induction

Selective induction determines a combination of attributes that best describes the
concept. Selective induction hypotheses are limited to applying the conjunction,
disjunction, and negation operators to the given attributes. The conjunction operator joins
two or more propositions through a logical and; both propositions must be true for the
conjunction to be true. The disjunction operator joins two or more propositions through a
logical or, one of the propositions must be true for the disjunction to be true. Finally, the
negation operator states that a particular proposition can not be included in the concept.
The selective induction process does not create new attributes, but instead combines
existing ones. Selective induction generalizes conjuncts of attribute values or partitions
instance space into contiguous regions. Conversely, constructive induction transforms
the original representation by associating diverse conjuncts or dispersed regions that may
appear unrelated [Ren90].

2.4.1.3.

Constructive Induction

Constructive induction, like selective induction, determines a combination of
attributes that best describes the concept. However, the constructive inductive process
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creates hypotheses by constructing new attributes. The process applies a variety of
operators to the original attributes from the representation. These hypotheses are tested
against the example set and incorporated into the rule base, if appropriate. The following
sections describe the processes necessary to develop a constructive induction based
learning mechanism.
2.4.1.3.1.

The Constructive Induction Process

As previously stated, inductive learning depends on the ability of the machine to
create hypotheses, indicating an approximation of the concept. Gunsch [Gun91]
describes a framework for the inductive learning process that follows the path of
hypotheses through the inductive system. The following sections describe the four
processes of induction.
Hypothesis generation. The first step of the inductive learning process is the
creation of new hypotheses based on current rules and attributes. Prior knowledge about
the concept can help to explicitly define the hypotheses, or to guide the selection or
retraction of operators to create new rules. An application of bias includes simplifying
conjunctive rules, turning constants into variables, extending the range of an attribute,
combining the attribute value intervals, and creating new rules that include exceptions.
An exception can be found by looking for positive and negative examples that use similar
attributes. For example if a positive example is described by P(x) and a negative example
by P(x) A Q(x) the exception is P(x) A -.Q(X) [DiM81]. Other methods to induce rules
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involve applying mathematical operators (+,-,*,/) or logical operators

(A,V,-I)

to the

attributes used in the representation.
Hypothesis ordering. Hypothesis ordering takes the generated hypotheses and
performs a preliminary check to ensure that only the most promising of the hypotheses
are evaluated. This step is a "heuristic, beam-sort approach and therefore does not
guarantee perfect filtering" [Gun91]. The main purpose of this step is to limit the number
of hypotheses to be evaluated, since hypothesis evaluation is an expensive process. This
is a form of bias necessary to control the computational explosion generated by this
learning method. Biases made during the development of MERCURY'S learning
component are discussed in Chapter Five.
Hypothesis evaluation. During hypothesis evaluation, each hypothesis is tested
against the goal of the system to determine if it should be used. As described earlier, the
goal of the constructive induction system is either characteristic learning or
discrimination of positive and negative examples. If the hypothesis adequately meets the
goal, then it is reserved for incorporation into the rule base. For example, hypotheses
generated by MERCURY'S learning component are evaluated based on their purity and
power scores. Power measures the strength of the hypothesis by rating the percentage of
classified examples over the entire set of examples, regardless of correctness. Purity
calculates the percentage of examples classified correctly, over the total number of
examples classified. If the hypothesis does not meet the goal, it is discarded or returned
to the hypothesis generation step for additional inductive refinement. This step is
computationally expensive since every hypothesis must be compared against all the
members of the example set.
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Hypothesis incorporation. In the final step, those hypotheses that have been
determined to meet the system goals are incorporated into the rule base. The hypotheses
are arranged within the rule base in the order they reduce entropy. Entropy is the amount
of disorder remaining within the divisions of the examples after applying a hypothesis or
group of hypotheses.

2.5.

Machine Learning Applied to Detection and Recognition

Machine learning can help solve difficult, real-world problems which have welldefined tasks, implemented programs, and identified principles [Win92]. Intrusion
detection, is one such problem; there are many applications of machine learning in
computer security systems. The following sections describe the use of different machine
learning methods to detect or recognize intruders, such as hackers or viruses, in computer
systems.

2.5.1. Incremental Learning Applied to Computer Intrusion Detection

Research conducted at the George Mason University [MaM95] describes an
incremental learning method, which modifies the current hypotheses set by combining
past training examples with new ones. The proposed method is incremental because
additional examples are incorporated into the training set over time. For this study, the
process was applied to the domain of intrusion detection in computer systems. This
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domain was chosen computer systems needs to interact with users and the environment to
adapt to changing conditions and behaviors. Researchers believe this method to be
effective for applications involving intelligent agents in a changing environment, active
vision, and dynamic knowledge bases.
The first phase of the methodology is traditional for the learning by examples
method. It involved building an adequate training set, which provided the learning
mechanism a sufficient concept of the computer environment. The second phase
involved incrementally teaching the machine and customizing the concept to the specific
environment of a particular user. The system received reinforcement or criticism from
the user and/or environment. This approach uses feedback from the user or environment
to determine training examples.
Concerns when applying this method are similar to concerns when a learning by
example approach is taken. The choice of representative examples and the maintenance
of these examples throughout the learning process are both important issues. Attributes
considered important in the early stages of learning might not be important in later stages;
more importantly, attributes considered unimportant in the early stages of learning might
be important in later stages. For a rapidly changing domain, it is probably more
beneficial to replace "old" attributes with "new and improved" attributes. For a more
stable environment, it might be more practical to keep all attributes.
Compared to a batch method of providing all examples at once, the proposed
method yielded significant gains in regard to learning time and memory requirements, but
lost some predictive accuracy and gained concept complexity. Though the experiment
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was scaled down significantly, future work will involve applying this method to more
complex problems.
MERCURY does not allow for incremental learning, but future iterations should.
Virus detection, like intrusion detection, requires a degree of interaction with users and
the environment to adapt to constantly changing conditions and behaviors. Future
versions of MERCURY should allow for relearning when the definition of self changes,
the system learns incorrectly, or the system receives virus prevention or detection
information from other components in the Computer Health System.

2.5.2. Neural Networks Applied to Computer Virus Detection

Researchers at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center [TKS96] developed a
neural network for the detection of boot sector viruses, which was deployed
commercially, as part of the IBM Antivirus software package. The team faced several
challenges such as representation scheme, scarcity of training data, tradeoffs between
false positive and false negative errors, and memory and computational complexity
limitations.
They developed a representation scheme based on features of byte strings from
infected and non-infected files, and using frequency analysis, narrowed the list of features
to those whose probability of occurrence was higher. Their limited examples were
divided into training and testing sets, with additional "man-made" inputs to combat
generalization, or underlearning of the concept. For practical virus detection, more
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emphasis was placed on false positives, instead of false negatives; false positives are
much more frequent. Memory and CPU constraints were reduced through changes in
storage formats, but present future challenges to commercial use of larger mutilayer nets.
The neural net's performance performs as expected, having caught 75% of all
new boot sector viruses since its release. Most of the viruses not caught eluded the
system because their byte patterns were obscured in some way; improvements are
constantly being made.
Similar to the system developed at IBM, MERCURY relies heavily on a priori
knowledge. The results in Chapter Six show that statistical guidance can be used when
developing the learning mechanism, reducing computational complexity and improving
the method's efficiency.

2.5.3. Genetic Algorithms Applied to Recognition in the Immune System

Researchers [FJSP93] built a model to study the pattern recognition processes and
learning that take place in the immune system, with a genetic algorithm as its central
component. Antigens and antibodies, the major players in the human immune system
were represented as binary strings. An antibody matches an antigen if their bit strings are
complementary; however, the strings do not need to match exactly. Matching functions
were defined, evaluated on their matching abilities, and awarded a fitness value.
In principle, the genetic algorithm should be able to find the matches with the
highest fitness values by evolving a population of antibodies. Though there was much
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"noise" in the experiment, the algorithm was able to detect common patterns for
antibodies. It also did not overlearn the problem by maintaining diversity within its
population. This algorithm for maintaining diversity is related to the ordering and
evaluating mechanism commonly employed in learning classifier systems.
Again, this research stresses the importance of domain knowledge to guide the
learning process and improve the classification results.

2.6.

Summary

This chapter presented a description of the areas needed to develop a constructive
induction based computer virus detection system. The literature review described the
function, structure, and types of computer viruses and explained the inadequacies of the
current methods used for their detection. Another aspect of a virus detection system is
the learning mechanism, also discussed this chapter. It described machine learning
methods, focusing on the method of constructive induction. Current research areas
applying machine learning to computer security problems were also addressed.
Chapter Three describes the analogies that can be drawn between MERCURY,
the constructive induction based virus detector, and certain characteristics of the human
immune system. The chapter also describes how this computer immune system fits into a
larger model of a Computer Health System. Chapters Four and Five provide general and
detailed descriptions, respectively, of a constructive induction based computer virus
detector.
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3.

3.1.

Computer Immune Models

Overview

Chapter Two described current methods of virus detection, concepts of
constructive induction, and research trends utilizing machine learning for computer
security and detection. This chapter explains some analogies between computer systems
and human systems by comparing the mechanisms used for the local detection and global
protection against virus invaders. The two computer models are the Computer Health
System, based on public health system, and the computer immune system, based on the
human immune system. Therefore, the first two sections provide discussions of these
immunologically-based areas. In addition, research trends in the area of computer
immunology are addressed. Finally, the computer models are presented. Their
characteristics and components are defined individually, and their requirements are
discussed. Special attention is afforded to MERCURY, the virus detection component of
a computer immune system. Chapters Four and Five provide general and detailed
descriptions of MERCURY, respectively.
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3.2.

An Overview of the Public Health System

Public health is the science and art of preventing disease, prolonging life and
promoting health through an organized community effort responsible for: sanitizing the
environment, controlling communicable infections, educating the individual in personal
hygiene, organizing medical and nursing services for the early diagnosis and preventative
treatment of disease, and developing a standard of living adequate for the maintenance of
health. [Tur97]
The public health system is a social enterprise that utilizes current knowledge in
order to have the maximum impact on the health of a population. It identifies problems
that call for a preventative "team" approach to protect, promote, and improve health.
Public health is a collective effort to identify solutions that prevent and avoid health
problems.
Public health's prevention efforts in the form of social policies, community
actions and personal decisions are responsible for 25 years of the 30-year improvement in
life expectancy since 1900 [Tur97]. Economic benefits of the public health system can
be measured in terms of prevention treatment over cure treatment cost savings.

3.2.1. Functions of the Public Health System

The public health system has three core functions: assessment, policy
development and assurance, described in the following sections [Tur97].
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3.2.1.1.

Assessment

The public health system assesses the health needs of the community by
establishing a systematic process that periodically provides information on the health
status and health needs of the community. The system also investigates health hazards in
the community by conducting investigations that identify the magnitude of health
problems, duration, trends, location, and populations at risk. The third aspect of
assessment involves analyzing the elements of identified health needs in order to find
causes and contributing factors that place parts of the population at risk of adverse health
outcomes.

3.2.1.2.

Policy Development

This system function advocates public health, builds constituencies,
identifies resources in the community and generates relationships with public and private
agencies for the effective planning, implementation and management of public health
activities. The system must set priorities among health needs based on the size and
severity of the problems and the acceptability, economic feasibility and effectiveness of
intervention. Another aspect of this function is the development of plans and policies
addressing priority health needs and establishing goals and objectives that focus on local
community needs.
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3.2.1.3.

Assurance

The third function involves managing resources and developing organizational
structure through the acquisition, allocation, and control of human, physical, and fiscal
resources. This includes maximizing the operational functions of the local public health
system through the coordination of community agencies and efforts to avoid duplication
of services. The system must also implement programs and other arrangements to ensure
direct services for priority health needs identified in the community. Additionally, this
function must evaluate programs, provide quality assurance, ensure programs are
consistent with plans and policies, and provide feedback on inadequacies and changes.
Informing and educating the public on community health, promoting an awareness about
available public health services and promoting health education initiatives are an
important aspect of this function because they contribute to individual and collective
changes in health knowledge, attitudes, and practices.

3.2.2. The Public Health System Framework

To understand what public health represents and how the components relate to
each other, a conceptual and understandable framework is necessary. This framework
brings together the mission and functions of public health in relation to the inputs,
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processes, outputs, and outcomes of the system. The following table summarizes these
components [Tur97].
Table 2 -- Public Health System Components

Outputs or
Services

Community leadership, human resources, fiscal, and physical resources,
information resources, and system organization necessary to carry out
the core functions of public health
Organizational practices or processes that are necessary and sufficient to
ensure that the core functions ofpublic health are being carried out
efficiently
Health services intended to prevent death, disease, and disability and to
promote the quality of life

Outcomes or
Results

Indicators of health status, risk education, and quality-of-life
enhancement

Inputs or
Capacities
Practices or
Processes

The mission of the public health system is to promote physical and mental health
and prevent disease, injury and disability. The core functions of public health are
assessment, policy development, and assurance. The inputs carry out the core functions
through processes called public health practices. Inputs are subjected to these processes,
resulting in outputs, in the form of activities labeled as programs or services. Outputs are
intended to produce the desired results, characterized as health outcomes. Figure 3 shows
the framework for public health; it attempts to bridge the gap between what public health
is and does and how it does this. This framework tends to be very ambiguous and
abstract, even to those in the medical field; however, most recognize the need for some
type of formalization. The following sections examine several of the public health
components in detail.
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Public Health System
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Figure 3 - The Public Health Framework

3.2.2.1.

Infrastructure as an Input

Infrastructure can be described in terms of both static and dynamic attributes. In a
static representation, the public health infrastructure is the basic building block and
foundation for public health activities. In a more dynamic representation, the public
health infrastructure is the capacity or capability of that foundation to carry out its main
functions. The infrastructure serves as the nerve center of public health and represents
the capacity necessary to carry out the core functions.
The infrastructure can be broken down into individual components. Components
of the infrastructure are human resources, organizational resources, informational
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resources, and financial resources [Tur97]. The following table summarizes these
components.
Table 3 ■- Public Health Infrastructure Components
Human
Resources
Organizational
Resources
Informational
Resources
Financial
Resources

Include the workforce ofpublic health and their knowledge, skills, and
abilities
The relationships among the various system participants, public and
private, and the mechanisms that manage the system practices,
including their leadership components and collaborative strategies
Include the various data, information, and communication systems
The funding levels and sources for the work ofpublic health

The first of the components is the "workforce" of public health. The
organizations facilitate the contributions of the workforce. Organizations are groups of
individuals linked by common goals and objectives. This implies that each organization
has a specific mission or purpose, resources appropriate to work toward that purpose, the
ability to determine progress towards its goals and objectives, and defined process for
making decisions.
The relationships among the agencies, organizations, institutions, and individuals
are informal and collaborative rather than formalized and centrally directed. The
workforce, the organizations, and their leadership rely heavily on information for
identifying problems, determining interventions, and tracking progress toward common
objectives. Together, these essential components of the infrastructure formulate the
system's role in public health. [Tur97]
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3.2.2.2.

Essential Health Services as Practices

The following list summarizes the organizational practices that are necessary and
sufficient to ensure that the core functions of public health are being carried out
efficiently [Tur97].

1.

Monitor health status to identify community health problems

2.

Diagnose and investigate health problems and health hazards in the
community

3.

Inform, educate, and empower people about health issues

4.

Mobilize community partnerships to identify and solve health
problems

5.

Develop policies and plans that support individual and community
health efforts

6.

Enforce laws and regulations that protect health and ensure safety

7.

Link people with needed personal health services and ensure the
provision of health care when otherwise unavailable

8.

Assure a competent public health and personal health care
workforce

9.

Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of personal and
population-based health services

10.

Research for new insights and innovative solutions to health
problems
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3.2.2.3.

Health Care Delivery as a Practice

The supply of health care resources is another important component of the public
health system. The growing numbers and types of health delivery systems reflect the
recent changing environment. Increasing competition, combined with cost containment
initiatives, has led to the generation of group medical practices, health maintenance
organizations, preferred provider organizations, ambulatory surgery centers and
emergency centers. Many of these delivery system have used managed-care strategies
and methods that seek to control the utilization of services to reduce costs. [Tur97]

3.2.2.4.

Prevention as a Practice

One of the most important features of public health is its reliance on prevention.
Prevention characterizes actions that are taken to reduce the possibility of something
happening, or minimize the damage if it does happen. Prevention is considered by many
to be the purpose of public health.
Prevention intervention strategies are divided into three types: primary,
secondary, and tertiary [Tur97]. Primary prevention involves the prevention of the actual
disease or injury, by reducing the exposure or risk level factors. Secondary prevention
attempts to identify and control disease processes in their early stages, before symptoms
are apparent. Tertiary prevention seeks to prevent disability by restoring individuals to
their optimal level of functioning following some kind of damage. Intervention at the

51

primary, secondary, and tertiary levels is a dependant upon knowledge, resources,
acceptability, effectiveness, and efficiency.

3.3.

An Overview of the Human Immune System

Immunology is the study of the body's resistance to invasion by other organisms.
The immune system uses several layers of defense to protect the body against invaders,
known as pathogens. Initial barriers to infection are the skin and physiological barriers
such as pH and temperature. If the pathogens are able to get past these barriers, they
must be dealt with by another layer of the immune system. This section provides an
engineer's perspective of this immune system layer by describing system components,
types of immunity, immunological functions, processes used to perform these functions,
and challenges to the immune system.

3.3.1. Immune System Components

One of the major components of the immune system is the lymphocyte. These
white blood cells attack inflamed, infected cells. There are three major types of
lymphocytes involved in the immune response. Two of these cell types are "born" as the
same type of lymphoid cell and later differentiate in separate areas of the body. One line
matures in the thymus and is referred to as a T cell, while the other line matures in the
bone marrow and is called a B cell. These two types differ greatly in function, yet both
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have a similar purpose: to recognize and react to specific pathogen targets in the body.
Lymphocytes are constantly circulating in the bloodstream and the lymphoid tissues,
allowing a rapid sampling of all cells that might possess "receptors" for pathogens, or the
ability to "bind to" pathogens.
Antigen-presenting cells (APC) are the third type of lymphocytes that participate
in the immune response. Although these cells do not have receptors as the T and B cells
do, they are still actively involved in the immune process. Their function is to "process"
the pathogen from inside a cell, and "present" it on the surface, making the pathogen
"visible" to the T and B cells [BSL96]. The following table summarizes the
responsibilities of these three types of lymphocytes discussed in the following sections.
Table 4 -- Immune System Lymphocytes
B Cells
T Cells
APC Cells

Responsible for the production of antibodies, which enhance and activate
various capabilities of the immune system
Responsible for regulating antibody production and cellular immune
reactions, and killing infectious cells
Responsible for processing and presenting antigens on the cell's surface
for recognition by other immune cells

3.3.1.1.

B Cells

These cells develop in the bone marrow and produce antibodies, or protein
molecules that enhance and activate various capabilities of the immune system.
Antibodies mark infected cells for attack by other immune cells. This is the simplest
immune response, yet very rapid and effective. Additionally, B cells mediate the immune
response. Cells develop through the process of negative selection whereby they die
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unless they receive the "survival signal" from the environment. The "survival signal" is
produced only when the antibodies do not react to the body. [WeC93]
Each B cell carries the antibodies on its surface that detect a unique antigen.
After being stimulated by both antigens and T cells, they may return to the bone marrow
to undertake their final maturation. Mature B cells do not secrete antibody, but instead
differentiate into antibody-secreting plasma cells during antigen stimulation [WeC93].
B cells have three purposes: serve as the first line of defense against pathogens,
specialize in neutralizing toxins, and secrete mucus to help create a barrier against
infectious agents [Nos93].

3.3.1.2.

T Cells

T cells develop in the thymus and are responsible for regulating antibody
production and cellular immune reactions, and killing infectious cells. While in the
thymus, these cells undergo a rigorous elimination process, akin to "boot camp."
Developing T cells are exposed to self: those that do not react to self may leave the
thymus and take up residence throughout the body [WeC93]. Otherwise, they are
eliminated.
There are two types of T cells: CD4 (helper or inflammatory) and CD8 (killer).
The CD4 cells promote inflammation and signal other T cells to multiply. They also help
B-cells by signaling an infection. CD8 cells are able to "punch holes" into the target cell
and inject it with chemicals, killing the infected cell.
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T cells differ from B cells in the kind of antigen they recognize and in the way
they recognize an antigen. T cells are unable to recognize the entire antigen, but instead
can recognize fragments of antigens, known as peptides. [Nos93]

3.3.1.3.

Antigen Presenting Cells (APC)

The third type of lymphocyte is the antigen presenting cell, which processes and
presents antigens to helper T cells. APCs include various types of lymphocytes, mainly
B cells, macrophages, which "ingest" infected cells, and dendritic cells. These cells take
in antigens and break them down, so fragments of the antigen can be brought to the cell's
surface. These fragments are carried to the surface by MHC proteins.
Major Histocompatibility Complex (MHC) is a set of proteins present in all cells
that bind to peptides produced within the cell and bring them to the cell surface, where
they can be recognized by the immune system. An important feature of MHC is a groove
in its structure, which enables the protein to bind to a wide range of antigenic peptides.
When the invader replicates inside a cell, MHC carries the short peptide chains from
those viral proteins to the cell surface. The patterns of these peptides are called epitopes,
which allow for the detection of multiple pathogens by a single lymphocyte. During an
immune response, the presence of these foreign peptides in the MHC groove tells the
immune system that the cell is infected. [Jan93]
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3.3.1.4.

Complement

In addition to the three types of lymphocytes, the body utilizes other components
to fight off infection, such as the complement system. Complement is a group of at least
11 proteins that circulate in the blood in an inactive, non-functional form. This system
"complements" the activity of the antibodies in destroying bacteria, either by easing
phagocytosis, or "eating of infected cells," or by puncturing the bacteria cell wall. It is an
essential player in the adaptive immune system because it entails the production of
molecules that influence cellular immune mechanisms.

3.3.2. Types of Immunity

"Immunity refers to all the mechanisms used by the body as protection against the
environment agents that are foreign to the body" [BSL96]. Examples of agents, or
pathogens are toxins, pollen, drugs, viruses, bacteria, and parasites. Pathogens can infect
cells through two methods: the pathogens are found within the membrane based
organelles through which they entered, or the pathogens gain access to the fluid part of
the cell and the cell nucleus. Viruses are the most common intracellular pathogens. The
body uses two types of immunity: innate and adaptive.
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3.3.2.1.

Innate

Innate immunity represents the part of the immune system present at birth, and
helps the body "resist infection through normal body functions." It includes body
surfaces, internal components, and other physiological barriers such as the skin, mucus
membranes, pH and temperature. All of these elements affect pathogens directly or
encourage other immune responses. This is a static system, unable to adapt to new
invaders. One of the main components of innate immunity is the macrophage cell,
responsible for the ingestion of foreign invaders.
The innate immune system is responsible for providing a barrier against infection
and detection of extracellular infections. These infections occur when the pathogen is
not yet bound to a specific cell in the body. The body defends against these infections
through a multilevel defense that includes: phagocytosis of bacteria and other invaders
by white blood cells and cells of the tissue macrophage system; destruction of organisms
by the acid secretions of the stomach and by the digestive enzymes; resistance of the skin
to invasion by organisms; and, presence in the blood of certain chemical compounds that
attach to foreign organisms or toxins and destroy them [Guy81].
The innate immune system generates detectors such as macrophages and the
complements. Since these detectors are not specific, there is no need for them to undergo
a process of testing for reaction against self. The complement component of the innate
immune system detects by an affinity to chemically react with bacteria. This reaction
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coordinates the complement system with the macrophages by signaling the macrophage
to destroy the bacteria [RBM98].

3.3.2.2.

Adaptive

Adaptive immunity enables the body to recognize and respond to previously
unseen invaders. This is one of the most powerful capabilities of the immune system.
Immunity is learned upon contact with the offending pathogens. Once an invader has
been detected in the body, immune cells activate to learn the structure of and destroy the
pathogen. An important feature of adaptive immunity is the body's ability to remember
previous invaders allowing a faster response time upon subsequent encounters with the
same pathogen.
The response begins with the B cells circulating throughout the bloodstream. The
antibodies present on their surface have a high affinity to bind to specific antigens. When
a B cell confronts its matching antigen, the antibodies on its surface bind to the antigen.
Detection is founded upon recognizing epitopes. Following detection, the complement
system is activated to destroy the antigen with the help of macrophages. Additionally,
the B cell replicates with a large number of mutations. Through the process of natural
selection, those B cells possessing the best antigen detecting capabilities are stored in
immunological memory for future defense.
The adaptive immune system requires an elaborate generation process to produce
detectors. The output of this process is a collection of cells that individually detect a few
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pathogens but collectively provide the capability to detect numerous pathogens.
Detection of the antigen occurs through different methods dependent upon whether the
pathogen is extracellular or intracellular.
As discussed previously, extracellular infections are normally handled by the
innate immune system. One of the primary activities of the adaptive immune system is
eliminating intracellular infections.
When the pathogen gains access to the inside of the cell, MHC binds to the
pathogen and moves it to the cell surface, where it is detected by B cells or helper T cells.
Once the immune response begins, the helper T cells secrete chemicals called cytokines.
These chemicals activate additional B and T cells, amplifying this cell mediated immune
response [Elg96, Pau93]. The binding between the pathogen fragments and the
lymphocyte is the first of two coordinating signals necessary for an immune response. A
second signal is used to activate killer T cells. Killer T cells destroy the infected cell by
eliciting apoptosis, a process that forces the cell to kill itself. Killer T cells can also
release chemicals called cytokines that limit viral replication within a cell while the cell
attracts macrophages and other phagocytes to destroy the cell.
Table 5 - Types of Immunity
Innate
Immunity
Adaptive
Immunity

Represents the static part of the immune system present at birth and
provides a barrier against infection and detection of extracellular
infections
Enables the body to recognize and respond to previously unseen invaders
and eliminates intracellular infections
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3.3.3. Functions

The immune system performs several functions in order to defend the body
against invasion.

3.3.3.1.

Detection

The immune system protects the body through the detection of nonself patterns.
The immune system's detection capability is very powerful since it is highly distributed,
detects previously unseen invaders, and does not require an exact match between detector
and pathogen. Lymphocytes circulate throughout the body and bind to foreign invaders,
initiating the immune process. The immune system utilizes a distributed system of
millions of detectors to fight invaders. The detection problem is a hard problem since
there are on the order of 106 self patterns to distinguish from 1016 nonself patterns
[FHS97].

3.3.3.2.

Adaptation

The immune system incorporates mechanisms that enable lymphocytes to learn
the structures of specific foreign proteins; essentially, the immune system evolves and
reproduces lymphocytes that have high affinities for specific pathogens. The immune
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system adapts through a process called affinity maturation, which is essentially a process
of mutation and selection [Zin96].
When a B cell is activated by binding to a pathogen, it secretes antibodies,
inactivating pathogens or identifying them to other innate system defenses for
elimination. After this binding, the B cell hypermutates, creating additional receptors.
The immune system is constantly adapting through slight variations of successful
receptors in pursuit of the most effective immune response [Jan93]. All B cells compete
for available pathogens, with the highest affinity B cells being the "fittest" and replicating
the most.

3.3.3.3.

Memory

The body remembers previously seen invaders, speeding up the response to
subsequent encounters. The first time an invader is encountered, the body launches a
primary response that learns the structure of the pathogen. The immune system stores
this knowledge in memory cells. Subsequent invasions result in the activation of these
memory cells, providing a very specific and rapid response.
Table 6 - Immune System Functions
The ability of the immune system to recognize nonself utilizing lymphocytes
circulating throughout the body
The ability of the immune system to learn the structures of specific
pathogens;
the immune system evolves and reproduces lymphocytes that
Adaptation
have high affinities for these pathogens
The ability of the immune system to efficiently and effectively remember
previously
seen invaders and speed up the response to subsequent
Memory
encounters
.^^—
Detection
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3.3.4. Human Immune Processes

Innate and adaptive immunity have common processes that are used as a
framework for a model of the immune system: generation, detection, coordination, and
destruction. During the generation process, the immune system creates all its antigenic
detectors through random mutations and combinations of genetic material. Those
detectors that are not self-reactive are released into the body. During the detection
process, detectors move about the body attempting to determine the existence of nonself.
The immune system provides a highly distributed detection system with local
coordination. Coordination is required to ensure that the proper immune response is
taken following detection of the pathogen. The immune system uses various signals and
chemical attractions to coordinate the components of the immune system. The main
function of the immune system is to destroy invaders. Destruction can occur through
ingestion of the invader by immune cells, inducing the pathogen to kill itself, ingestion of
infected cells, and other processes. Destruction also occurs through the creation of
inhospitable environments for pathogens through pH, temperature and mucous.
Table 7 ~ Immune System Processes
The process of creating antigenic detectors through random mutations
and combinations of genetic material
The process of detectors moving about the body attempting to determine
Detection
the existence of nonself
The process of implementing the proper immune response following the
Coordination detection of a pathogen
The process of eliminating the invader by immune cell and other
Destruction processes
Generation
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3.3.5. Autoimmmunity

While the immune system usually protects us against foreign invasion, sometimes
the recognition capabilities falter, causing the body to make antibodies and T cells that
attack self. This process is called autoimmunity.
Autoimmunity may be caused by an abnormal immune response to normal selfantigens, a normal immune response to abnormal self, or an abnormal immune response
to abnormal self. Two major mechanisms lead to autoimmunity: a change of self, leading
to the formation of new antigens, and exposure to antigens that induce cross-reactive
antibodies [BSL96]. Other conditions can also lead to autoimmunity, such as a decrease
in killer T Cells or helper T Cells, a dysfunctional MHC presentation of peptides on a
non-APC, problems with lymphocyte production, and genetic and hormonal factors
[Ste93].
Autoimmune diseases are either organ-specific or systemic and are a consequence
of a dysfunction in adaptive immune system, caused by self-reacting T cells or
antibodies. Autoimmunity may also be induced by exposure to antigens bearing a close
structural resemblance to normal tissue components, called antigen mimicry. In this case,
damaged is caused when the immune system cross-reacts with the normal tissue that has
been mimicked.
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3.4.

Computer Immune System Research

As the complexity of computer systems increases to a level comparable to
biological systems, an analogy between computer systems and immune systems is
possible. Computer scientists hope that in studying the human immune system, new
solutions will emerge to computer viruses and other security problems. Beneficial
properties of a computer immune system include: detection of a virus in the host,
isolation of the virus and classification based on its characteristics, location of infected
resources within the host, repair of any damaged host resources, and storage of
information on previously encountered viruses [MVL98].
Current immunologically inspired research investigates different methods of
detection. One method built a computer immune system to detect computer viruses
across hosts connected to a network. Another research group used a computer immune
system for network intrusion and virus detection, by monitoring system calls to detect
intrusion. This same group also studied the generation of detectors modeled after the T
cell generation of the human immune system. A third group defined a distributed
architecture for a self-adaptive computer virus immune system, and described the role of
evolutionary algorithms and performance of intelligent agents in this system. Finally,
another approach investigated information survivability, utilizing the public health
infrastructure as a model for a computer immune system.
The following sections expound upon these different approaches and their
respective models. Since the last portion of this chapter combines advantageous
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properties from each of the research areas to form a different computer immune
approach, these characteristics will be noted throughout the sections.

3.4.1. The Digital Petri Dish

Jeffrey Kephart and Steve White conducted research at IBM Thomas J. Watson
Research Center [KSCW97], developing a computer immune system to detect computer
viruses across hosts connected to a network. In their system, each networked PC
analyzed potentially infected files, and sent suspected infected files to a central computer.
The detection methods employed by the computers modeled the human immune system.
Detectors were generated in large numbers, and those known to flag abnormal activity
were replicated throughout the system, much like immune cells with receptors matching a
given antigen are stimulated to reproduce themselves. This provided stronger selection
for good recognizers and increased the chance of generating computer immune cells that
are matched to a particular invader.
In their system, when one of the networked PCs receives a suspected "infected"
sample, it sends the file to another computer that acts as a "digital petri dish." A software
program on this computer tricks the virus into infecting a "decoy," bringing the viral code
out of hiding [KSCW97]. If a virus is detected, a signature is extracted through bayesian
methods, and sent to the infected host and other computers on the network. These
bayesian methods analyze frequency of byte patterns occurring in infected and uninfected
files. With a recognizer and a repair algorithm appropriate to the virus, the extracted
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viral information can be added to the corresponding databases. If the virus is ever
encountered again, the immune system will recognize it immediately as a known virus.
Figure 4 shows the petri dish concept.
A computer with this immune system could be thought of as "ill" during its first
encounter with a virus. However, on subsequent encounters, detection and elimination of
the virus would occur much more quickly, for the computer could be thought of as
"immune" to the virus.
This computer immune system is desirable and feasible. The technology is being
integrated with IBM AntiVirus, Symantec's Norton AntiVirus, and Intel LANDesk Virus
Protect [IBM98]. Most of the necessary components are already in use in one form or
another, some already exist in IBM AntiVirus itself. Others are presently in use in the
virus laboratory, for updating the databases employed by IBM AntiVirus to recognize
viruses and repair infected files. Judging from the relatively low false-positive rate of the
IBM AntiVirus signatures, the detector algorithm's ability to select good signatures is
better than can be achieved by typical human experts.
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Figure 4 - Pictorial Representation of the Digital Petri Dish

Table 8 -■ Highlighted Features of the Digital Petri Dish

Network Connectivity
Centralized Viral Analysis
Information Sharing

Advantageous Properties
Provides more efficient access to virus data and
detection resources
.^___
Allows for easier coordination and less duplication of
virus information and detection resources
Provides efficient and effective means for disseminating
virus information

Disadvantageous Properties
Sensitive infected files are at risk when sent over the
network; the system is dependant on the availability of
Network Connectivity
network
Dependency is increased; single point of failure exists
Centralized Viral Analysis

3.4.2. Improving Computer Security

Stephanie Forrest and researchers at the University of New Mexico, the Santa Fe
Institute and Odyssey Research Associates conducted research that examined the
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similarities between living organisms and computers in order to improve computer
security. Improvements in intrusion detection can be achieved by designing computer
systems with some important characteristics taken from the human immune system:
multi-layered protection; highly distributed detector, effector and memory systems;
diversity of detection ability across individuals; inexact matching strategies; and
sensitivity to most new foreign patterns [FHS97].
Their computer immune system has the following components: a stable definition
of self; the ability to prevent or detect and subsequently eliminate dangerous foreign
activities; memory of previous infections; a method for recognizing new infections;
autonomy in managing responses; and a method of protecting the immune system itself
from attack. [FHS97]
One of the first challenges the team confronted was the determination of self and
nonself. They wanted their definition of self to be tolerant of legitimate changes,
including those made to files, caused by adding new software or users, and routine
activities of the system administrators. However, the system must be able to detect
unauthorized changes and users, as well as viruses and inside attacks. These conflicting
requirements were addressed in two supplemental areas of research: intrusion detection
and distributed change detection.
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3.4.2.1.

Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

The IDS approach to security is based on the assumption that a system will not be
secure, but that intrusions can be detected by monitoring and analyzing system behavior
[HFS97]. In the network intrusion detection domain, their system is based upon self and
nonself recognition through anomalous system calls. Each computer's definition of self
is based upon a baseline analysis of system calls executed by privileged processes in a
networked operating system.
Their strategy for the intrusion detection system was to first build up a database of
normal behavior for each program of interest. Second, during a program's execution they
scanned traces of system calls that might have contained abnormal behavior, and matched
the trace against patterns stored in the database. If this trace did not occur in the normal
database it was recorded as a mismatch, and used to distinguish between self and nonself.
As in the body, the database of self is unique to each computer. Figure 5 presents the
main concepts of this system.
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Figure 5 - Pictorial Representation of the Intrusion Detection System

The research group constructed these databases, and performed abnormal traces
for three Unix processes. Their results suggested that short sequences of system calls
executed by running programs are a good discriminator between normal and abnormal
operating characteristics. These calls provide a compact signature for normal behavior
and the signature has a high probability of being perturbed during intrusions. [HFS97,
FHS97]
According to the research team, the current system is far from having the
capabilities of a natural immune system. Besides refining the notion of self on a
computer, provisions need to be made to allow the concept of self to change over time.
Much work needs to be done in the area of partial or approximated matching, for the
team realizes they have no mechanism for self-adaptive learning, as in the case of affinity
maturation or negative selection in the human immune system. [FHSL96]
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Table 9 ■- Highlighted Features of the Intrusion Detection System

System Specific
Decentralized Analysis
Multiple Applications
Lack of Learning

3.4.2.2.

Advantageous Properties
The database of self is unique to each computer
Each system develops its own concept of self and
adapts accordingly
Can be used to detect viruses, intruders, or malicious
users
Disadvantageous Property
I There is no mechanism for self-adaptive learning

Distributed Change Detection

This application of immunology borrows from mechanisms involving T cell
generation and training. T cells have binding regions created through a random process,
much like random strings could be generated. Since it is possible that these T cells will
bind to self, they are tested before being leaving the thymus. This entire T cell censoring
process can be thought of as defining a protected collection of self in terms of its
complementary patterns of nonself. [FHS97] Figure 6 presents the concept of detector
generation.
The research team designed a distributed change detection algorithm which:
generates of a set of nonself detectors, uses detectors to monitor important data, and
identifies the location of change when a detector activates [FHS97]. In their computer
immune system, binding between detectors and foreign patterns is modeled as a match
between two strings. Self is defined as a set of equal-length substrings, formed by
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segmenting the data, and each detector is defined as a string of equal length as the
substrings.
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Figure 6 -■ Pictorial Representation of the Detector Generation

This system uses "negative detection," generating detectors for byte patterns not
previously seen on the host [DFH96]. Detectors are continuously and randomly
generated, compared against self, and discarded if they match. This approach is easily
distributed because each detector covers a small part of nonself. A set of detectors could
be split up over multiple sites. This would reduce the coverage at a given site, but would
provide better system-wide coverage [FHS97]. To obtain similar results with self
detectors would be much more expensive, because a complete set of positive detectors
would be needed at every site, duplicating efforts and requiring much more
communication between sites.
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This algorithm is useful for dynamic or noisy data; it is effective for intrusion
detection, as well as virus detection, the system's original intent. Based on the
continuous detector generation and evaluation methods, this T cell based system could be
especially advantageous when used as the adaptive component of a multi-layered
computer immune system.
Table 10 -- Highlighted Features of the Distributed Change Detection

Distributed Detection
Adaptive

Advantageous Properties
The approach is easily distributed because each
detector covers a small part ofnonself; provides better
system-wide coverage
Learning new concepts of self is easy due to nonself
detector generation and evaluation

Disadvantageous Property
The randomly generated strings may not cover all
Incomplete Set of Detectors
possible combinations ofnonself

3.4.3. Distributed Architecture for a Self-Adaptive CVIS

Other researchers [LVM98] at the Air Force Institute of Technology are
investigating a Computer Virus Immune System (CVIS). This system uses the human
immune system as a model for identifying, attacking, and eradicating viruses from
computers and networks. Based on an analysis of the requirements of such a system, this
team proposed a distributed architecture that utilizes Intelligent Agents and Evolutionary
Algorithms to self-adapt to a constantly changing virus population.
As pointed out by this research, there are several obstacles to implementing a
CVIS. Though the human immune system provides a basic model for a computer
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counterpart, there are many "unmatched" parallels between the two systems. In the
human immune system lymphocytes are distributed throughout the body and act as
independent agents in search of invaders. This method has limitations in a computer
immune system, such as: the number of available system processors, competition
between tasks for processor time, and bottlenecks in accessing shared resources.
[LVM98]
Their proposed CVIS requires distributed control, multi-layer security, diverse
implementations, and self-adaptation in a dynamic software environment. All system
activities should be autonomous and applicable to the various architectures of current
computer systems. [LVM98]
Another challenge in the accomplishment of this type of system is the
implementation of an artificial adaptation mechanism. Computer systems lack the
evolutionary adaptation mechanism as seen in the human immune system. The
development of several components within the CVIS is required, including virus
detection, virus purging, and damage repair. This research led to the conclusion that
computational complexity of such a task would be overwhelmingly difficult for one
system to handle.
To overcome these challenges, this AFIT team proposed a multi-level distributed
architecture with the responsibilities of managing the computational complexity
associated with implementing this system. This was accomplished through the
coordination of autonomous agents at three levels: local, network, and global. Each agent
has a number of goals, a scope of competence, and the ability to collaborate and
communicate with other agents, objects, and humans. Based on human immune system
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components, agents represent the following functions: detect, classify, repair, update,
communicate, help, kill, and suppress [LVM98]. Figure 7 presents a pictorial view of
this system.
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Figure 7 ™ Pictorial Representation of the Self-Adaptive CVIS

Agents at the local level would be responsible for virus detection, virus
elimination, system repair, and vulnerability analysis. Those agents at the network level
are characterized by a high degree of interaction; they share many resources and are
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connected by a network. The network agents' purpose is to classify viruses, disseminate
information and alert other agents of viral threats. At the global level, attention is given
to the generation, adaptation and storage of virus information. Once developed, this
information is disseminated to agents at the lower levels. Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs)
are used in this CVIS at the global level for resource adaptation. They are used to
improve the "decoy method" of virus detection, as originally presented by the researchers
at IBM. The AFIT team's approach uses the networks linked to the CVIS as laboratories
for virus evaluation. Using EAs enables a single, dedicated platform at the global level to
mange a large decoy population.
This research combines previous human immune-based virus fighting efforts with
the new twist of self-adaptation. The distributed nature of their system spreads out the
computational burden of immune system tasks, and provides an efficient and effective
CVIS.
Table 11 ■■ Highlighted Features of the CVIS
Advantageous Properties
A high degree of system interaction through the
Network Connectivity
sharing of resources and connection by a network
System responsibilities are divided among agents;
Compartmentalized Domain agents function independently of each other
Agents are grouped into different levels and interact
Hierarchy of Responsibilities together to achieve the responsibilities ofthat level
Provides efficient and effective means for disseminating
Information Sharing
virus information
Utilization of a learning mechanism to adapt to an ever
Adaptation
changing virus population
Disadvantageous Properties
The system is dependant on the availability of the
Network Connectivity
network
Systems at the local level can not communicate with
No Peer-to-Peer
other systems at that level
Communication
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3.4.4. DARPA's Public Health Infrastructure

The Information Technology Office of DARPA presented research on
information survivability, in response to the DoD's reliance on highly integrated and
complex military information systems [Shr96]. Since these systems interoperate with the
commercial computing infrastructure and rely on many of its components, penetration by
unauthorized users can be conducted from virtually anywhere and by anyone. The goal
of DARPA's research was to develop technology to ensure critical information systems
continue to function adequately when attacked [Shr96]. These are large scale, complex
distributed systems, many of which were developed without survivability as a prime
concern. In order to improve current survivability approaches, this team looked to
biological and social models, especially biological organisms, populations and society.
The benefits of individual organisms include barriers to infection and immune
systems, detecting the presence of infection, and attacking and removing the invader.
Other beneficial qualities of organisms include a redundancy and fault tolerance
mechanism and homeostatic functions that maintain critical functions under stress. The
team concluded these same ideas apply at the macro level of populations and societies.
Collectively, the population is fault tolerant to the loss of individuals, and the species
evolves based on which individuals survive the best in their environment. DARPA's
research concentrated in three areas: public health infrastructure, adaptive architecture,
and variability.
The Public Health Infrastructure element includes a set of security and
survivability protocols with the ability to operate with available resources. The
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infrastructure supports problem solving between components of the system, such as:
decoys deflecting attack, facilitating detection, and aiding with diagnosis; canaries
warning of impending danger; and honeypots drawing attack to immaterial subsystems.
Just as a computer immune system would notice user intrusions into individual
systems, corruption of data, or anomalous system behavior, this public health
infrastructure must detect the symptoms of an attack effectively and efficiently. After
symptoms are detected, the system must be able to disseminate this information rapidly
and comprehensively. Once a part of the system is identified as infected, it must be
"quarantined" so as not to infect other parts of the system. If the attacks increase, the
system must be able to heighten its level of concern and allocate more resources for the
diagnoses of the attack. As information about the attack is uncovered, vulnerabilities and
recovery procedures must be relayed throughout the system.
Many issues accompany the public health model. There are many questions about
the low-level immune system, especially building detectors, detecting attacks, learning
anomalous behavior utilizing artificial intelligence, and keeping attack profiles current
and correct. Issues involving information flow though the public health network include
information control, method of flow, and methods for notification of attack.
The Adaptive Architecture element develops technologies that allocate resources
to critical tasks, allowing the system to function while under attack. This system has a
highly adaptive architecture to guarantee these functions continue with the loss of
resources. This element also develops new models of semantic redundancy allowing
corrupted data to be recovered by inference.
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The Variability element develops technologies that allow differences between
individual systems, in order to impede unknown threats. These technologies include: a
variety of operating system implementations, randomized communication patterns,
randomized memory layout, randomized allocations and variable operational patterns.
Uniformity is dangerous; if system vulnerabilities were exploited, all machines would be
immediately vulnerable.
These areas of public health infrastructure, adaptive architecture and variability
together provide a high-level model of a Computer Health System; however, they fail to
specify the lower-level details of an individual immune system.
Table 12 -- Highlighted Features of DARPA's Public Health Infrastructure
Advantageous Properties
Provides a set of security and survivability protocols
Secure Infrastructure
with the ability to operate with available resources
All components can communicate with all other
Component Communication components through the system hierarchy (vertically)
and peer-to-peer (horizontally)
Provides efficient and effective means for disseminating
Information Sharing
virus information
Disadvantageous Properties
The ability of the individual detection system to
Unspecified Detection
recognize nonselfis unspecified
The ability of the individual detection system to learn
the structures of specific viruses and adapt to the
Unspecified Adaptation
changing definition of self is unspecified
The ability of the individual detection system to
efficiently
and effectively remember previously seen
Unspecified Memory
viruses is unspecified
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3.5.

The Computer Models

The final portion of this chapter describes the two computer models developed as
part of this research, which utilized some advantageous properties of the models
discussed in the previous sections. The first model is a high level view of a Computer
Health System, utilizing the public health system as a model. This Computer Health
System is utilized for virus detection, though could be applied to other security domains.
This health system includes the second immune model as a component. The second
model is an individual computer immune system, with the virus detection component,
MERCURY.
First, the general characteristics of model building are discussed, as well as the
different types of models that can be used. Next, the Computer Health System is
explained, from a high-level perspective of overall requirements and responsibilities.
Finally, the computer immune system is presented, from a perspective of system
properties. Throughout this explanation, parallels to the public health system and to the
human immune system are drawn.

3.5.1. Model Building

The purpose of building a model is to explain observations made at particular
levels for a given experiment and to possibly serve as a device for predicting what may
occur at a specified spatial or temporal point of interest [Cas97]. A good model is not
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required to capture all aspects of the system it represents; rather, it should capture the
system's essence [MVL98]. The model should be simple, clear, tractable, and relatively
bias-free [Cas97].
Models can be either formal or informal, depending on their description or
purpose. An informal model describes or represents system observations, components, or
interactions imprecisely [MVL98]. It can help explain observations, but can't make
accurate predictions of future ones. Formal models, however, are more likely to have a
higher predictive power because they are mathematically based and represent the "true"
system with greater accuracy. A formal mathematical system is a collection of abstract
symbols with a set of rules expressing how strings of these symbols can be combined to
form new strings [MVL98].
There are also different categories of models based on their purposes: predictive,
explanatory, and prescriptive. Predictive models enable developers to predict future
system behavior based on the properties of the system's components and their current
behaviors. Conversely, the purpose of an explanatory model is to not predict future
behavior of a system, but rather to provide a framework in which past observations can
be understood as an overall process. Both predictive and explanatory models are passive,
whereas the prescriptive model is active. The prescriptive model offers a top-level
picture of the real world, enabling the developer to vary parameters for analysis. The
following tables summarize the different types of models.
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Table 13 ■- Summary of Model Types

Formal

Mathematical basis for
representing the "true"
system

Predictive

Explanatory
Informal

Describes system
observations, components,
or interactions imprecisely

Prescriptive

A prediction of future system
behavior based on the
system's components and
their current behaviors
A framework in which past
observations can be
understood as an overall
process
A top-level picture of the real
world, with the ability to vary
parameters

I
j
I

\

3.5.2. Modeling a Computer Health System (CHS)

The CHS is an informal, explanatory model based on some essential qualities of
the public health system. Due to the model's informality, not every aspect of the model
will be explicitly stated. Though many parallels can be drawn between the systems, the
CHS framework will not present the complete picture or solution. Rather, it is an
approach to the overall process of detection, prevention, and cure of viruses on computer
systems. Figure 8 presents the pictorial view of this system, its components, and their
responsibilities and interfaces.
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Figure 8 -■ Pictorial Representation of the Computer Health System
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3.5.2.1.

Computer Health System Objectives

DARPA's research suggests the public health system is a highly robust and
survivable infrastructure developed to detect, diagnose, isolate, cure, and prevent
infections. The CHS presented here has the same overall objectives for the protection of
computer systems against viruses.
Table 14 -■ Comparison of Health System Objectives
Objectives of Public Health System

Objectives of Computer Health System

Detect Human Diseases
Diagnose Human Diseases
Isolate Human Diseases
Cure Human Diseases
Prevent Human Diseases

Detect Computer Viruses
Diagnose Computer Viruses
Isolate Computer Viruses
Cure Computer Viruses
Prevent Computer Viruses

3.5.2.2.

Computer Health System Requirements

Like the public health system, the CHS is a social enterprise that utilizes current
knowledge in ways that have the maximum impact on the way a computer system
protects against virus invaders. This system identifies computer virus problems through a
preventative "team" approach in order to protect, promote, and improve the "health" of
computer systems, with an emphasis on preventative strategies. The primary goal of the
CHS is to provide a framework for the globally scoped protection of computer systems
against virus invaders. Some of the advantageous properties of the previously discussed
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immune models are included as requirements for the CHS. These requirements also
improve upon the previously discussed models' shortcomings.
The CHS functions optimally, yet not solely with network connectivity. This
connection provides the most efficient access to virus data and detection resources. Due
to the individual immune systems on each computer, and many paths of connection
throughout the network, this global system does not possess a single point of failure.
Therefore, components can function autonomously with limited, or nonexistent network
capabilities. Using a network connection precipitates the need for a secure
infrastructure. This includes a set of security and survivability protocols that operate
with available resources. These protocols ensure the protection of information as it
traverses through the system's networks.
The system must provide component communication. All components must be
able to communicate with all other components of the system. This communication
includes hierarchical or "vertical" interchanges and peer-to-peer or "horizontal"
connections. Component communication provides the vehicle for information sharing.
This provides the essential means for efficiently and effectively disseminating computer
virus information.
The system is partly based on centralized viral analysis. Specialized computer
health agencies and virus experts are responsible for much of the computer health
objectives. Their main tasks are explained in detail in subsequent sections. This allows
easier coordination and less duplication of virus information and detection resources.
Additionally, the system is partly based on decentralized viral analysis. Each individual
computer immune system develops its own concept of self and adapts to viruses to the
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best of its ability, with the help of global prevention information and self-adaptability
using MERCURY.
In addition to these requirements, the system also possesses intervention strategies
extracted from the public health system. These intervention strategies can be divided into
three types: primary, secondary, and tertiary.
In the computer sense, primary prevention involves the prevention of the actual
virus, by reducing the exposure or risk level factors. This type of prevention includes
regular disk and system scanning through an antivirus system, and responding to updated
prevention measures, such as virus updates. Secondary prevention takes place if the virus
had infected the system. This prevention would detect and control the virus destruction
in its early stages, perhaps before the virus executed or caused large amounts of damage
to the system. Tertiary prevention would involve repairing the system by restoring it to
the optimal level of functioning following an infection. System intervention at the
primary, secondary, and tertiary levels is a dependant upon the knowledge base of the
computer immune system, the knowledge base of the virus experts, and the effectiveness
and efficiency of the virus information transfer between components in the system.
Primary prevention reduces the number of virus infections, whereas secondary
and tertiary prevention reduce virus predominance by decreasing the "life" of a virus and
minimize its effects. As with public health, approaches emphasizing primary prevention
have greater potential benefit than approaches emphasizing other levels ofprevention.
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3.5.2.3.

Computer Health System Services

Many of the public health services translate easily into the computer health
domain. The following chart states a few of the services this global system could
provide.

1. Monitor virus status within the network communities
2. Diagnose and investigate viruses found on computer systems
3. Inform, educate, and empower users about virus issues and
PREVENTION!
4. Mobilize research groups to identify and solve virus problems
5. Develop policies and plans that support virus detection and prevention
efforts
6. Enforce laws and regulations that protect computer systems against
malicious attacks
7. Link users and administrators with specialized agencies and virus
experts
8. Assure a competent computer health workforce
9. Evaluate effectiveness, accessibility, and quality of the infrastructure
and system
10. Research innovative solutions to virus problems
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3.5.2.4.

Computer Health System Functions

As in the public health system, the Computer Health performs three core
functions: assessment, policy development and assurance. The Computer Health System
assesses the needs of the computer systems and networks by establishing systematic
processes that periodically provide information on the status of viruses through the cyber
community. The CHS also investigates virus hazards in the community by conducting
research that identifies the magnitude of viral damage, symptoms, and avoidance. The
CHS must advocate collaborative research efforts, identify resources in the cyber
community, and generate relationships with public and private agencies for the study of
viruses. Another function of the CHS is the development of plans and policies
addressing virus attacks and establishment of goals and objectives that focus on
preventive measures. The CHS is responsible for informing and educating the users and
administrators on computer health, promoting awareness about available antivirus
applications and preventative techniques in order to increase knowledge, attitudes, and
practices about computer viruses.
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3.5.2.5.

Computer Health System Components

Responsibilities are allocated among the four main components of the Computer
Health System: specialized agencies, virus experts, infrastructure, and individual
systems.

3.5.2.5.1.

Specialized Agencies

Specialized agencies are organizations or research groups that facilitate
contributions to the virus detection field. These agencies are linked by common goals
and objectives with the specific mission of some aspect of virus detection or prevention.
The relationships among the agencies are informal and collaborative rather than
formalized and centrally directed. The main responsibility of these agencies is to conduct
research and trend analyses of viruses, and develop useful statistics and metrics. Also,
they provide a general classification for viruses, and formalize the methods of virus
detection, extraction, and repair. Lastly, they provide policy guidelines and standards to
establish goals and assign responsibilities within the Computer Health System.
The Center for Virus Control (CVC) is a proposed computer health agency based
on the Center for Disease Control and Prevention. The main goals of the CDC are
surveillance, applied research, and prevention and control. [OUSD96]. The CVC would
be responsible for detecting, investigating and monitoring virus threats, and determining
the factors influencing their occurrence. The agency would be responsible for integrating
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industry, academia and government research, improving virus security practices. The
CVC would enhance private and government communication about emerging viral
threats, and ensure prompt implementation of prevention and control strategies.
Information dissemination would be a top priority, as would establishing implementation
standards and guidelines.
The Virus Prevention Agency (VPA) is a proposed computer health agency based
on the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The mission of this public health
agency is to provide leadership and support to reduce the loss of life and property and
protect our nation's institutions from all types of hazards through a risk-based,
emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery
[OUSD96]. Applying this to the computer health domain, the agency is responsible for
helping network and computer systems defend against viruses, making virus repair
assistance available to all users, and teaching users and administrators how to protect
against viruses.

3.5.2.5.2.

Virus Experts

Within the public health system, many physicians practice in groups where they
can share expenses, medical equipment, and responsibility for emergencies. In the public
health system, group practices, hospitals and other arrangements are called Health
Service Organizations (HSOs) [Ayr96]. This same technique of pooling resources,
personnel and knowledge can be applied to the virus expert component of the Computer
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Health System. In this system the main responsibilities of the virus experts are:
implementing and teaching preventative techniques, analyzing new viral types, extracting
and diagnosing new viruses, and "curing" the system once it has been infected. These
services provided by the virus experts are globally based and are targeted toward network
systems rather then individual systems. Virus experts may be augmented with automated
systems such as IBM's digital petri dish or MERCURY.

3.5.2.5.3.

Infrastructure

Analogous to the public health system infrastructure, the infrastructure of the
CHS is the backbone that protects and carries all the information flowing throughout the
system. The supply of health care resources is an essential concern to the public health
system; whereas, the supply of information is an important aspect of the Computer Health
System. The CHS infrastructure provides the following functions: system security,
information sharing and component interfacing.
The infrastructure must provide system security through three fundamental
objectives. Confidentiality requires that the data in a computer system, as well as the data
transmitted between computer systems, be revealed only to authorized individuals.
Integrity stipulates that the data in a computer system, as well as the data transmitted
between computer systems, be free from unauthorized modification or deletion.
Availability requires that the authorized users of the computer systems and
communications media not be denied access when access is desired. [WPF96]
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The infrastructure also provides the CHS requirement of information sharing.
Information is shared rapidly and comprehensively between agencies and experts, and
among the population of computer systems. Virus information flows upward when a
system detects or is infected with a virus and flows downward when a virus cure is
discovered or preventative measures are formalized.
The component interfaces throughout the system require interfaces to manage the
information control, method of flow, and methods for notification of attack. These
concerns are analogous to the different types of health delivery systems available in the
public health system. Group medical practices, health maintenance organizations and
preferred provider organizations are all methods for individuals to "connect" to the public
health system, just as communication protocols between and within subsystems enable the
two-way connections between all subsystems and peer-to-peer systems.

3.5.2.5.4.

Computer Systems

The final component of the Computer Health System is the individual computer
system, equipped with a computer immune system. This immune system is similar to the
human immune system, in that its purpose is to protect the computer system from
invasion by viruses. The main functions of the individual computer immune system are
system analysis, virus detection, self-adaptation, memory, and virus elimination/system
repair. These functions are described in Section 3.5.1.
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3.5.3. Modeling a Computer Immune System

Computer scientists hope that in studying the human immune system, new
solutions to combating computer viruses will emerge. There are many properties of the
immune system of interest to a computer scientist. Human immune systems are unique,
meaning individual immunity is derived and adapted; this is a desirable and applicable
property of a computer system, as well. The immune system uses an efficient
decentralized and distributed detection process, which is also of interest in the virus
detection domain. The human system is also very flexible and does not require the
absolute detection of every invader; instead, partial detection allows for quicker
recognition of multiple invaders. This is applicable to partial detection of byte patterns in
an infected file on a computer system. Another very important feature of the immune
system is its ability to detect and react to invaders, or nonself, while not reacting to what
belongs in the body, or self. This property applies to invaders that have been previously
seen, as well as those previously unseen. The human system can learn and remember the
structures of these previously unseen invaders, so that the body's future responses to the
same invader can be faster. [FHS97]
An individual computer immune system is an informal, explanatory model that
captures the essence of the human immune system. Due to the model's informality, not
every aspect of the model will be explicitly stated. Though many parallels can be drawn
between systems, the computer immune system model will not present the complete
picture or solution. While the CHS provides the framework for global protection against
viruses, the computer immune system provides for local detection of these invaders.
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3.5.3.1.

Functions

As introduced in Section 3.5.2.4, there are several desirable functions for a
computer immune system: system analysis, virus detection, adaptation, memory, virus
elimination, and system repair. MERCURY, a prototype of a virus detection component
of a computer immune system, is designed to incorporate three of these functions,
detection, adaptation and memory. The following subsections describe each function,
and, if appropriate, their design in MERCURY.

3.5.3.1.1.

System Analysis

The system analysis function provides local prevention from computer viruses.
Analysis is individualized through prevention strategies such as policy enforcement, disk
checking and system scanning procedures, and analysis for viral system calls.
Additionally, this function provides an analysis of normal system activity, in a manner
similar to user profiling utilized in intrusion detection systems [WFP96]. Policies and
procedures are obtained from the specialized agencies and specific preventive measures
are obtained from the virus experts of the Computer Health System. MERCURY does
not incorporate system analysis, but can be integrated with existing systems that provide
this functionality.
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3.5.3.1.2.

Detection

Just as antigens can infect cells in the body through two methods, intracellular and
extracellular, a virus can infect a system in two basic ways. The virus is found within the
system, such as memory, or boot sector or the virus gained access to the inside of a file.
Similar to the human system, a computer system detects a virus through different
methods, dependent upon whether the virus is "extracellular" or "intracellular."
Extracellular Infections on a Computer. Similar to the multilevel defense against
infections in the body, behavior blockers raise a warning when suspicious activity occurs
on the computer. These programs have a sense of typical virus behavior, such as access
to certain system resources and files, just as certain chemical compounds in the blood
know to attach to foreign organisms or toxins and destroy them. Behavior blockers use a
reactive method, since a virus is detected after the computer is infected.
Intracellular Infections on a Computer. Similar to the lymphocytes circulating in
the bloodstream looking for pathogens found in the body, a virus scanning program
would "circulate" through the computer system and compare system and data byte
patterns to those previously seen patterns maintained in a virus database. In the body, the
lymphocytes can not see the pathogen "inside" the cell without the assistance of MHC,
which brings the invader to the cell's surface. In a computer, an infected file does not
present the infection to virus scanner; instead, the scanner must look inside the file in
order to determine if a file is infected.
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The scanning component of MERCURY, though not fully implemented, would be
responsible for extracting and detecting byte patterns in files. MERCURY'S scanner
recognizes viruses through an exact match of a relatively short sequence of bytes
occurring in the virus, or by a rule generated by the learning component of MERCURY
which specifies a set of bytes, combined using certain operators. Matching a small
portion of the virus is more efficient in time and memory, and it enables the system to
recognize variants.
As a component of MERCURY, a virus scanner was developed to evaluate the
byte patterns inside files. This scanner functions just as the "team" of lymphocytes
would in the human body. As the scanner reads the byte patterns in each file, they are
compared to nonself and self byte patterns stored in the knowledge base. In the body, B
cells circulate through the body, looking to bind with nonself antigens. If nonself is
encountered, the cell is flagged as infected, and the "killer" cells are activated. In the
computer system, if the pattern matches what is known to be a virus, an immune process
is also initiated. The file is "flagged" and the elimination and repair function of the
computer immune system is activated.

3.5.3.1.3.

Adaptation

Detection involves the recognition of known viruses, whereas adaptation deals
with previously unknown viruses. In the human immune system, innate immunity
represents the part of the immune system present at birth. In a computer system, innate
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immunity can be thought of as what is initially learned, supervised or unsupervised, as
acceptable system byte patterns and acceptable system activity. These allowable patterns
and activities could be defined through initial heuristics and analysis. Similar to the work
done by Forrest, databases of these allowable byte patterns and activities could be
constructed.
Adaptive immunity for a computer system, like the human immune system, would
enable the system to recognize and respond to previously unseen viruses. Once an
previously unseen byte pattern is encountered in the computer, the system detectors
determine whether it is a virus or new self, based on the predictive capabilities of current
definitions of self and nonself. If the system detectors are unable to incorporate the byte
pattern into these definitions, the system must seek advice from a virus expert. After the
byte pattern has been identified by the expert, the system incorporates the byte pattern
into the knowledge base so that it can be recognized quickly on subsequent infections.
As a component of MERCURY, the constructive induction engine, HEC was
developed to perform the adaptive function of learning new byte patterns. On a fully
operational system, once a byte pattern is labeled as self or nonself, HEC would
incorporates it into the system's concepts of self and nonself, and update the knowledge
base. As a computer changes, its immune system must adapt. Constructive induction
provides a mechanism to incorporate these modifications and classify them as self or
nonself.
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3.5.3.1.4.

Memory

A computer system must have the ability to remember previous viruses, allowing
a faster response time upon subsequent encounters with the same virus. As a component
of an operational version of MERCURY, a knowledge base could be built that contains
the byte patterns that distinguish between self and nonself. This knowledge base would
be accessed by the scanner and updated by HEC. MERCURY'S current implementation,
however, does not utilize memory external to the constructive induction engine.

3.5.3.1.5.

Virus Elimination and System Repair

Once nonself byte patterns have been recognized in a file, the computer immune
system must respond by enabling the elimination and repair function. This can be
accomplished by attempting to reconstruct the file from a checksum database repository,
or by attempting to identify and remove the exact viral code [KSSW97]. While the
purpose of this computer immune function is analogous to the human immune system,
the implementation differs. In the human body, cells are expendable, and can be killed
without affecting the overall function of the system. However, in the computer system,
files can not be "killed," or deleted with the same degree of indifference. MERCURY
does not incorporate elimination and repair, but can be integrated with existing systems
that provide this functionality.
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3.5.3.2.

Autoimmunity

While the purpose of this computer immune system is to protect against foreign
invasion, the recognition capabilities of MERCURY could falter, causing the system to
classify self as nonself. This process would be similar to autoimmunity in the human
immune system.
For example, a common error occurs when the antivirus program reports "false
positives" on legitimate programs. This results from the current manual techniques used
to extract virus byte patterns from an infected file. These current antivirus techniques can
be expected to fail within the next few years with the rapid, accelerating influx of new
computer viruses.
Another problem with detecting viruses in a computer system is that the notion of
self in computers is questionable. Self is not solely the pre-loaded software on a
computer when purchased. Users are continually updating and adding new software, so it
would be unacceptable if the computer immune system were to reject all such
modifications and additions on the basis that they were different from what was on the
system already. The human immune system can usually get away with "presuming the
guilt" of anything unfamiliar, whereas the computer immune system must presume that
new software is innocent until it can prove that it is guilty of containing a virus. [Kep94]
Autoimmunity could occur in two ways within MERCURY. The scanner could
detect a previously unseen self byte pattern as nonself. Additionally, if the self and
nonself files are similar, HEC could learn incorrectly. This could be treated proactively
or reactively. Proactive treatment would require the user to interface with MERCURY,
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through the addition of new examples. The reactive treatment involves adding the new
system files and waiting for the byte patterns in this file to be detected. After the new
byte patterns are detected, they could be sent to HEC to relearn the self concept.
Although an important function of a computer immune system, MERCURY does not
allow for user intervention, but could be modified if needed.

3.5.3.3.

Computer Immune System Interfaces

A computer immune system should contain the five functions discussed in the
preceding sections. MERCURY was designed to incorporate three of these functions,
detection, adaptation and memory. This immune system decomposition necessitates
interfaces between MERCURY and the other systems responsible for analysis and
elimination/repair. Coordination between these systems is required to ensure that the
proper prevention strategies are used and that the proper response is taken following
detection of the virus. The body uses chemical attractions and signals to coordinate the
components of the immune system; the computer immune system must also coordinate its
functions.

3.6.

Summary

This chapter explained several analogies between a computer system and the
human immune system by presenting several computer immune models. First,
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discussions of the human immune system and the public health system were presented,
with research trends in the area of computer immunology addressed. The CHS was
presented as an informal, explanatory model of the public health system; the computer
immune system was presented as an informal, explanatory model of the human immune
system. MERCURY'S role in the computer immune system was defined. Chapters Four
and Five provide general and detailed descriptions, respectively, of this virus detection
component.
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4.

4.1.

System Design

Overview

Chapter Two described current methods of virus detection, concepts of
constructive induction, and research trends utilizing machine learning for computer
security and detection. This chapter conjoins these areas to form the basis of MERCURY,
the virus detection component of a computer immune system.
Chapter Three presented the Computer Health System, a global approach at virus
prevention, based on the public health system. This approach identified the requirement
for an individual computer immune system, based on the human immune system. Chapter
Four focuses only on MERCURY and the design fundamentals of this virus detection
system.
The methodology provides a framework for MERCURY by defining the
objectives, requirements, and architecture of a fully operational detection system. The
major subsystems and processes involved are decomposed and system integration and
testing are addressed. The detailed descriptions of the subsystems and processes included
in the implemented prototype of MERCURY will be provided in Chapter Five.
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4.2.

General Description

A system is a set of interrelated systems, or subsystems, working together toward
some common objective [B1F90]. MERCURY is a virus detection system, composed of
a virus scanner, a constructive induction based learning engine named HEC, and a
knowledge base. This implementation is a proof-of-concept; HEC is a model of the
learning process that provides the scanner with byte signatures that distinguish between
self and nonself. This system tests the hypothesis that constructive induction can be
effectively applied to the virus detection domain.

4.3.

Objectives

An effective system engineering process begins by identifying a need, based on a
want or desire for something, possibly arising from a deficiency [B1F90]. Current viral
detection techniques are reactive, labor intensive for virus researchers, have a slow
response from time of discovery until the cure is prescribed, and require user intervention
to update the virus signature database [Kep94]. Due to these recognized inefficiencies,
the need was identified for an improved technique that combats these virus detection
problems.
Once the need is identified, system objectives must be explicitly defined and
understood so that the system provides the desired output for each given set of inputs.
The objectives of this detection system match the three most prominent functions the
human immune system uses to defend the body against invasion. The objectives of
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MERCURY are to: detect viruses, adapt to changes in self through learning, and
remember previously seen viruses.
Table 15 -- MERCURY'S Objectives
Detection
Adaptation
Memory

4.4.

The ability of the detection system to recognize nonself
The ability of the detection system to learn the structures of specific
viruses; the detection system adapts to the changing definition of self
The ability of the detection system to efficiently and effectively remember
previously seen viruses, speeding the response to subsequent encounters

Requirements

Once system objectives are determined, specific requirements of the system must
be defined. Requirements are decided prior to development so that expected system
outputs are known and can be tested [B1F90]. A full implemented version of MERCURY
should meet the following requirements:
1. Detect previously seen self in the system
2. Detect previously seen nonself in the system
3. Isolate and flag previously unseen files in the system
4. Send indiscernible files to virus experts
5. Relay virus information to the constructive induction engine for selfadaptation and learning
6. Update the knowledge base of virus signatures base on new concept of
self
7. Send information about damaged files to the cleaner subsystem,
outside of the MERCURY system
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4.5.

Architecture

After the system requirements are established, they are utilized to choose a design
approach [B1F90]. Choosing a system architecture is a design approach that defines a
system in terms of components, interactions and correspondence to system requirements
[ShG96]. Implementing a particular architecture benefits the system's development and
maintenance by defining the commonalties, identifying areas of reusability, and
communicating the design to others. Architectures can be chosen by analyzing the
applicability of different architectures and system requirements.
MERCURY'S requirements involve collecting, manipulating, and preserving
large bodies of complex virus information; overall, the system exhibits many qualities of
a shared information system. This architecture supports independently processing
subsystems interacting through a shared data store. When fully implemented,
MERCURY subsystems would act independently; HEC and the virus scanner would each
have processes that run autonomously within their respective subsystems. These
subsystems would interact through a central knowledge base of virus information.
The definition of a system is not complete without considering its position in a
larger, higher-level system. A virus detection system, such as MERCURY, would be a
component of a individual computer immune system. This computer immune system is a
component of the Computer Health System, designed and explained in Chapter Three.
These systems protect computer systems against viruses through the detection, diagnoses,
isolation, cure, and prevention of virus infections.
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An individual computer immune system is responsible for system analysis,
detection, adaptation, memory, and virus elimination/repair. MERCURY encompasses
the functions of detection, adaptation, and memory, interfacing with the system analysis
and virus elimination/repair components. Within MERCURY, there are three
subsystems: virus scanner, constructive induction engine (HEC), and the knowledge base.
The simplified view of the Computer Health System, and MERCURY'S position within
it, are depicted in Figure 9.

4.6.

Description of Subsystems

The following sections describe MERCURY'S three subsystems, by providing
their general descriptions, and defining their objectives, requirements, and architecture.

4.6.1. Constructive Induction Engine (HEC)

HEC is a software program developed as the constructive induction based
learning engine. HEC is needed to drive the learning process for MERCURY, enabling
the system to learn the definition of self and nonself and adapt to changes. The
objectives of a constructive induction engine are to: generate, order, evaluate, and
incorporate hypotheses [Gun91]. Hypothesis generation involves the creation of
hypotheses based on predetermined rules and operators. Hypothesis ordering serves as a
filter, identifying the most and least promising hypotheses. Hypothesis evaluation tests
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hypotheses to see if the goal of the system is achieved through their use. Hypothesis
incorporation integrates the hypotheses determined to work properly into the rule base.
With these subsystem objectives determined, the specific requirements and
expected outputs of a fully operational version of HEC are defined as follows:
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1. Read-in a set of files identified as nonself or self
2. Use selective induction methods to generate all possible hypotheses
from these files
3. Order and evaluate these generated hypotheses based on their abilities
to distinguish between self and nonself
4. If generated hypotheses do not distinguish between self and nonself
with a desired level of accuracy, use constructive induction methods to
construct new hypotheses
5. Order and evaluate these constructed hypotheses based on their
abilities to distinguish between self and nonself
6. Iterate through the constructive induction process until accepted level
of accuracy is obtained
7. Output an accepted set of detectors, based on the hypotheses which
best define the concepts of self and nonself
System architectures may be further refined as architectural subsystems. These
subsystems are often developed independently, so they can be reused in different contexts
[ShG96]. Similar to its "parent system," HEC exhibits many qualities of a shared
information system since its main responsibilities are collecting, manipulating, and
preserving large lists of byte pattern information. The processes of this subsystem that
manipulate hypotheses are independent of each other, run in a fixed sequence until
completion, and pass the hypothesis list to the next process for computation.

4.6.2. Virus Scanner

The virus scanner subsystem is needed to scan system files for viruses. The
scanning method of virus detection was chosen over the other antivirus methods due to its
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ease of programming, modifiability, and function. Its simplicity is best suited for this
proof-of-concept design to improve virus detection. The objectives of the virus scanner
are to: scan system files for nonself, accept previously seen self, reject previously seen
nonself, and flag previously unseen byte patterns, which could represent nonself.
With system objectives determined, specific requirements and expected outputs of
a fully operational virus scanner, within MERCURY, are defined as follows:
1. Read byte patterns from system files
2. Access the byte patterns maintained in the knowledge base
3. Compare system byte patterns to those in the knowledge base
4. Accept files with self byte patterns from the knowledge base
5. Reject files with nonself byte patterns from the knowledge base
6. Question files with byte patterns not contained in the knowledge base
7. Send questionable files to the virus expert
The expected output from this subsystem is a decision to accept the file as self,
reject the file as nonself, or flag the file as indiscernible, based on current knowledge.
The virus scanner follows the organization of a main program/subroutine
architecture [ShG96]. The main program acts as the driver for the subroutines, providing
a control loop for sequencing through the subroutines in a defined order. The virus
scanner calls a read subroutine, which inputs all signatures from the knowledge base,
then calls a locate subroutine, which finds all the files in system to be compared. Finally,
it calls a compare subroutine, which compares the system file byte patterns to those in the
signature list.
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4.6.3. Knowledge Base

If fully implemented, MERCURY would utilize a knowledge base, or data
repository that maintains all byte patterns used to define the concepts of self and nonself.
This subsystem is needed to store and transfer information between the learning engine
and the virus scanner. The objectives of the knowledge base are to maintain byte
patterns, to accept data input from the constructive induction engine, and to provide
signature access to the virus scanner. The specific requirements of the knowledge base
are the ability to:
1. Maintain the data in the form of a signature list
2. Accept inputs from HEC in the form of a list of detectors
3. Provide read-only access to the virus scanner
The expected output from this subsystem is a database of signatures. The
knowledge base does not generate any actions on its own, but instead responds to
requests to store and access data.

4.7.

Dynamic Structure of MERCURY

A system can be understood by examining its dynamic structure, which represents
control information such as events, states, and operations occurring within a system. An
event is a signal that something has happened. A state represents the system in the
interval between events and specifies how events are interpreted. A transition between
states represents the response to an event and may include actions and events to send to
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other system components. A transition may also contain guard conditions, which control
whether a transition is allowed to occur. An action is an automatic operation in response
to an event; one type is sending an event outside the system. A state diagram is a graph
of states and transitions labeled by events. [RBP91]
The overall dynamic structure of a fully implemented version of MERCURY is
depicted in the state diagram in Figure 10. The current prototype of MERCURY does not
fully encapsulate this dynamic structure. This research was concerned with developing a
proof-of-concept of the applicability of constructive induction to this domain. Therefore,
development efforts focused on the inductive learning foundations of HEC.
The first state of MERCURY is "scanning the system for viruses." While
scanning, if MERCURY encounters files with known byte patterns of self that are
contained in the knowledge base, it continues. If MERCURY encounters files with at
least one known nonself byte patterns it sends the "eliminate and repair message" to the
elimination/repair system and continues scanning. If MERCURY locates a file with no
byte patterns from the knowledge base, it sends the "identify file message" to the virus
expert system and continues scanning. Once the virus expert has classified the file as self
or nonself, MERCURY sends the classification and the file to the induction engine
(HEC). MERCURY also sends the "eliminate and repair message" to the
elimination/repair system if the file was identified as nonself. While the system
continues to scan for other nonself files, HEC relearns the concept of self. It remains in
this state until the learning process is complete and the new list of detectors is formed.
This research assumes that learning will be possible with the given methods of
selective and constructive induction. There may be cases when learning is not possible,
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such as inconsistencies in the classification of examples. Once this process is complete,
MERCURY enters the "update knowledge base" state of the system. During this state,
scanning temporarily stops and the knowledge base accepts inputs from the induction
engine, updating its signature list. Once the update is complete, MERCURY re-enters the
"scanning the system for viruses" state and continues scanning for viruses, utilizing the
new signature list.
Event:
Guard:
Action:
Send:

Event:
Guard:
Action:
Send:

Encounter known self OR nonself
At least oneße byte pattern in knowledge base
Continue scanning
"Eliminate and repair message" to the cleaner
system if file is nonself

Encounter previously unseen resource
No file byte patterns in knowledge base
Continue scanning; Await instructions
"Identify file message" to expert system

Event:
Action:

Update complete
Continue scanning

/
Scanning System
and Awaiting
Response

Updating
Knowledge Base

\
Event:
Action:
Send:

Identity of indiscernible file determined
Send Information about file to
induction engine (HEC); Continue scanning
Alert Cleaner resource if file is nonself

\

Event:
Action:
Guard:

z

Learning process complete
Send updated information
Detector List formed

^L
Scanning System
and Relearning
Concepts of Self
and Nonself

T
Event:
Guard:
Action:

Learning process not complete
Detector List not formed
Continue learning; Continue scanning

Figure 10 -- MERCURY'S Dynamic Structure
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To further understand the dynamic structure of MERCURY it is helpful to study
the dynamic structure of MERCURY'S main component, HEC. The dynamic structure of
HEC is depicted in the state diagram in Figure 11. The current prototype of HEC does not
fully encapsulate this dynamic structure. This research was concerned with developing a
proof-of-concept of the applicability of constructive induction to this domain. This
prototype is not optimized enough to be utilized in a fully operational system.
Additionally, the "constructing detector list" state is not implemented.
The first state of HEC is "gathering examples." In this state, the engine reads in
byte patterns from the provided example files identified as self or nonself. Next, HEC
enters the "generating hypotheses based on selection methods" state, where it forms a list
of hypotheses using predefined methods of selective induction. Once this hypothesis list
is complete, the system begins "evaluating and ordering hypotheses." This state tests and
ranks the ability of the hypotheses to distinguish between self and nonself, given as a
score. This score, which measures the ability of the hypothesis to classify many
examples correctly, is discussed in Section 5.3.2. If one or more hypotheses produce an
acceptable score, the system generates a signature list, based on these hypotheses and
enters the "constructing detector list" state. The system utilizes this list to update the
knowledge base and redefine the concepts of self and nonself. If the hypothesis or
hypothesis group does not produce an acceptable score, HEC enters the "formulating
hypotheses based on construction" state, where it forms new hypotheses through
constructive induction methods. These hypotheses are formed by combining previously
generated hypotheses, using a predefined set of operators. After the combinations are
complete, a constructed hypothesis list is passed back to the "evaluating and ordering
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hypotheses" state, where the score for each new hypothesis is tested and compared. HEC
will continue to construct and evaluate hypotheses until it achieves acceptable score or
until the system times out. All design considerations are discussed in Chapter Five.

Event: Read Byte Patterns From Files
Action: Append Example list

Gathering
Examples

(•>

Event: All Examples Gathered
Action: Pass Example list

v

Generating
Hypotheses
via Selection
Methods

J

Event: All Hypotheses Ordered
Guard: Score Unacceptable
Action: Pass a Hypothesis List

Event: Last Hypothesis Generated
Action: Pass Generated Hypothesis list

►/

Evaluating and
Ordering
Hypotheses

Formulating
Hypotheses via
Construction
Methods

V
Event: All Hypotheses Ordered
Guard: Score Acceptable
Action: Pass Hypothesis List

^

Event: All Hypotheses Constructed
Action: Pass Constructed Hypothesis list

Constructing
Detector
List
Event: List Complete
Action: Update Knowledge Base

Figure 11 -■ HEC's Dynamic Structure
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4.8.

Description of Data Flow

In addition to understanding the dynamic structure of MERCURY, it is also
important to recognize the flow of data through a system. The data flow diagram in
Figure 12 provides an overall view of the system by presenting the origination and
destination of data and the processes that transform them [RBP91]. It shows the
sequences of the transformations performed, as well as the external systems affecting the
computation. Processes are depicted as circles, dataflows are depicted with arrows, and
data stores are depicted with parallel lines. The current prototype of MERCURY does not
fully implement this data flow. HEC does not fully interactive with the knowledge base
and scanner, data flow is constrained within this system. Additionally, this design
includes an incremental learning mechanism, which has not been incorporated into HEC.
An operational version would complete these interactions.
MERCURY'S first process scans the system by comparing known byte patterns
from the knowledge base to byte patterns from files in the system. The next process
determines if an unclassified file is self or nonself, through a virus expert system. Once
the file has been identified as self or nonself, the file and the virus expert's classification
are transferred to HEC. This adaptive component will induce a detector for the file that is
consistent with the existing definitions of self and nonself. Upon completion of this
process, the new detector is transferred to the knowledge base, in the form of byte
patterns.
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■ System Files

Virus Expert

Figure 12 -- MERCURY'S Dataflow Diagram

4.9.

System Integration and Testing

The high-level integration of MERCURY involves matching the inputs to outputs
between the major subsystems: HEC, virus scanner, and knowledge base. This
integration step is necessary for the operational version of MERCURY. The virus
scanner must be able to access the byte patterns in the knowledge base. The virus
scanner and the inductive engine must be to communicate through the virus expert and
the knowledge base. Figure 13 loosely describes the exchange of data between the
subsystems, depicted as black boxes, with notional inputs and outputs.
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Figure 13 -- MERCURY'S Integration

Testing of the fully operational version of MERCURY should occur in several
phases. First, each of the subsystems should be tested as independent units, to assure
individual requirements were met. Once each unit is determined to function properly,
each of the three interfaces should be tested: HEC's interface with the knowledge base,
the virus scanner's interface with knowledge base, and virus scanner's interface with
HEC, through the virus expert. After this testing is complete, the entire system should be
tested. While testing the system, the following should be considered:
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1. Overall system objectives and requirements were met
2. Subsystem objectives and requirements were met
3. System and subsystem outputs are valid
4. System and subsystem processes operate accurately and efficiently
5. Data integrity was maintained throughout the system

4.10. Summary

The Computer Health System, presented in Chapter Three, identified the need for
an individual computer immune system. This chapter focused on its main component,
MERCURY. The design presented here provided a high-level description of an
operational version of MERCURY, by defining its objectives, requirements, and
architecture, the major subsystems and processes involved, and their integration and
testing. Deviations between this proposed design and the prototyped implementation
were noted.
An important aspect addressed in this chapter was the dynamic structure of
MERCURY, detailing the system states and the sequences of actions and events with
trigger transitions. Within MERCURY, there is a constant flow of data between the
subsystems. This chapter discussed data origination and destination, as well as the
integration required to enable transmission between subsystems. Finally, the levels of
testing were briefly discussed. Chapter Six provides specific information about the types
of tests conducted with the prototype.
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The detailed descriptions of design decisions, tradeoffs, and limitations for each
subsystem and process within MERCURY are provided in Chapter Five. Chapter Six
discusses the testing methods utilized to validate and verify the output of MERCURY
and provides the results of the testing.
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5. System Implementation

5.1.

Overview

Chapter Four presented the high-level description of an operational version of
MERCURY. This chapter highlights the prototyped implementation of this proposed
design. This chapter provides a detailed description of the components and processes
within the prototyped version of MERCURY, including the prototyped versions of its
three main components: the constructive engine, the scanner, and the knowledge base.
Each of these components is represented abstractly, not practically, in the system. The
system components are explained in terms of their functions, design decisions and
corresponding advantages and disadvantages, tradeoffs and limitations, complexity, and
modifiability. Chapter Six presents the results of the testing of MERCURY. Chapter
Seven presents the conclusions of this research.

5.2.

Definitions

Several terms will be used extensively in the discussion of the detailed design.
This section clarifies their meaning in relation to the detection system:
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Signature

A series of bytes from a file that distinguishes self for
nonself.

Hypothesis A candidate signature formed by HEC. A hypothesis is
composed of a label, features, the generation method, and a
score that indicates the "goodness" of the hypothesis.
Example

A labeled instance of the concept to be classified. In this
system an example is a file that is labeled as self or nonself.

Label

A flag that indicates whether the example is an instance of
self or nonself. The label is also used to flag whether the
hypothesis classifies self or nonself.

Attribute

A byte from a file. A byte is composed of 8 bits, represented
by logical IsandOs.

Feature

A sequence of 16 attributes that can be used to identify a file
as self or nonself. The absolute position of the attributes is
not considered, although relative position is used by the
selection rules. A hypothesis generated by construction
contains multiple features, while a hypothesis generated by
selection contains one feature.

Generation The series of steps that were used to create the features.
Method
Concept

An abstraction that a file belongs to a class. The concept
space of this research is self and nonself.
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5.3.

Construction Induction Engine

HEC develops signatures for both self and nonself files. Self signatures are used
to classify files currently on the computer. Nonself signatures store information about
previously seen viruses. The use of self and nonself detectors allow for extensibility
within the computer immune system by allowing the ability to share virus information
across computer systems. This capability is analogous to a vaccination shared among a
population, in order to prevent the spread of disease.
The constructive induction engine is responsible for providing MERCURY'S
virus scanner the signatures needed to distinguish self from nonself. HEC performs the
four constructive induction processes that were discussed in the literature review:
hypothesis generation, evaluation, ordering, and incorporation. The following sections
cover the implementation of these processes and the required design decisions.

5.3.1.

Hypothesis Generation

Hypothesis generation involves the creation of hypotheses based on
predetermined rules and operators. HEC creates hypotheses based on two methods:
initial selection of attributes from an example file, or construction based upon the
features of two existing hypotheses from the same concept. HEC creates hypotheses by
selective, then constructive induction. The following subsections describe the notion of a
hypothesis, explain the selection rules and define the constructive operators and
generation grammar.
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5.3.1.1.

Hypothesis

A hypothesis is a candidate solution to the problem the system was assigned to
solve; however, more than one hypothesis may be needed to solve a problem. Inductive
systems are based upon the creation, manipulation and evaluation of hypotheses.
Hypotheses in HEC represent a candidate signature, or a sequence of bytes that identify a
file as either self or nonself.
In HEC, a hypothesis is composed of a label, feature, generation method, and
score for effectiveness. The label indicates whether the hypothesis classifies self or
nonself. During creation of a hypothesis by a selection rule, the hypothesis' label is
given the same value as the example. A feature is a sequence of 16 bytes that may
uniquely identify the example. This size was chosen based upon research done at IBM.
This research empirically determined that a 16 byte signature is sufficient to provide a
high detection rate with a false positive probability of less than 0.5% [KeA94].
Additionally, 16 bytes is the signature size used in current virus research, as noted in the
industry publication Virus Bulletin [KSSW97]. The generation method explains how the
hypothesis was created; this information is needed during evaluation and by the scanner.
The score for effectiveness measures how effectively the hypothesis distinguishes
between self and nonself. This score is discussed in the hypothesis evaluation subsection.
Hypotheses are stored as a list of records. The list data structure was chosen for ease of
manipulation. The record for each hypothesis contains three fields, label, method, and
score.
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This research hypothesized that a series of bytes can be used as an effective
inductive feature to distinguish between self and nonself in a file. Other features could be
used for this purpose, notably system calls or system state. Different antivirus programs
have been created that use these features to determine the existence of viruses in a
computer. MERCURY utilizes a scanner type antivirus program, since this type
effectively recognizes byte signatures in files.

5.3.1.2.

Example Set

The example set is a collection of files that are labeled as instances of self or
nonself. Through the inductive process, HEC seeks to create signatures which classify
members of the example set as self or nonself. Some researchers use the term training set
in lieu of example set, since the examples are used to train the system in the problem
area.
The example set is specified by a file that contains a listing of the file names and
associated self or nonself labels. Self and nonself examples are included in the example
set to ensure that signatures for each concept are induced from examples. Another
technique would include examples from one concept only, allowing the system to detect
members of the other concept as deviations. A system that trains on one concept would
need to learn the most general hypothesis, while a system that trains on all possible
concepts can learn a more specific hypothesis [Hau87].
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5.3.1.3.

Selection Rules

HEC begins as a selective induction system; it only selects existing attributes to
describe the concept. Any rule that extracts bytes from the example can be used for
selection. Possible selection rules include: selecting bytes from a certain portion of a
file, selecting random bytes from a file, selecting certain chunks from a file, selecting
bytes through a sliding window moved across the file, or selecting every Nl byte.
Based upon storage and computational limitations and constrained by the scope of
this research, selection rules were limited. HEC uses three selection rules, chunking,
sliding window, and every other byte sliding window. Table 16 explains these rules.
Table 16 -- Selection rules

Rule
Chunking Selection
Sliding Window
Selection
Every Other Byte
Sliding Window
Selection

Description
This rule breaks an example into nonoverlapping segments containing an equal
number of bytes.
This rule divides an example into
overlapping segments containing an equal
number of bytes.
This rule divides an example into
overlapping segments, extracting every other
byte from each segment until the specified
number of bytes are selected.

# Hypotheses Created1
N/K

N-K+l

N-(2K-1)

By way of illustration, Figure 14 shows how the selection rules create hypotheses from
the examples.

1

N is the number of bytes in the example. K is the number of bytes in each feature field of the hypothesis.
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Chunking Selection from a File
01010100010111110101011111010151 01110100 01011011 01010011 11011101 11010101 01110100 01011111 01010111

Hypothesis One:
0101010001011111
01010111 11010101

Hypothesis Two:
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101

Hypothesis Three:
1101010101110100
0101111101010111

Sliding Window Selection from a File
01010100 01011111 01010111 110101O1 01110100 01011011 01010011 11011101,11010101 01110100 01011111 01010111
*•
\L~
-*
J
1
I

Hypothesis One:
0101010001011111
0101011111010101

•••
Hypothesis Nine:
1101010101110100
0101111101010111

Every Other Byte Sliding Window Selection from a File
Q1010100 01011111 01010111 11010101 01110100)01011011 01010011,11011101 11010101 01110100 01011111 01010111|

Hypothesis One:
0101010001010111
0111010001010011

• ••
Hypothesis Six:
0101101111011101
01110100 01010111

Figure 14 — Selection rules
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5.3.1.3.1.

Bias

The choice of selection rules is a form of bias since these rules are based upon
background knowledge gained from other antivirus research. Sliding window selection is
similar to the current method of choosing byte signatures for a scanner based antivirus
program. These methods try to find a series of bytes in a file that can be found anywhere
in the file. Chunking selection was included in this research since this rule produces
features that are a subset of those produced by sliding window selection. Every other byte
sliding window (EOSW) selection was included in this set of selection rules to increase
the probability of capturing patterns across a greater number of bytes. This form of
selection could be interpreted as a form of construction, since these selection rules
combine attributes through conjunction, creating a new feature.

5.3.1.3.2.

Process / Algorithm

HypoList = []
Read in file and associated label
Use chunking selection rule to create hypotheses from file
Use sliding window selection rule to create hypotheses from file
Use every other byte sliding window selection rule to create
hypotheses from file
HypoList = hypotheses from chunking, sliding window and every
other byte sliding window
Figure 15 -- Algorithm for Selecting Hypotheses

During the first hypotheses generation process, files from the example set are read by
HEC. Each selection rule is applied to these files, resulting in a list of hypotheses.
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5.3.1.3.3.

Computational Complexity

Computational complexity captures the order of growth of an algorithm and gives
a simple characterization of the algorithm's efficiency. This measure allows computer
scientists to compare the relative performance of algorithms, identify areas of
improvement, and highlight expected pitfalls during execution [CLR90].
Each selection rule is applied to each file from the example set. The number of
hypotheses selected is the important factor in the computational complexity of selection.
Based upon Table 16, the computational complexity of selection is O(n-k), or linear.

5.3.1.4.

Hypothesis Construction

The other method of hypothesis generation in HEC is hypothesis construction.
Hypotheses are constructed by combining existing hypotheses through constructive
operators. This constructive process can be repeated if "better" hypotheses are needed.
Initially, hypotheses are constructed solely from selected hypotheses, although
constructed hypotheses can be used as input for later iterations of construction.
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5.3.1.4.1.

Constructive Operators

Constructive operators create new hypotheses by specifying relationships among
features of existing hypotheses. These operators can manipulate the features through
logic, mathematics, statistics, heuristics, or a variety of other means.
HEC uses three logical operators and two spatial operators. The logical operators
perform a Boolean comparison of the existence of two features. The three logical
operators are AND, OR, and XOR. These operators input two hypotheses with the same
label and the same selection method. The constructive process outputs a single
hypothesis that captures the essence of: both features in a file, one feature or another or
both are in a file, or one feature or another has to be in the file, but not both
simultaneously. Given N hypotheses, each logical operator will construct C(N,2) or N
choose 2, hypotheses. Figures 16 through 18 illustrate the logical operators constructing
a new hypothesis from two existing hypotheses.

Constructed
Hypothesis:

Hypothesis One:
01010100 01011111
01010111 11010101
AND
Hypothesis Two:
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101

01010100 01011111
0101011111010101
AND
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101

Figure 16 -- Pictorial Representation of the AND Operator
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Constructed
Hypothesis:

Hypothesis One:
01010100 01011111
01010111 11010101

01010100 01011111
01010111 11010101
OR
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101

Hypothesis Two:
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101

Figure 17 -- Pictorial Representation of the OR Operator

Constructed
Hypothesis:

Hypothesis One:
0101010001011111
01010111 11010101

0101010001011111
01010111 11010101
XOR
0111010001011011
01010011 11011101

Hypothesis Two:
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101

Figure 18 ~ Pictorial Representation of the XOR Operator

The spatial operators compare the relation of the features' relative locations in a
file. The two spatial operators are BEFORE and DISTANCE. These operators input two
hypotheses with the same label, the same selection method, and created from the same
example file. The operators output a single hypothesis that captures the idea that one
feature is before the other feature, or that one feature must be a certain number of
attributes, or bytes, away from the other feature.
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Hypothesis One:
01010100 01011111
01010111 11010101

Hypothesis Two:
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101

File
K01 010100

01011011 01010011 11011101
J01010100 01011111 01010111 11010101]
11010101 01110100 01011111 01010111
01010100 01011111 0101011111011101
101110100 01011011 01010011 110111011
M1010101 01110100 01011111 01010111

Constructed
Hypothesis:
01010100 01011111
01010111 11010101
COMES BEFORE
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101
Figure 19 - Pictorial Representation of the BEFORE Operator

Hypothesis One:
01010100 01011111
01010111 11010101

Hypothesis Two:
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101

File
01010100 01011011 01010011 11011101
101010100 01011111 01010111 11010101
11010101 01110100 01011111 01010111
01010100 01011111 0101011111011101
1110100 01011011 01010011 110111011
11010101 01110100 01011111 01010111

J

Constructed
Hypothesis:
01010100 01011111
01010111 11010101
IS 8 BYTES FROM
01110100 01011011
01010011 11011101
Figure 20 - Pictorial Representation of the DISTANCE Operator

The distance between features is based upon the number of bytes between the last
feature of the first hypothesis and the first feature of the second hypothesis. This method
does not account for hypotheses with interleaved features. Given N hypotheses, each
spatial operator will construct C(N,2) or N choose 2, hypotheses. Figures 19 and 20
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illustrate the relation between the new constructed hypothesis and the original hypotheses
from which it was formed.

5.3.1.4.2.

Bias

Several biases were used in determining whether to apply a constructive operator
to two hypotheses. The first bias only allows construction on hypotheses from the same
concept as determined by the label. This bias ensures that the hypothesis' label is not
assigned randomly; rather, the label is based upon previous information.
Another bias limits construction to existing features, instead of allowing randomly
generated features. During the selection process, HEC extracts all possible features from
the file based upon the selection rules. Randomly generated features are not guaranteed
to be found in the example files. Randomly generated features that are found in the
example files are duplicates of existing selected features. Since randomly generated
features would not provide any new information or insight, they are not used in HEC.
From a system perspective, scanning for randomly located byte patterns is unnecessarily
complex, compared to a methodical approach.
Another bias limits the application of operators to hypotheses created through the
same selection rule. This bias was included in the system to limit the different methods
of file reading the virus scanner would need to use when searching for a detector in a file.
This bias also reduces the number of constructed hypotheses. Finally, removing the
possibility of combining selection rules in a hypothesis aids in isolating and analyzing
whether a particular constructive operator improves the performance of HEC. The main
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objective of this research was to demonstrate the applicability of constructive induction to
virus detection; therefore, this bias simplified the testing of this objective. It simplified
testing by concentrating attention on the effect of operators used for construction, rather
than the effects of combining selection rules.
The choice of constructive operators is based upon background knowledge of the
binary structure of executable programs and virus research. The logical operators
account for multiple, or restricted virus characteristics. Logical operators also account
for common information that can be found in uninfected programs. The spatial operators
account for the positioning of virus characteristics and nonvirus characteristics in an
infected file.
Bias also restricted the application of the operators to two hypotheses, based upon
the example file from which the hypotheses were derived. The first operator bias
involves the AND operator. The AND operator is only applied to hypotheses with
features from the same file. Since features are derived from an example file, the selected
hypotheses are guaranteed to detect at least one example correctly. Without this bias, it is
possible to create hypotheses using AND that do not classify any examples, reducing
system performance when compared to selection. Another bias involves the XOR
operator. Since XOR captures the essence that one feature or another feature is found in
the file, but not both, a check is made prior to construction to ensure the hypotheses do
not contain features generated from the same file. Other biases involve the spatial
operators. The spatial operators BEFORE and DISTANCE are only applied to
hypotheses derived from the same example file. This guarantees that the constructor will
be able to determine a distance and ordering for the features in the file. The final
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operator bias is for the OR operator, which has no restrictions. The use of these biases
reduces the overall number of hypotheses generated through construction.
A variety of techniques can be used in the application of constructive operators
across the hypotheses. One technique would apply all the operators across two
hypotheses and then evaluate the results. Another technique would apply an operator
across all the hypotheses, evaluate the results from that operator, and if necessary, apply
the next operator in succession. A third technique would apply all the operators across all
hypotheses and then perform hypothesis evaluation. HEC utilizes the third technique.
This decision was based on the need to test this research's primary hypothesis that
constructive induction provides a suitable learning mechanism for the virus detector
system of a computer immune system. Each operator is applied to all the hypotheses to
see if construction improves the overall detection potential of the system. This technique
also tests the constructive operator hypothesis by providing information on whether the
spatial and logical operators can be used to construct effective hypotheses. Finally, since
constructive induction has not been used in previous virus detectors, no background
knowledge exists that can guide which operators will lead to the best detector.

5.3.1.4.3.

Generation Grammar

A hypothesis can be created in several ways through the selection rules and
constructive operators. Information is stored in the generation method field of the
hypothesis that records the selection rule used to extract the features from the file and the
relationship between the features established by the constructive operators. Evaluation
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of the hypothesis is accomplished by comparing the hypothesis to the examples and
scoring the hypothesis. During this comparison, the features are found using the
selection method and the relation between the features is compared to the generation
grammar to determine if the hypothesis classifies the example.
The generation method field is instantiated through the generation grammar. This
grammar is similar to prefix mathematical notation, where the selection rules are
analogous to operands and constructive operators are similar to mathematical operators.
The productions for the generation grammar are:

S-»R
S ^ OSS
R -» chunking I sliding_window | eo_sliding_window
O ■> and I or I xor | before I distance

By way of example, the generation method stored for a hypothesis created by applying
the OR operator to two features selected through chunking rule would be [or, chunking,
chunking]. The generation method is stored in a binary tree data structure inside the
method field of the hypothesis.

53.1.4.4.

Process / Algorithm

During constructive induction, the various constructive operators are applied
across all the hypotheses. For each operator, two hypotheses are chosen from the
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hypothesis list, and the labels and selection method are checked to ensure they match.
The new hypothesis is created by setting the label equal to the label of the original
hypotheses and the score is set to null. The algorithm for this process is shown in Figure
21.
The next steps are dependent on the type of operator being used. Construction
through logical operators is accomplished by ensuring that any biases applicable to the
operator are satisfied. Next, the method is constructed by placing the operator at the root
of the new expression, with the left and right methods from the original hypotheses.
Construction through spatial operators is accomplished by ensuring that the hypotheses
are from the same file. Following this step, the file from which the hypotheses were
selected is searched to determine the relative location of the features for BEFORE and the
number of bytes between the features for DISTANCE. This process is continued until
each constructive operator has been applied to the hypotheses. This method does not
exhaustively search for repeated features.
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ConstructedList = []
HypoList = hypotheses to be used for construction Loop
Loop

Hypol = first hypothesis in HypoList
Tail = remainder of HypoList after Hypol
Loop
Hypo2 = first hypothesis from Tail such that
Hypo2.Label = Hypol.Label and selection rule for
Hypol and Hypo2 are the same
Apply constructive operators to Hypol and Hypo2, storing
new hypothesis in ConstructedList
End Loop when Tail = []
End Loop when HypoList = []
ConstructedList = Hypotheses created from applying constructive
operators to hypotheses in HypoList
Figure 21 -■ Algorithm for Constructing Hypotheses

5.3.1.4.5.

Computational Complexity

Constructing hypotheses uses a doubly nested loop to select the hypotheses two at
a time in a combinatorial fashion. The complexity of this loop is based upon the number
of hypotheses in the HypoList, or n. The application of the constructive operator takes
constant time for logical operators and is based upon the size of the file, or/, for spatial
operators in order to perform the search for the features. Based upon this analysis, the
algorithm for constructing hypotheses takes 0(n f).
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5.3.2.

Hypothesis Evaluation

Hypothesis evaluation is responsible for determining a score of "goodness" for
each hypothesis. This score is used to determine if the hypothesis should remain in the
system for possible construction or incorporation into the knowledge base. During
hypothesis evaluation, each hypothesis is compared against the example set to determine
the number of examples that the hypothesis classified and whether these classifications
were correct.

5.3.2.1.

Scoring

MERCURY classifies files as self or nonself based upon virus signatures learned
by HEC. HEC is responsible for learning signatures for self and nonself that are able to
accurately classify files and have a predictive capability. This capability determines
whether a previously unseen file is similar to existing self or nonself. In order to achieve
a globally maximum accuracy and predictive capability, HEC seeks to induce hypotheses
that are locally maximal. The hypothesis score is used to determine if the hypothesis is
locally maximal.
Classification is when the features of the hypothesis are found in the example and
this match of features satisfies the expression stored in the generation method field of the
hypothesis. Misclassification is a form of classification where the labels of the example
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and the hypothesis are different. Correct classification is when the hypothesis classifies
the example and the labels of the hypothesis and the example are the same.
A variety of measures can determine the effectiveness of a hypothesis for
classifying files as self or nonself. Many existing constructive induction systems have
used information gain for this purpose. Information gain is a measure of how well an
attribute splits the examples into groups; i.e. the reduction of system entropy by the
hypothesis. Information gain is computed through the following set of equations, where
p is the number of examples classified in class P, n is the number of examples classified
in class N, and v is the total number of examples.

I(p,n) = -(-E-log2-?-)-(-?-\og2^-)
p+n
p+n
p+n
p+n

E(A) = ±^^I(Pi,ni)
,=i P + n

gain(A) = I(p,n)-E(A)
I(p,n) captures the idea that the probability of any example belonging to class P is
p/(p+n) and the probability of any example belonging to class N is n/(p+n). E(A) is the
expected information requirement for examples that have a particular attribute, A. The
information gain is then the amount of entropy reduction ascribed to a particular attribute.
[Qui86]
In HEC, the hypothesis is labeled during generation. During evaluation, HEC
must determine how well the hypothesis detects examples with the same label. Using
information gain in HEC would result in assigning the same score to hypotheses that
classify many examples correctly and to hypotheses that classify many examples
incorrectly. This property of information gain is based upon the score's normal usage,
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where the system assigns a label to the classifier after evaluation. This property is based
upon the log2 terms used in the calculation for I(p,n). Based upon this property,
information gain is not used in HEC. Instead, other measurement criteria are used to
evaluate hypotheses.
The hypothesis score used in HEC reflects three important measurement criteria
of effectiveness: power, purity, and complexity. Power indicates the capability of the
hypothesis to classify any given example. Purity reflects the ability of the system to be
correct when it classifies. Complexity is related to Occam's razor; simple hypotheses
should be preferred over those that are complex. Based upon these measurement criteria,
the measurements of Table 17 are possible. In order to illustrate how these measures are
calculated, an example is provided in Figure 23.
Table 17 ■■ Possible Measurements for Hypothesis Effectiveness

Power

Purity

Complexity

Measurement One
This measurement calculates the strength of the hypothesis by rating the
percentage of classified examples over the entire set of examples. This
measure does not account for correctness.
Measurement Two
This measurement examines the group classified as belonging to a
specific concept; in order to calculate the percentage of examples
classified correctly over the total number of examples classified by that
hypothesis.
Measurement Three
This measurement is based on Occman's Razor [Gun91], which states
"Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitat," meaning entities should
not be multiplied unnecessarily. This measure is calculated by looking
at the depth of the tree stored in the method field of the hypothesis, with
a complexity of 0 for selection.

A desired measure is one that rewards a hypothesis for low complexity, high
power and high purity. This concept is depicted in Figure 22. Hypotheses that posses
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this desired property are locally maximal and encourage the system to become globally
maximal.
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Figure 22 — Depiction of Optimal Scores
The score for each hypothesis is stored as a record with fields for complexity,
power and purity. These measurements require the evaluation process to determine the
following metrics for each hypothesis: R, the number of examples classified correctly; S,
the number of self examples; N, the number of nonself examples; C, the number of
examples classified; and D, the number of constructions.
Based on this information, the score can be calculated by:

Power = ■

r.
N+S

Purity = —
NumConstru ctions = D
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Hypothesis Evaluation

Example Space

|

6 Positive +
7 Negative
13 Total

Classified

Unclassified

4 Positive +
3 Negative
7 Total

2 Positive +
4 Negative
6 Total

Hypothesis

7 /13 = 0.538
4/7 = 0.571
2

Power:
Purity:
Complexity:

Hypothesis
((00101000) OR (01010000)) AND ((00001111) XOR (11111110))

2nd Level of Construction

AND
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Figure 23 ~ Example of Calculated Scores
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Selection

5.3.2.2.

Coverage

Power, purity and number of constructions provide a local perspective on the
performance of an individual hypothesis. A global perspective is also needed to ensure
the hypothesis list, as a whole, can classify the example set. This perspective is
encapsulated by the concept of coverage. Coverage is derived by comparing the
hypotheses to the examples to determine the number of hypotheses that classify,
misclassify and fail to classify each example. Coverage shows whether the hypotheses
are able to classify the entire example set, or only a certain portion. This measure is
based on the percentage of examples classified by the set of hypotheses. Coverage is
calculated after evaluation in a separate procedure.
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5.3.2.3.

Process / Algorithm

R,S,N,C <- 0
HypoList = hypotheses to be evaluated
ExampleList = examples that hypotheses are evaluated against
Loop
Hypo = first hypothesis in HypoList
Loop
Example = first example in ExampleList
If Example.Label = Self
S <- S + 1
Else
N <- N + 1
End If
P <- Parse(Hypo, Example)
If P = Found
C <- C + 1
If Hypo.Label = Example.Label
R <- R + 1
End If
End If
End Loop when ExampleList = []
Hypo.Score = Score(Hypo)
End Loop when all hypotheses are evaluated
Figure 24 -- Algorithm for Hypothesis Evaluation

During the evaluation algorithm, depicted in Figure 24, each hypothesis is
compared to all examples to determine its score. The parse function is used to compare a
hypothesis from the list of hypotheses and an example chosen from the example list.
Parse is responsible for determining whether the features were found and the method was
satisfied. If the features were found and method was satisfied, the hypothesis classifies
the example. This classification is correct if the labels of the hypothesis and the example
match, otherwise this hypothesis misclassifies the example. Score is responsible for
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performing the calculations for the hypothesis score and storing this information in the
hypothesis. The evaluation process stops when all the hypotheses have been compared
against all the examples.

5.3.2.4.

Computational Complexity

Hypothesis evaluation is accomplished through a doubly nested loop. The first
loop traverses the hypothesis list, one at a time. This loop is executed n times, where n is
the number of hypotheses in the list. The second loop iterates through the list of
examples e times, where e is the number of examples. Therefore, evaluation has
computational complexity of O(en), or 0(n2) in the worst case.

5.3.3.

Hypothesis Ordering

The hypothesis ordering step is performed before or after the evaluation step, with
the purpose of reducing the number of hypotheses needed for evaluation or construction,
respectively. HEC has the ability to order hypothesis after evaluation, increasing the
efficiency of the system. Bias or other heuristics can be used prior to evaluation to
reduce the number of hypotheses that need to undergo this computationally complex
operation. After evaluation, hypotheses that do not perform well can be removed in a
manner similar to genetic algorithms or beam search.
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HEC orders the hypotheses after evaluation, with the purpose of removing poor
performers from the pool of hypotheses sent to construction. The decision to evaluate
before ordering is based on the research objectives of determining what constructive
induction components are viable in this domain. Ordering is used to improve the average
case performance of construction, which is an inherently combinatorial operation.
Ordering searches for hypotheses that are not dominated by other hypotheses. These
hypotheses have the highest score for power and purity. The following sections examine
the growth in the number of hypotheses without ordering, changes to the evaluation
process, and ordering the hypotheses to find the nondominated set.

5.3.3.1.

Hypothesis Growth

HEC generates numerous hypotheses in order to find the set of hypotheses that
adequately classifies the examples. This subsection explores the growth of hypotheses
based upon the various generation methods. Using the selection rules, selection creates at
most
N/K + (N-K+l)+ (N- (2K-1))
which by reduction, is equivalent to
N/K+2N-3K+2
hypotheses from a file, where N is the number of bytes in the file and K is the number of
attributes in each feature.
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Following selection, hypotheses are used for construction. Construction chooses two
hypotheses at a time, in a combinatorial fashion, and applies the five constructive
operators. This process can be examined in terms of the number of hypotheses sent to
construction, or x.
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This equation does not account for the biases used in construction to limit the application
of constructive operators. This equation can be viewed more generally in terms of the
levels of construction, L; the number of constructive operators, Ops; and the number of
initial hypotheses, X as:
l 1
2L-1„2

0(Ops'- x* )
This order of growth of the number of constructed hypotheses is valid for x > 4. By way
of example, Figure 25 shows how the number of hypotheses in the system increases with
each level of construction for a system like HEC that uses 16 attributes in a feature.
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Construction Complexity caused by the Number of
Constructions

Chunking
Sliding Window
EO Sliding Window

1

2

3

Number of Constructions

Figure 25 ~ Complexity caused by Number of Constructions

5.3.3.2.

Nondominated Set

A variety of techniques could be used to reduce the number of hypotheses in the
system. More heuristics could be used to limit the number of hypotheses that are
constructed. The label of a hypothesis with a high power and low purity could be
switched from one concept to another. These hypotheses have an ability to classify many
examples, however incorrectly; switching the label would dramatically improve the
purity. Such a step is not needed since the corresponding hypothesis that has high power
and high purity exists elsewhere in the hypothesis list. Hypotheses could be randomly
chosen from the hypothesis list and used for construction. Such a stochastic process
would have the same average performance of not ordering and would not guarantee any
improvements.
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EEC's ordering mechanism is based upon the nondominated set of hypotheses.
This set is found by placing the hypotheses into "bins", a two-dimensional array that
equally distributes the hypotheses based upon their power and purity score. A
hypothesis is assigned to a bin based upon a mapping that translates the power and purity
scores from the range [0.0 .. 1.0] into five bins with containing the ranges ([0.0 ..
0.20),(0.21 .. 0.40),(0.41.. 0.60),(0.61 .. 0.80),(0.81..1.0]). Five bins were chosen to
provide a coarse ordering, since a lack of existing empirical evidence impedes finer
tuning. The system was designed to use a varying number of bins. With this system of
bins, a hypothesis with a power score of 0.9 and a purity score of 1.0 would have the
index (5,5) into the two dimensional array of bins. A hypothesis with a power score of
0.5 and a purity score of 1.0 would be placed into bin (3,5). The index into the bins is
expressed in terms of the power index followed by the purity index, or (power, purity).
The bin (5,5) is considered the "optimal" bin in this system since this is the location of
the hypotheses with the highest power and purity scores. Figure 26 illustrates this system
of bins and the location of the optimal bin.
The nondominated set is the set of hypotheses with scores that are greater than the
hypotheses in the dominated set. In terms of the bins, the dominated set is the set of nonempty bins where another non-empty bin has a higher power index and a higher purity
index. The one exception to this rule is that all filled bins in the column for the highest
purity scores are included in the nondominated set. Since HEC is designed to learn
classifiers for a concept, and purity measures the ability of the hypothesis to classify
correctly, hypotheses with a high purity score should remain in the system.
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5.3.3.3.

Process / Algorithm

Index = indexes of previous ordering
HypoList = []

B = bins with evaluated hypotheses
PrevPur <- 0
For Pow = (5 .. 1)
If PrevPur > Index(Pow)
PrevPur <- 0
End If
OldPur <- Index(Pow)
For Pur <- (5 .. 1)
If (Pur < PrevPur) and (Pur < 5)
Exit loop
End If
If B(Pow,Pur).Count > 0
Append(HypoList, B(Pow,Pur).BinHypoList)
Index(Pow) <- Pur
If Pur < OldPur
PrevPur <- Pur
Exit Loop
End If
End If
End Loop
End Loop
Index = Specifies the bins that compromise the nondominated set
HypoList = Hypotheses in the nondominated set
Figure 27 -- Algorithm for Hypothesis Ordering

Figure 27 shows the algorithm used to order hypothesis stored in bins. The output
of this algorithm is a list of hypotheses from the nondominated set. Additionally, an
index is created that defines the location of the nondominated set in the bins. This index
can be used if the nondominated set of hypotheses is not sufficient to construct classifiers
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of the examples. The index can be used to increase the membership of the nondominated
set, increasing the number of hypotheses available for subsequent inductive steps.

5.3.3.4.

Computational Complexity

Searching through the bins for the members of the nondominated set is accomplished
through a doubly nested loop. Each loop iterates one time for every power row, or 5
times. The append operation can be accomplished in constant time through pointer
manipulation. The overall complexity of the ordering step can be generalized to
0(bpowbpur) where each b is the number of bins into which power and purity are divided.

5.3.4.

Hypothesis Incorporation

Hypothesis incorporation is responsible for converting the hypotheses that
correctly classify the examples into a form for acceptance into the knowledge base. The
current version of MERCURY dose not fully implement this process. Future iterations of
MERCURY should investigated algorithms for reducing the number of hypotheses
needed to form detectors. Adding this incorporation capability will close the inductive
loop.
Several fields of a hypothesis would be needed by the virus scanner, including
label, generation method, and features. The hypothesis score could also be incorporated
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into the knowledge base, to aid the virus scanner in determining the relative worth of a
classification.
When hypotheses are incorporated, they are sorted so that hypotheses that detect
nonself are at the beginning of the list. This ordering ensures nonself byte patterns of
files are detected before self byte patterns, improving the classification process.
Following this sorting operation, the relative fields of a hypothesis are written to a text
file, with one field written per line.

5.4.

Knowledge Base Interface

The knowledge base is responsible for storing information about the detectors
used to classify files as self or nonself. This knowledge base is currently structured as a
flat text file consisting of the detectors for self and nonself. The nonself detectors are
included first to ensure that viruses are detected with few misclassifications as self. This
knowledge base can accept virus signatures from other files than HEC. Current virus
signatures are comparable to nonself hypotheses selected through the sliding window
selection rule. This ability ensures that existing virus detection knowledge is not lost
using a system like MERCURY.
The only components of MERCURY that can access the knowledge base are HEC
and the scanner. Future iterations of MERCURY will include interfaces for introducing
new detectors through vaccination. Controlled user manipulation of the knowledge base
is also an area of possible development, as well as virus updates received through the
Computer Health System.
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5.5.

Scanner

The third and final component of MERCURY is the virus scanner. This scanner
is responsible for determining the classification of a file based upon the self and nonself
detectors created by HEC. The following sections discuss the use of self and nonself
detectors to classify files on the system. In the current version of MERCURY, the
scanner is not fully implemented. Reading the detectors from the knowledge base and
determining the files to scan were not incorporated, while determining the classification
of a file was. Several of the components of HEC can be reused in the scanner.

5.5.1.

Reading Detectors

The detectors created by HEC are stored in the knowledge base. As discussed
above, these detectors are stored in a flat file. Each detector consists of a label, feature,
and generation method. The scanner reads this information from the file and creates a list
of hypotheses based upon the hypothesis data structure from HEC.

5.5.2.

Determining Files to Scan

Only certain files are susceptible to infection by viruses. This research is
concerned with detecting file infector viruses in executable files, as compared to viruses
that affect data files, for example macro viruses in the Microsoft Office product line.
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Executable files are distinguished by the following file extensions: exe, com, sys, dll, bat,
vxd, cab and drv. The list of files to scan is generated by searching the directory structure
of the system for files with these extensions. This list is converted into the example list
data structure used in HEC. In order to provide a basis for comparison against the list of
detectors, each file is given the label of self.

5.5.3.

Determining Classification of File

A file is classified by determining if any of the detectors can be found within it.
This process is carried out by using the test_example function of HEC's evaluator. This
function operates by comparing the list of examples to the list of hypotheses; in the
scanner, the files to scan are compared to the list of detectors. Each file is opened and
read, 16 bytes at a time, using the various selection methods. These bytes are compared
to the features from the detectors. A flag is raised if there is a match based upon the
detection scenarios below. The entire generation method and features of the detector
must match for the file to be considered classified.

5.5.3.1.

Detecting Unknown Files

A file is considered unclassified if no detector was able to classify it. In the fully
implemented version of MERCURY, this file would be annotated as unclassified and sent
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to the virus expert to determine if the file is infected. Once the expert classified the file,
HEC would learn a new detector for it.

5.5.3.2.

Detecting Self Files

A file is classified as self if one or more self detectors are found in the file, and no
nonself detectors are found. As discussed in Chapter Two, when a virus infects a file, the
virus normally leaves large portions of the file intact. If the existence of any self
detectors, without regard to the existence of nonself detectors, were used as the decision
criteria, the system would be duped by "normal" viruses.

5.5.3.3.

Detecting Nonself Files

A file is classified as nonself if any nonself detector is found. Once a file is
detected as nonself, the user is informed of a possible virus. Future versions of the
scanner will allow the user to remove the infection from the file, delete the file, or
exclude the file from future scanning. The system could send the file to a virus expert in
the Computer Health System, or if it was misclassified, send the file to HEC to learn a
self detector for this file.
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5.5.3.4.

Detecting Previously Unseen Infectors

Previously unseen infectors are detected through the failure to recognize the self
detectors and the predictive capability of the nonself detectors. When a virus infects a
file, it moves portions of the file to different locations. Such an action can violate the
conditions of the self detector. This violation may be caused by breaking the sequence of
bytes used as a feature or breaking the relationships between the features established by
the constructive operators. An infection may also be detected by a nonself detector that
has the predictive capability to recognize features of similar viruses.
It is possible for viruses to go undetected. If a self detector is found and no
nonself detectors are found, MERCURY could classify an infected file as self. The use
of self and nonself detectors should improve the ability of MERCURY to combat these
invaders by providing an extra layer of detectors the virus would need to elude. Future
iterations of MERCURY should employ heuristics from current antivirus programs to
supplement MERCURY'S ability to detect previously unseen invaders.

5.6.

Development Process

MERCURY was developed using a risk driven software process model called the
spiral model. This process iterates through objectives, constraints, alternatives, risks, risk
resolution, planning and commitment [Boe88]. Each step of the process is preceded by

157

a risk analysis to determine if continuing the process will result in positive gains. The
development of HEC followed this process.
The first iteration of the development process explored the feasibility of the
algorithms used for construction. This iteration did not look at accessing files, but rather
developing and integrating the processes of selection, construction, and evaluation.
Through the use of Prolog, the algorithms were developed with respect to logic and
purpose, rather than implementation. Construction used bitwise binary operators that
manipulated the bits of the features through the AND, XOR, OR, and NOT operators.
This method of construction was deemed ineffective, since it could misclassify files
based upon the variety of byte combinations that could result in the same feature.
Development in Prolog was halted due to execution speed considerations and the memory
requirements of storing a large number of hypotheses. This iteration illustrates an
alternative method to construction, representation of hypotheses and evaluation. The
hypotheses were evaluated by converting the examples into a list of all possible
derivations of an example using selection and construction.
The next iteration of the spiral investigated different alternatives to the induction
algorithms with the intention of improving efficiency and classification. The current
constructive operators replaced the bitwise operators. The bitwise operators were
deemed ineffective based upon the lack of specificity in comparison to the original
features. Finally, the program was translated to Ada, in order to take advantage of the
structured nature of the algorithms and improved file access ability provided by this
language. Another iteration resulted in more efficient evaluation routines, introduction of
ordering, increased information hiding, lower coupling and greater cohesion.
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5.7.

Summary

This chapter highlighted the prototyped implementation of the proposed design of
MERCURY. The chapter provided a detailed description of the components and
processes within the prototyped version of MERCURY, including the prototyped
versions of its three main components: the constructive engine, the scanner, and the
knowledge base. The constructive induction, HEC, was decomposed into its four main
processes: hypothesis generation, evaluation, ordering and incorporation. Biases that
were incorporated into the learning process and the reasoning for their inclusion were
investigated. These biases provide tidbits of background knowledge that aid the learning
mechanism in determining the "best" classifier. Issues involving the knowledge base,
and its integration into future iterations of MERCURY were addressed. The
methodology used to scan for viruses was discussed, as well as possible solutions to
detection challenges future iterations of MERCURY will encounter. Chapter Six presents
the results of the tests run utilizing MERCURY. Chapter Seven draws conclusions from
these analyses, and provides areas for system and methodological optimization, and
future areas of research in these fields of study.
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6. Analysis and Results

6.1.

Introduction

Chapter Five provided a detailed description of the components and processes
within the current version of MERCURY, focusing attention on the constructive
induction engine named HEC. This chapter presents the results of running various testing
scenarios utilizing MERCURY, in order to determine the effectiveness of the
constructive induction approach applied to virus detection.
First, the eleven test cases are explained in terms of their creation and testing
purpose. The performance of MERCURY is analyzed in five dimensions: time, space,
power and purity, coverage and process optimization. Each of these dimensions are
described in their importance for rejecting or supporting the hypotheses stated in Chapter
One. The primary research hypothesis as related to MERCURY is that constructive
induction provides a suitable learning mechanism for the virus detector system of an
individual computer system. In support of this primary hypothesis, the virus feature
hypothesis conjectured byte patterns can be used as the basis of a constructive induction
based computer virus detector. Additionally, the constructive operator hypothesis stated
logical and spatial operators can be used for constructing new attributes for the computer
virus detector. Conclusions from these analyses are presented in Chapter Seven along
with future areas of research.
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6.2.

Test Cases

Testing of MERCURY was accomplished through analyzing the hypotheses
generated for all eleven test cases. These test cases were divided into two groupings:
laboratory and operational. The laboratory test cases were designed to test
MERCURY'S functionality under certain expected situations along controlled
dimensions. The operational test cases utilized segments of actual application programs
to test MERCURY'S functionality in simulated "real world" situations.
Each test case was composed of eight files labeled self and two files labeled
nonself. This composition was chosen to reflect the small number of files that may be
infected on a computer. Each file was 100 bytes in length, based upon the large time and
space growth needed for generating, evaluating and ordering hypotheses.
The laboratory test cases were designed to investigate MERCURY'S performance
in particular situations. The files that composed each test case do not reflect files that are
used in a computer; rather, these files reflect situations that might be encountered or
particular machine learning problems. Since these test cases were used to validate and
verify MERCURY, the analyses presented in the subsequent sections will focus on the
operational test cases. Table 18 provides an overview of the laboratory test cases.
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Table 18 -- Test Cases 1 - 8
Number
1

Structure

6

Self- Mil's
Nonself-All O's
Self- All l's
Nonself- Random characters
Se//- Random characters without y
Nonself- Random characters with y
Self- Have equal number of l's and O's
Nonself- Random characters with unequal
number of l's and O's
Self- Contain pattern y same distance apart
Nonself- Contain pattern y varying distance
apart
Self- same as Nonself

7

Self and nonself are complement of each other

8

Self- Randomly generated string
Nonself- Randomly generated string

2
3
4

5

Purpose
Does detection work?
Does MERCURY detect repeated
patterns?
Does MERCURY induce classifier
for infrequent patterns?
Does MERCURY detect parity of
bytes?
Does MERCURY detect spatially
and logically?

Does MERCURY'S evaluation
process work?
Can MERCURY induce detector
for absolute position?
Can MERCURY detect patterns in
random strings?
1

The operational test cases investigated MERCURY'S ability to induce detectors
for segments of application programs. The files in this test case were created by
extracting a 100 byte segment approximately 2,000 bytes offset from the beginning of the
file. This segment of bytes was chosen to increase the probability of detection based
upon patterns in the binary application code, rather than patterns in binary libraries
included in the beginning of many applications. Table 19 shows the structure and
purpose of each operational test case.
Each test run collected information on: the time needed for selection and
construction; the coverage of the examples by the hypotheses; and the label, generation
method, and score fields of the hypotheses.
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1
j

Table 19 - Test Cases 9 -11

Number
10
11

6.3.

Structure
Self- Randomly chosen programs
Nonself- Randomly chosen programs
Self- Programs copyrighted by companies other
than Microsoft
Nonself- Programs copyrighted by Microsoft
Self- Randomly chosen programs
Nonself- File infector viruses

Purpose
Does MERCURY detect patterns
in programs?
Does MERCURY detect patterns
in programs from different
companies?
Does MERCURY detect viral
patterns?

Time

The first dimension of MERCURY analyzed was the time the constructive
induction process utilized to generate, evaluate and order the hypotheses. Two time
parameters were considered important for each test case: the time needed for selective
induction and the time needed for constructive induction. The following subsections
analyze the time results for the laboratory and operational test cases. These results were
obtained by running each test on one type of computer and cross validating some of these
results on another type of computer. The first type of computer was an Intel Pentium
200MHz computer with 64MB of RAM running Windows 95. The second type of
computer was an Intel Pentium II 350MHz with 64MB of RAM running Windows 95.
The laboratory test cases illustrated the difference in time requirements for
selective and constructive induction. Selective induction was run on the first hardware
platform, and took an average of 1.5 minutes to complete while constructive induction
took an average of 1338.5 minutes to complete. These results were not cross validated
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based upon the small expectations of occurrence in operation. The graphical depiction in
Figure 28, shows the disparity in time needed for selection and construction.
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Figure 28 -■ Hypotheses Generation Time for Test Cases 1-8

Similar to the laboratory test cases, there was a significant difference in the
induction times between selection and construction for the operational test cases. Each
time result was cross validated to investigate the effect of hardware upon the performance
of MERCURY. Selective induction for these test cases took 5.4 and 2.8 minutes for each
testing platform respectively. Constructive induction took 4797.5 and 3531.9 minutes
respectively for each hardware platform. These results are graphically depicted in Figure
29.
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Figure 29 -- Hypotheses Generation Time for Test Cases 9-11

6.4.

Space

The next performance dimension of MERCURY is the number of hypotheses that
were induced. The results of this section were based upon a frequency analysis of the
hypotheses that remained following hypothesis generation, evaluation and ordering.
Several aspects were important to the space performance of MERCURY. The
first consideration was the composition of hypotheses generated during selection. The
next consideration was the composition of hypotheses generated during construction by
each method. The third consideration was the composition of hypotheses generated
during construction by each operator. The final consideration was the total number of
hypotheses created by selective and constructive induction, combined.
The first aspect of space performance is the composition of hypotheses generated
by each selection rule in selective induction. Across all the laboratory test cases, 4% of
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all hypotheses were generated by the chunking selection rule, 44% by the every other
byte sliding window selection rule, and 52% by the sliding window rule. Across all the
operational test cases, 4% of all hypotheses were generated by the chunking selection
rule, 43% by the every other byte sliding window selection rule, and 53% by the sliding
window rule. These percentages agreed with the space predictions in Chapter Five.
Additionally, these percentages were similar to the results of the laboratory test cases.
This similarity was a result of the algorithm used to generate hypotheses, rather than the
effect of data. These percentages agreed with the space predictions in Chapter Five.
Composition of Hypotheses
Generated by Selection
100%
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Figure 30 -- Composition of Hypotheses Generated by Selection for Test Cases 1-8

The second important aspect of space performance is the composition of
constructed hypotheses. This aspect was useful for showing a change in the composition
of the hypothesis list when the selected hypotheses were used for construction. Across
all laboratory cases, 0.2% of all constructed hypotheses were based upon chunking
selection rule hypotheses, 40% were based upon every other byte sliding window
selection rule hypotheses, and 59% were based upon sliding window selection rule
hypotheses. Across all operational cases, 0.3% of all constructed hypotheses were based
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upon chunking selection rule hypotheses, 39% were based upon every other byte sliding
window selection rule hypotheses, and 60% were based upon sliding window selection
rule hypotheses. The results between the laboratory and operational tests were essentially
equivalent. Again, these results showed the construction algorithm as the determinant for
the composition of hypotheses, rather than the data that was used. The results for the
laboratory test cases are depicted in Figure 31.

Composition of Hypotheses
Generated by Construction
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Figure 31 - Composition of Hypotheses Generated by Construction for Test Cases 1-8

The third space performance aspect is the composition of hypotheses constructed
by the constructive operators. Figures 32 and 33 show this composition. These results
showed that the OR and XOR constructive operators constructed a majority of
hypotheses that remained in the system after hypotheses ordering. The results for these
operators reflected the effect of fewer biases that constricted the choice of hypotheses
used for construction.
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Composition of Hypotheses Constructed

BAND
■ BEFORE
D DISTANCE
DOR
■ XOR

57%

Figure 32 ~ Operator Composition of Constructed Hypotheses for Test Cases 1-8

Composition of Hypotheses Constructed
5%

33%
■ AND
■ BEFORE
D DISTANCE
□ OR
■ XOR

52%

Figure 33 - Operator Composition of Constructed Hypotheses for Test Cases 9 -11

The final aspect of the space performance of MERCURY is the number of
hypotheses generated by selection and construction, combined. Based upon the
combinatorial process of constructing hypotheses, the number of constructed hypotheses
was much greater than the number of selected hypotheses. The total number of
hypotheses was dependent upon the examples. The range of selected hypotheses was
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750-1,600 hypotheses, while the range of constructed hypotheses was 250,000 to 910,000
hypotheses as shown in Figures 34 and 35.

Number of Hypotheses Generated by Selection and
Construction
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Figure 34 - Number of Hypotheses Generated for Test Cases 1-8

Number of Hypotheses Generated by Selection and
Construction
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■ Construction
□ Selection
□ Construction

Figure 35 -- Number of Hypotheses Generated for Test Cases 9 ■ 11
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6.5.

Power and Purity

The next performance dimension of MERCURY is power and purity. As
discussed in Chapter Five, power measured the number of examples that the hypothesis
classified, either correctly or incorrectly, while purity gauged the correctness of the
classifications that the hypothesis made. These measurements provided a local view of
the performance of MERCURY. The following subsections explore the power and purity
of hypotheses in MERCURY from the laboratory and operational test cases. This
exploration looks at five aspects of power and purity: selection, construction, analysis of
selection methods, analysis of operators, and overall results. This section provides a
foundation for the process optimization section, which will explore the effects of the
different system parameters upon power and purity.
The power and purity scores were the weighted average of the raw power and
purity scores that were stored in the hypotheses, in relation to the number of hypotheses
with that score combination. These hypotheses were considered in the same hypothesis
class. This weighted average was used to account not only for the best performers, but
also for the amount of processing the system required to induce those hypotheses.
The power and purity scores were analyzed by self and nonself. This distinction
was necessary due to the composition of the test cases, which have eight self and two
nonself files. Without this distinction, nonself hypotheses with the optimal power score
of 20% and an optimal purity score of 100% would not be distinguished from suboptimal
self hypotheses with the same scores. The power and purity scores of each hypothesis
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were weighted by the number of examples in the concept that the hypothesis should be
able to classify, allowing for direct comparison of the values. A consequence of this
weighting was that overclassification is indicated by a power score greater than 100%.
MERCURY should be able to induce hypotheses with a power score greater than 12.5%
for self and 50% for nonself. These scores indicate hypotheses that only detect one
example, reflecting a performance equivalent to chance.

6.5.1. Laboratory Test Cases

The first aspect of power and purity is the average power and purity scores for
selection. Based upon the laboratory test cases, the average power score for self was
66.5% and 86.9% for nonself, while the average purity score for self was 96.0% and
100.0% for nonself. These values indicated that a large number of the selected
hypotheses were good detectors. This inflated result was possibly due to the contrived
nature of the laboratory test cases. The average scores for the different selection rules are
illustrated in Figure 36 and 37. These graphs show that the selection rules appeared to
have no relation to the power, while the every other byte sliding window selection rule
appeared to be a poor performer for purity.
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Average Selection Scores for Power
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Figure 36 ~ Average Selection Scores for Power for Test Cases 1-8
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Figure 37 ~ Average Selection Scores for Purity for Test Cases 1 - 8

While the average power and purity scores show the overall state of the system,
the detectors utilized as signatures will most likely be the hypotheses with the maximal
power and purity scores. The maximal power score was 100% for both self and nonself,
while the maximal purity score was 97% for self and 100% for nonself. These results
were the maximums across all the test cases.
The second aspect of power and purity is the average power and purity scores for
construction. Based upon the laboratory test cases, the average power score for self was
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60.8% and 149.6% for nonself, while the average purity score for self was 96.9% and
98.3% for nonself. These values decreased in relation to their counterparts for selection.
Test cases 5 and 6 were designed to reduce the performance of the constructive operators.
Test case 5 was designed to reduce the effectiveness of the logical operators, while
increasing the effectiveness of the spatial operators. Since the space performance
analysis showed that more hypotheses constructed with logical operators were kept in the
system, this test case artificially inflated overclassification. Test case 6 was designed to
eliminate the number of possible unique patterns between self and nonself. With no
unique patterns to distinguish, this test case forced all hypotheses to overclassify.
Statistical evidence of these conclusions is presented in the process optimization section
of this chapter.
The average scores for the different selection rules are illustrated in Figure 38 and
39. These graphs showed that constructed hypotheses, based upon the sliding window
selection rule, had the most overclassification, with a nonself average power of 184%.
Additionally, constructed hypotheses based upon the chunking selection rule and the
every other byte sliding window selection rule have similar power and purity scores.
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Figure 38 ■- Average Construction Scores for Power for Test Case 1-8
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Figure 39 - Average Construction Scores for Purity for Test Case 1 - 8

Another aspect of the power and purity performance of construction is the choice
of constructive operators. The average performance of the constructive operators is
shown in Figures 40 and 41. Figure 40 fails to show the full extent of the
overclassification caused by the AND operator, which had an average power of 273%.
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Average Operator Scores for Power
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Figure 40 - Average Operator Scores for Power for Test Cases 1-8
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Figure 41 - Average Operator Scores for Purity for Test Cases 1-8
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An overall analysis of the results for the laboratory test case is provided in Table
20. These results showed that the average power score increased from selection to
construction, 70.6% to 78.6%, respectively. The average power score was based upon a
proportion of the averages for self and nonself power and the number of self and nonself
examples. This increase indicated that the constructive induction process appeared to
help learn detectors for files. However, the average purity score decreased for both self
and nonself examples. A comparison of maximum power for selection and construction
provided little information since overclassification resulted in power scores greater than
100%. Looking at the maximum values when overclassification exists falsely inflated the
worth of the overclassified parameter.

6.5.2. Operational Test Cases

The operational test cases reflected a "real world" view of the performance of
MERCURY. The individual test cases were not designed to reduce the performance of
one aspect of the system in order to test another aspect, as occurred with the laboratory
test cases. This section will analyze these test cases with respect to the power and purity
scores from selection, construction, construction with respect to each selection method,
construction with respect to each operator. It also provides an overall view of the test
cases.
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The first aspect of the power and purity performance is the average power and
purity for selection. All hypotheses induced for the operational test cases had a purity of
100% for both self and nonself. Since purity was not a varying parameter in the
operational test cases, it will not be discussed further in this section.
During the operational test cases, MERCURY was able to generate detectors with
an average power score of 12.7% for self and 50% for nonself. These power scores were
equivalent to the chance scores of 12.5% for self and 50% for nonself. The selection
rules did not vary the average power scores, as can be seen in Figure 42. The maximum
power for self hypotheses was 37.5% and 50% for nonself detectors.
Average Selection Scores for Power
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Figure 42 ~ Average Selection Scores for Power for Test Cases 9-11

The next aspect of the power and purity performance of the operational test cases
is the average power for construction, which were 22.6% for self and 66.9% for nonself.
These scores were not equivalent to the chance scores of 12.5% for self and 50% for
nonself. Additionally, the maximum power score was 62.5% for self and 100% for
nonself. The average and maximum power scores both increased from selection to
construction.
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Average Construction Scores for Power
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Figure 43 -- Average Construction Scores for Power for Test Cases 9-11

The above figure shows that the power scores for constructed hypotheses vary
slightly with the selection rule, upon which the hypothesis is based. Table 21 shows that
the best performing hypotheses were constructed using the sliding window selection rule;
their maximum power was 62.5% for self and 100% for nonself. The process
optimization section will continue to explore the relationship between power and the
various selection rules.
The next aspect of the power performance of the operational test cases is the
effect of the constructive operators. Figure 44 portrays the relationship between the
constructive operators and power. The OR and XOR operators have different power
scores than the other operators. OR had an average power score of 23.9% for self and
75.2% for nonself, while XOR had an average power score of 25.4% for self and 100%
for nonself. The maximum power scores for both OR and XOR were 62.5% for self and
100% for nonself. These scores were also the maximum across all the operators.
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Average Operator Scores for Power
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Figure 44 -- Average Operator Scores for Power for Test Cases 9 -11

The overall power and purity performance can be found in Table 21. As stated
above, the purity of all the hypotheses was 100%. The average power across the self and
nonself concepts increased from 20.2% for selection to 31.5% for construction. This
increase shows that MERCURY was able to create better hypotheses. This finding is
supported by the increase in maximum power for self from 37.5% to 62.5% and for
nonself from 50% to 100%.
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6.6.

Coverage

The fourth dimension of the performance of MERCURY is coverage. This
measurement provided information about the global behavior of MERCURY. As defined
in Chapter Five, coverage is the number of hypotheses that classify, misclassify and fail
to classify each example. Coverage can be used to determine the classification rate, or
the percent of examples that are classified, misclassified or not classified by the
hypotheses. The following subsections provide a discussion of the classification rate of
MERCURY.
The power and purity results for the laboratory test cases showed that some
hypotheses overclassified. The coverage results in Figure 45 showed that for test cases 5
and 6 the nonself files were misclassified. In test case 5, hypotheses were induced that
either classified or failed to classify the self examples. In addition, a large number of
hypotheses were induced that misclassified the nonself files, with a smaller number either
failing to classify or correctly classifying these files. These results indicated that
hypotheses were induced having the ability to classify the nonself files, while not
misclassifying the self files. While a definitive conclusion can not be reached without
determining which hypothesis classified which examples, it is probable that a smaller
subset of the hypothesis list from test case 5 could have classified each example in the
training set. However, no subset could be derived for test case 6. With the files the same
for both self and nonself, finding a detector with the ability to distinguish the two
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concepts is impossible. The results concurred with this analysis, since no hypotheses
were able to classify the nonself examples correctly.
Coverage by Selection and Construction
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Figure 45 ~ Coverage for Test Cases 1-8

The coverage results for the operational test cases are graphed with respect to
classification in Figure 46. These results show that all hypotheses had 100% purity, each
example was classified and there were no misclassifications.
Coverage by Selection and Construction
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Figure 46 ~ Coverage for Test Cases 9 -11
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6.7.

Process Optimization Through Response Surface Methodology Techniques

Response surface methodology (RSM) is a collection of statistical and
mathematical techniques useful for developing, improving, and optimizing processes
[MyM95]. This technique is useful in applications where several input variables
potentially influence some performance measure or quality characteristic of the product
or process. The input variables are sometimes called independent variables, and are
subject to the control of the engineer or scientist, at least for the purposes of the
experiment. The performance measure or quality characteristic is called the response.
The general objective of the RSM process is to find values for the input variables that
yield a desired, often "optimal" response.
Since the form of the true response function/is unknown, it must be
approximated. The successful use of RSM is critically dependent upon the
experimenter's ability to develop a suitable approximation for/. A response surface is
the geometric representation of a response function. [Hil98]
The ability to observe the response of a system is often skewed by variability and
uncertainty. If repeated observations of the system are made at the same set of input
conditions, the responses observed may vary from observation to observation because of:
measurement errors, variability in the "experimental material", or the influence of other
variables not accounted for.
After observing the response at different sets of values of the input variables, an
attempt is made to use this information to develop a parsimonious approximation to the
response function referred to as the empirical model. RSM comprises a set of statistical
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and mathematical techniques for empirical model building and exploitation that
encompasses [Hil98]:
1. Designing a series of experiments that will yield adequate and reliable
measurements of the response(s) of interest in a region of interest.
2. Analyzing the results of those experiments to determine an empirical
model that best fits the data collected
3. Searching for the optimal settings of the input variables that produce a
desired response

These techniques include:
1. Designed Experiments - an experimental process of inducing
purposeful changes in the input variables in order to observe and
model the changes in the response
2. Regression Analysis - statistical techniques used to model the response
as a linear combination of various forms of the input variables and
their interactions
3. Steepest Ascent - a gradient search technique that helps us to "scale
the heights" of the response surface

This research is targeted at demonstrting that constructive induction provides a
suitable learning mechanism for the virus detector system of an individual computer
system. Based on the empirical analysis of MERCURY'S results, presented above, the
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hypothesis that constructive induction provides a suitable learning mechanism for the
virus detector system of an individual computer system can not be accepted or rejected.
The RSM methodology can be applied to the constructive induction approach to
the virus detection domain. The output from the testing of MERCURY can be
manipulated using statistical and mathematical techniques, in order to possibly improve
and optimize the process of virus detection using the constructive induction approach.
The input variables influencing the performance and quality of the virus detection are
numerous. These independent variables are listed in the following table; each is defined
by its name, type, and range.
Table 22 - RSM input variables

Input Variable
Test Case Number
Number of Hypotheses Generated
Method used for Hypothesis
Generation
Operator used for Hypothesis
Generation
Hypothesis Label
Induction Type

Type
Nominal
Continuous
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal
Nominal

Range
1-11
1 -1,000,000
Chunking, EOSW, Sliding
Window
NONE, AND, OR, XOR,
BEFORE, DISTANCE
Self or Nonself
Selective or Constructive

Each of these input variables could potentially contribute, in varying degrees, to
the quality of the response, which in our case is the "goodness" of constructive induction
applied to the virus detection domain. Specifically, this "goodness" is measured through
two scores of power and purity for each class of hypotheses. A class of hypotheses are
those generated by the same combination of constructive operators and selection rule, and
yielding the same scores for power and purity. Each hypothesis within a class might
represent a different group of features; however, this research focused upon the
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generation method. Therefore, these two scores will be utilized as the response variables
intended for optimization. The response variables are defined in the following table, by
name, type, and range. The general objective of this RSM process is to find values for
the input variables that yield an "optimal" response for power and purity.
Table 23 -- RSM response variables

Response Variable
Power
Purity

Tyjie.

Continuous
Continuous

Range
0.0-1.0
0.0-1.0

The data produced by MERCURY contains a certain amount of variance, some of
which can be explained. The output generated by MERCURY exhibits a high degree of
variability between test cases and a low degree of variability within test cases. The
variability between test cases is most evident between test cases 1 through 8 and between
the "group" 1 through 8 and the "group" 9 through 11. The heterogeneity between test
cases was primarily driven by the objectives of each test case. Test cases 1 through 8
represent contrived, laboratory test cases, whereas 9 through 11 represent the operational
test cases, with byte patterns extracted from "real-world" non-infected files and "realworld" virus files. The low variability within test cases could be explained by the small
size of individual test cases, the small size of extracted byte patterns, and the method of
contriving the test cases in order to test the functionality of certain generation methods
and constructive operators.
MERCURY was tested on 11 test cases, using different sets of values of the input
variables. However, the process optimization techniques will only be applied to the
operational test cases. The laboratory test cases were only used to verify and validate
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MERCURY, which renders them unsuitable for optimization. The primary RSM
technique used in this dimension of analyses is regression analysis, which attempts to
model the response as a linear combination of various forms of the input variables and
their interactions. These analyses will examine the output for the operational test cases to
determine the existence of a parsimonious, empirical model. The RSM techniques will
also determine which input variables have the greatest effect on the responses of power
and purity, and determine the optimal "settings" of the input variables which produced
the optimal responses.
The following sections present the findings of the RSM study. All analyses were
obtained using the JMP Statistical Analysis Program. The first section describes the
distribution characteristics of the data set, and makes provisions for their analyses.

6.7.1. Analyzing the Distribution of Data

A normality test was conducted on the test cases, using the Shapiro Wilk Test for
Normality. These tests concluded that the data set was not normally distributed. If the pvalue is less than 0.05 or some other alpha, conclusions of a non-normal distribution can
be made. The following table, showing the results of the normality test, which supports
the conclusion of non-normality. The purity scores were all 1.0 for the operational test
cases; therefore, they were not tested or analyzed.
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Table 24 ■- Test for Normality
Shapiro-Wilk W Test - Test for Normality
Test Case Group
9-11

Response
Power
Purity

W

p-value

0.785653

0.0000

Based on these results, nonparametric tests were used for this data. These types
of tests do not depend upon a normal distribution of data; nor do they depend on the
assumption that the population from which the sample was taken is normal [A1190]. The
assumptions for nonparametric tests are that the samples are independent from each
other, their variances are constant, and their residuals are normally distributed.
Nonparametric methods are often computationally simpler and easier to understand;
however, they also have some disadvantages. One disadvantage is that they tend to be
less sensitive than their parametric counterparts and thus require stronger evidence to
reject a null hypothesis [A1190].
The first assumption of independence is satisfied, based upon the deterministic
qualities of MERCURY. The second assumption of constant variance is partially
satisfied. Based on the results presented in the following three tables, variance across
methods and labels is constant, though variance across operators is not constant. These
conclusions are based on at least one test for each group, where the probabilities greater
than 0.05 showed constant variance, and probabilities less than 0.05 showed non-constant
variance.
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Table 25 ~ Tests that the Variances are Equal across Operators

Test
0'Brien[.51
Brown-Forsythe
Levene
Bartlett

F Ratio
8.5902
3.2398
6.0585
6.1502

DFNum
5
5
5
5

DFDen
162
162
162
?

Prob>F
<.0001
0.0081
<.0001
<.0001

Table 26 ~ Tests that the Variances are Equal across Methods

Test

O'Brienr.51
Brown-Forsythe
Levene
Bartlett

F Ratio
0.9712
1.4102
1,7973
1.2445

DFNum
2
2
2
2

DFDen
165
165
165
?

Prob>F
0.3808
0.2470
0.1690
0.2881

Table 27 ~ Tests that the Variances are Equal across Labels

Test

O'Brienr.51
Brown-Forsythe
Levene
Bartlett

F Ratio
38.6499
3.7111
63.1145
30.1749

DFNum
1
1
1
1

DFDen
166
166
166
?

Prob>F
<.0001
0.0558
<.0001
<.0001

The third assumption of normally distributed residuals is not satisfied. The
following figure shows the distribution of residuals. Based on the results of the Shapiro
Wilk Test for Normality, with a p-value of <. 0001, these tests concluded that the
residuals were not normally distributed. Although not all three assumptions for
nonparametric testing were fully satisfied, the analyses will use this form of testing.
Since the data from the test cases are nominally scaled, the applicability of variance and
normality could be lessened.
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Figure 47 -- Distribution of Residuals

6.7.2. Analyses on Test Cases 9 through 11

6.7.2.1.

Preliminary Analyses

The analysis on the operational test cases used the input variables Test Case
Number, Number of Hypotheses Generated, Method used for Hypothesis Generation,
Operator used for Hypothesis Generation, and Hypothesis Label as factors affecting the
responses of power. There are no tests for purity, since all the hypotheses had a score of
1.0 across all test cases.
For each of these variables, a pictorial representation of the data is presented,
showing the range, mean, and distribution of the power scores. The tables following each
figure show the results of the Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Test, a nonparametric tool that
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tests whether group medians are the same across all groups. The usual analysis of
variance assumption of normality is not made. "Prob>ChiSQ" is the probability of
obtaining by chance alone a chi-square value larger than the one calculated if, in reality,
the distributions across factor levels are centered at the same location [A1190]. Observed
probabilities of 0.05 or less are often considered as evidence that the distributions across
input variable levels are not centered at the same location. Assumptions of the KruskalWallis Test are that the populations have identical shape and variation, and that they are
not normally distributed.
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Figure 48 -- Pictorial View of Power across Test Cases

Table 28 - Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis for Differences in Power across Test Cases

Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
Level
9
10
11

Count
51
55
62

Score Sum
4307
4580.5
5308.5

Score Mean
84.4510
83.2818
85.6210

(Mean-Mean0)/Std0
-0.007
-0.232
0.234

1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
ChiSquare
0.0721

Prob>ChiSq
0.9646

DF
2
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Figure 49 - Pictorial View of Power across Operators

Table 29 - Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis for Differences in Power across Operators

Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
Level
AND
BEFORE
DISTANCE
NONE
OR
XOR

Count
24
22
21
24
45
32

Score Sum
1762
1628
1561
1762
4346
3137

Score Mean
73.4167
74.0000
74.3333
73.4167
96.5778
98.0313

(Mean-Mean0)/Std0
-1.244
-1.120
-1.056
-1.244
2.010
1.805

1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
ChiSquare
10.3443

Prob>ChiSq
0.0660

DF
5
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Table 30 - Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis for Differences in Power across Methods

Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
Level
CHUNKING
EOSW
SLIDING_WINDOW

Count
42
52
74

Score Sum
3586.5
4267.5
6342

Score Mean
85.3929
82.0673
85.7027

(Mean-Mean0)/Std0
0.140
-0.447
0.292

1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
ChiSquare
0.2023

Prob>ChiSq
0.9038

DF
2
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Table 31 - Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis for Differences in Power across Labels

Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
Level
NONSELF
SELF

Count
63
105

Score Sum
8406
5790

Score Mean
133.429
55.143

(Mean-Mean0)/Std0
10.435
-10.435

1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
ChiSquare
108.9314

Prob>ChiSq
<.0001

DF
1
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Based on the results from the figures and tables above, the following conclusions
can be drawn. The power scores of each test case are not significantly different from
each other, shown by a probability score of 0.9646. These are the expected results, since
the examples in these test cases were generated from "real world" files.
The power scores generated by the different operators are statistically different,
proven by the probability value of 0.0660. In order to accept the conclusion of
difference, an alpha of 0.10 is required, as opposed to 0.05, which provides less
confidence in these results. This test is significant because it proves that at least one
operator or group of operators provided a better measure of power than the other
operators. By observation, it could be concluded that OR and XOR are better operators,
based on their high power scores of 96.5778 and 98.0313, respectively. These scores
were obtained from Table 29. By performing additional tests, it can be shown which
operator is different. Isolating the four variables believed to be similar, AND, NONE,
BEFORE and DISTANCE, the test below confirms they are statistically the same.
Table 32 - Wilcoxon/Kruskal-Wallis for Differences in Power across FOUR OPERATORS

Wilcoxon / Kruskal-Wallis Tests (Rank Sums)
Level
AND OP
BEFORE
DISTANCE
NONE

Count
24
22
21
24

Score Sum
1101.5
1013.5
969.5
1101.5

(Mean-Mean0)/Std0
-0.019
0.010
0.030
-0.019

Score Mean
45.8958
46.0682
46.1667
45.8958

1-way Test, Chi-Square Approximation
ChiSquare
0.0020

Prob>ChiSq
1.0000

DF
3

If the OR operator is added to this group of four, the similarity of the OR operator
with the remaining operators can be tested. Running the same tests yielded a probability
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score of 0.1224, concluding the operators are similar, using an alpha of 0.05. Similar
results were obtained when XOR was added to the group of four operators, giving a
probability value of 0.1751. Finally, XOR and OR were compared, resulting in a
probability score of 0.8867. Though not statistically proven, some conclusions can be
drawn by observation. The XOR and OR operators likely yield a higher power score than
the other operators. This information may be useful when ordering the operators for use
in a constructive induction approach to virus detection. If the more useful operators are
used first, the computational complexity of the entire operation may be improved.
Since "NONE" was used as the operator for the selection method, the
implications are that selection did not produce a power score significantly different from
the power scores produced when using a constructive operator. This test should not be
used alone to discount the effects of construction over selection. Since the sample sizes
were so small, and sensitivity could be lost with nonparametric tests, further
investigations would be needed to conclude the effectiveness of this learning method.
The probability value of the Chi-square test for the label test is <.0001, implying a
difference exists in the score for power due to the label of self or nonself. Hypotheses
generated to detect nonself have a statistically better power score than those generated to
detect self.
In both cases of power and purity, results could be skewed by the fact that there
was a 4 to 1 ratio of self files to nonself files in the example set. The possible values of
power for nonself were {0%, 50%, 100%}; the possible values of power for self were
{0%, 12.5%, 25%, 37.5%, 50%, 62.5%, 75%, 87.5%, 100%}. The disparity between
these two sets could have artificially inflated the effects of the hypothesis label on power.
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Since purity is a measure of how correctly the hypothesis classifies the examples, this
score could also be affected by the difference.

6.7.2.2.

Regression Analyses

To confirm the findings from the nonparametric tests, a regression test was run,
which tested the "effects" of the input variables on the specified response of power.
Though the data set was not normally distributed, these regression tests are robust enough
to allow for non-normality. The results of these tests are derived from a model that
exhibited a "good fit."
There are three primary measures that assess a fitted model: MSE, R and F. A
"good" model will be significant, as indicated by a "large" value of F, exhibit a "small"
error component MSE and explain most of the variation in the responses by having a
"large" R2.
Table 33 - Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Table for the Power Model

Source

DF

Sum of Squares

Model
Error
C Total
Label

11
156
167
1

8.611177
2.844289
11.455466
6.2961494

Mean
Square
0.782834
0.018233
345.3233

F Ratio
42.9359
Prob>F
<.0001
<.0001

The Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) table above shows the significance of this
model through the "large" F Ratio of 42.9359. This indicates at least one of the input
variables is contributing significantly to the model. The Mean Square Error (MSE)
provides a measure of the variability within the residuals and provides a measure of how
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well the fitted responses match those observed. The table above shows the "small" error
value of 0.018. In the following table, the R2 value of 0.75 represents the proportion of
the variability within the observed responses that can be explained or accounted for by
the model. Additionally, developing a "best" model usually involves finding a model
that has the above characteristics and is "parsimonious", meaning it involves the fewest
parameters. It is difficult to just delete parameters, this process is often facilitated by
testing the addition or removal of the variables. [Hil98]
The model derived here is a "good" model, meaning it can be used to gain
insightful knowledge into the important factors affecting the power response. This could
be very useful in the application of constructive induction to virus detection. As stated
previously, the computational complexity of this learning method is extreme. A method,
such as regression can help pinpoint and guide the learning process by identifying early
in the process the important variables and the settings needed to optimize the desired
responses of high power and high purity.
Table 34 depicts the results of the effect test for the model. This test shows the
impact of variables on the response of power. The F test is used to determine if all
settings of a variable have the same effect. The null hypothesis states all settings have
equal means, and the alternative hypothesis states that at least two means are different.
The variable settings with "large" F ratios and "small" probabilities, of less than alpha,
reject the null hypothesis. Using an alpha of 0.05, the most significant effects are the
operator, method, and label. This indicates that at least one setting within each variable
has a different mean than the others. Further analyses, using the parameter estimates' t
tests indicated which settings were the most significant.
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Table 34 - Effect Test for the Power Model

Source
Test Case
Operator
Method
Label

Nparm
2
5
2
1

DF
2
5
2
1

Sum of Squares
0.018
1.783
0.145
6.296

F Ratio

Prob>F

0.519
19.56
3.98
345.32

0.5957
<.0001
0.0204
<.0001

Table 35 shows the parameter estimates for the variables and their settings, and
their tests of significance. Since the input variables are nominal, each term symbolizes a
particular variable setting compared to the rest of the settings for that variable [SAS95].
For example, the term "Operator[AND-XOR]" symbolizes the effect of the AND
operator compared to the group containing the rest of the operators. A t test is performed
which indicates the significance of that particular variable setting. This tests whether the
setting of a particular variable is statistically different from the other settings of that
variable. The null hypothesis states all settings are equal, and the alternative hypothesis
states that a particular setting is not equal. The variable settings with "large" t ratios and
"small" probabilities, of less than alpha, reject the null hypothesis. Using an alpha of
0.05, all of the operators and both of the label variables produced high t ratios, meaning
these terms are significantly different from each other. With an alpha of 0.10, the method
of chunking becomes significantly different than the other two generation methods. The
other generation methods and the specific test cases do not appear to be significantly
different from each other.
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Table 35 - Regression Information for the Power Model
Summary of Fit
RSquare
RSquare Adj
Root Mean Square Error
Mean of Response
Observations (or Sum Wgts)

0.751709
0.734201
0.135028
0.385893
168

Parameter Estimates
Term
Intercept
TestCase[9-m
TestCasejlO-lll
Operator[AND-XORl
Operator[BEFORE-XORl
Operator[DISTANC-XORl
Operator[NONE-XORl
Operator[OR-XORl
MethodrCHUNKIN-SLIDING]
Method[EO SLID-SLIDING]
LabelfNONSELF-SELFl

Std Error
0.011644
0.015182
0.014863
0.025034
0.025924
0.026439
0.025241
0.020025
0.016629
0.015363
0.011307

Estimate
0.4202101
-0.007323
-0.007414
-0.064471
-0.07446
-0.078363
-0.070195
0.1033423
-0.031237
-0.008616
0.2101124

t Ratio
36.09
-0.48
-0.50
-2.58
-2.87
-2.96
-2.78
5.16
-1.88
-0.56
18.58

Prob>ltl
<.0001
0.6303
0.6186
0.0109
0.0046
0.0035
0.0061
<.0001
0.0622
0.5757
<.0001

Breaking the model down even further, additional analyses can be conducted.
The least squares means are predicted values from the specified model across the levels
of each variable setting, where the other variables are controlled by being set to neutral
values. The least squares means are the values to examine to see which levels produce
higher responses from power, holding the other variables constant [SAS95]. The
following three tables show the least squares mean scores for the operators, methods, and
labels. XOR and OR appear to give the largest power scores of all operators, sliding
window appears to give the highest power score of all methods, and hypotheses with the
nonself label appear to have higher power scores.
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Table 36 - Least Squares Means for the Operators

Least Squares Means
Level
AND
BEFORE
DISTANCE
NONE
OR
XOR

Std Error
0.027985
0.029111
0.029712
0.028284
0.020420
0.024710

Least Sq Mean
0.342110
0.332121
0.328219
0.336387
0.509924
0.590728

Mean
0.30416
0.30909
0.31190
0.30416
0.46555
0.49781

I

Effect Test
Sum of Squares
10.3443

DF
5

F Ratio
19.5647

Prob>F
<.0001

Table 37 - Least Squares Means for the Methods

Least Squares Means
Level
CHUNKING
EOSW
SLE)ING_WINDO
W

Std Error
0.021602
0.019127
0.016673

Least Sq Mean
0.375345
0.397965
0.446435

Mean
0.40357
0.37942
0.38040

Effect Test
Sum of Squares
0.14544740

DF
2

F Ratio
3.9887

Prob>F
0.0204

Table 38 - Least Squares Means for the Labels

Least Squares Means
Level
NONSELF
SELF

Std Error
0.017767
0.014186

Least Sq Mean
0.616694
0.196469

Mean
0.64285
0.23171

Effect Test
Sum of Squares
6.2961494

DF
1

F Ratio
345.3233
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Prob>F
<.0001

|

6.7.3. Utilizing Process Optimization

In order to show the useful application of the process optimization techniques
discusses above, a case study of their utilization was simulated. Since insight was gained
about the effects of different operators on the response of power, this knowledge was
included in a simulation of MERCURY. This simulation only used the OR and XOR
operators to construct new hypotheses. The results from this simulation are presented
below.
Power of construction
before optimization

Power of construction
after optimization

22.6% self
66.9% nonself
31.5% overall

25% self
83% nonself
36.3% overall

The results show an increase of average power scores for both self and nonself
hypotheses. The overall weighted average also increased. Additionally, this optimized
simulation produced 18.4% fewer hypotheses. By knowing the effects of the OR and
XOR operators, they can be used more effectively in the inductive process. They
produced a better average, and decreased some of the computational growth. Though this
decrease is small, it represents only a small tidbit of a priori knowledge. If combined
with other pieces of knowledge, the computational growth could be reduced even further.
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6.7.4. RSM Conclusions

The results of these tests provided evidence that statistical methods, like the ones
used in RSM processes, can provide empirical analysis and knowledge that could make
the constructive induction learning process more efficient. Although little insight could
be gleaned from the first group of tests cases, the second group of test cases was able to
demonstrate the capabilities of process optimization technique. Since the main
disadvantage of constructive induction is its computational explosion, these results
provide mathematically-based methods that could decrease its computational complexity,
by providing knowledge about the problem domain a priori.
Based on the knowledge obtained from the last three test cases, future runs of
MERCURY could be optimized by utilizing the sliding window method before other
methods. In addition, construction could begin with the XOR and OR operators,
followed by the others, if necessary. This could reduce the time and space explosions
explained in previous sections of this chapter.

6.8.

Summary

This chapter presented the results of various test scenarios utilizing MERCURY.
These results were analyzed by the five performance dimensions of time, space, power
and purity, coverage and process optimization. Time and space were both recognized as
potential downsides to MERCURY; however, several optimization methods to future

205

code iterations and algorithms that could reduce these effects are presented in Chapter
Seven. Power and purity scores, in general, were shown to increase between selection and
construction, possibly indicating useful selection methods, operators, or constructive
rules. Although a statistically significant improvement between selection and
construction using the optimization techniques of RSM was not shown, other important
information was obtained through this analysis. These techniques were recognized as
potential "guidelines" for increasing the performance of a constructive induction learning
engine. RSM could provide the virus detection programmer a priori knowledge, resulting
in a better detection system. Further conclusions from these analyses are presented in
Chapter Seven.
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7. Conclusions

7.1.

Research Overview

This research integrated four different domains: computer virus detection, human
immunology, computer immunology and constructive induction. The goal of this research
was three-fold. First, a computer health model was defined that could possibly improve
the current "global" approach to computer viruses/This health model was based on the
public health system, and provided a high level view of a Computer Health System.
Second, a computer immune model was defined that could possibly improve the current
"local" approach to computer virus detection. This detection model was based on the
human immune system, and provided a high level view of an individual computer
immune system. Third, a detection model was developed, represented by the prototype
MERCURY. This model utilized the machine learning concept of constructive induction
to capture the human immune characteristic of self-adaptation. The work accomplished as
part of this investigation tested the primary hypotheses.
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7.2.

Research Hypotheses

Primary Hypotheses
1. The public health system is a useful model for a Computer Health
System for the global protection of computer system against viruses
2. The human immune system is a useful model for a virus detection
system on an individual computer system
3. Constructive induction provides a suitable learning mechanism for the
virus detector system of an individual computer system

The first two objectives of this research were to test the first two hypotheses to
determine if the public health system and the human immune system were useful models
for a Computer Health System and computer immune system, respectively. To
accomplish this objective, research in the areas of public health and human immunology
was conducted. The requirements, objectives and components of the models were also
evaluated. Both computer models are informal, explanatory models based on some
essential qualities of their respective systems. Due to the models' informalities, though,
not all of their aspects were explicitly stated.
Though the first two objectives were not formally tested, the first two hypotheses
can be supported. The Computer Health System was derived by analogy from an
effective system in an applicable domain. The computer immune system was also
derived by analogy, and its main functions of detection, adaptation and memory were
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translated into the design of the prototype, MERCURY, and abstractly demonstrated in
its implementation.
The third objective of this research was to empirically test the third hypothesis.
This objective investigated whether constructive induction was suitable for virus
detection in a computer immune system. Testing was conducted utilizing MERCURY.
While MERCURY captures the essence of constructive induction, it does not fully
employ all the characteristics of a complete inductive engine. The analyses supported the
third hypothesis by failing to reject it, and by showing empirical evidence that
construction improved classification. In other words, MERCURY was not able to
validate, or refute, that constructive induction definitively provides a suitable learning
mechanism for the virus detector system of an individual computer system.
The results of these tests did provide empirical evidence and analytical knowledge
that could make the learning process more efficient. Since the main disadvantage of
constructive induction is its computational explosion, these results provided
mathematically based methods which could decrease its computational complexity.
These methods could improve the capabilities of a fully developed constructive induction
based virus detector, by providing knowledge about the problem domain and the system
parameters a priori. To confirm these findings, a process optimization simulation was
conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of a priori knowledge applied to the virus
detection problem.
The third hypothesis was decomposed into smaller, more manageable, subhypotheses. The first sub-hypothesis was the Virus Feature Hypothesis:
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Virus Feature Hypothesis
Byte patterns can be used as the basis of a
constructive induction based computer virus detector.

Although current virus research stated byte patterns were useful features, it was
necessary to ensure constructive induction did not decrease detection capabilities. To
confirm this, MERCURY'S learning component was programmed to extract, manipulate,
and test byte patterns from various files. Testing concluded that the learning component,
using features composed of byte patterns, was able to detect self and nonself files with
varying degrees of accuracy. Therefore, it can be concluded that byte patterns can be
used as the basis of a constructive induction based computer virus detector.
The second sub-hypothesis was the Constructive Operator Hypothesis:

Constructive Operator Hypothesis
Logical and spatial operators can be used for
constructing new attributes for the computer virus detector.

Current virus research confirms the applicability of using relative and absolute
locations of virus characteristics to detect an infected file. This hypothesis validated that
the choice of operators combining these characteristics was adequate, better
distinguishing between infected and uninfected data. To confirm this, MERCURY'S
learning component was programmed to manipulate the byte patterns from various files
based on two types of operators, logical and spatial. Testing concluded that the learning
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component, using logical and spatial operators, was able to detect self and nonself files
with varying degrees of accuracy. While the logical operators performed better in this
system, spatial operators should not be discounted. Further testing of these spatial
operators should be conducted. Therefore, it can be concluded that logical operators can
be used for constructing new features for the computer virus detector. More research is
required for spatial operators.

7.3.

Research Implications

The results of analyzing MERCURY demonstrate an inherent lack of
representational power of computer virus byte patterns using selective induction methods.
Constructive induction provides new, potentially powerful, and often necessary
representations. However, the results of this research confirmed constructive induction's
main deficiency, the explosion in the number of hypotheses generated.
The effects of this deficiency can be improved by utilizing key pieces of
knowledge to guide construction. Process optimization through statistical techniques,
provides direct insight into these key pieces of knowledge. Many factors influence the
computational explosion of this system. Some of these are: feature size, file size, number
of selection methods, number of operators, number of constructions, and construction
rules. Examples of some guidelines for improving the performance of constructive
induction in a virus detector are: the ordering of the selection methods, the ordering of
the operators, the sequence of selection and construction, the appropriate time to
evaluate, and the appropriate hypotheses to evaluate. Knowledge about the virus domain,
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such as characteristics of typical viruses and regularities in the byte patterns, also
provides guidance for effective construction. However, care must be taken to not
constrict or oversimplify the problem.

7.4.

Research Limitations

Several factors limited aspects of this research. Due to the broadness of the four
research areas and the disparity of the concepts being intertwined, time was a limitation.
As proven in the subsequent section discussing future research topics, this problem
domain is without boundaries in a vast number of directions. This research focused on
the detection component of an individual computer immune system as part of a larger
Computer Health System. Since these computer immune models were informal models,
the validity of the models is limited to common sense and intuition.
Other limitations to this system were caused by hardware configuration and
software design constraints, such as processing speed and memory and limited data
structures. In addition, due to the computational complexity of this learning method, the
number of test cases, the number of generation methods, the number of operators, the
number of construction rules, and the number of constructions were all limited.
The results of testing and the conclusions drawn from them were also limited.
Due to the small file sizes and example set sizes, and the non-normal distribution of this
particular data, conclusions can not be absolutely validated. On the other hand, the
primary hypothesis for constructive induction applicability in the virus detection domain
can not be rejected. There is not enough evidence to support the claim that constructive
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induction is the answer to virus detection. However, evidence suggest that through
empirical analyses and statistical techniques, improvements can be made over current
methods of virus detection

7.5.

Future Research

7.5.1. Computer Immunology

Application of computer immune models to other domains. The Computer
Health System model and the computer immune model that were
developed in this research can be utilized in other computer security
domains. These models provide global scoped and locally driven
protection for computer networks and individual computers. The
applicability of these models to intrusion detection, change detection, and
malicious user detection should be explored. An additional goal of this
research should be the integration of the various domains through these
models.
Model refinement. This research provided an overview of the Computer
Health System, as discussed in Chapter Three. Further model refinement
is needed to expand components, specify interfaces between the global
Computer Health System and the local computer immune model, and
specifying the communication protocols between systems.
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Expanding the computer immune model. This research focused on
specifying the detection component of the computer immune model. The
system analysis, virus elimination, and file repair tasks need to further
specification. Current antivirus techniques, discussed in Chapter Two, can
be incorporated into the model to handle these tasks.
Other aspects of immune system models. This research investigated the
use of the human immune system's defenses against intracellular and
extracellular infection as a means of detecting computer viruses. Certain
immunological aspects were not fully addressed in the model
specification, requiring future work. These areas include autoimmunity,
allergy, B-cell and T-cell interaction, and the role of macrophages.
Additionally, a new concept of immune system operation, the danger
theory, should be investigated. This theory claims that the immune system
does not work through detection of self and nonself, but rather through
detection of dangerous nonself through a costimulatory signal produced by
antigen presenting cells [Ric96, Pen96].

7.5.2. Machine Learning

Different forms of machine learning. The use of constructive induction in
this research was not the only from of machine learning available. As
discussed in Section 2.5, three current forms of machine learning, neural
networks, genetic algorithms, and intelligent agents should be studied for
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their applicability to this domain. These forms of learning should be aided
by the empirical evidence that that was collected and utilized in this
research.
User intervention. The current structure of MERCURY does not allow
the user to intervene into either the learning or virus detection processes.
Future research should investigate means for correcting overlearning or
underlearning by HEC, proactively adding self to the knowledge base, and
handling unclassified files.
Constructive Induction Code Optimization. Several aspects of the
constructive induction process can be optimized based upon the results of
this research.
•

Data structure improvements. The hypotheses are currently stored
in a flat list structure. This structure is traversed several times to
construct hypotheses and evaluation. The system could be
improved if an index into the features of the hypotheses was
maintained. With such an index, it would be possible to search
through the example file once to determine coverage, power and
purity. Coverage is currently determined independently of the
score for power and purity.

•

Inclusion of domain specific bias from either empirical evidence or
antivirus researchers. Very little virus specific bias is included in
HEC. The empirical results of this investigation and other biases
could be used to guide the choice of hypotheses used for
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construction, the operators used to construct, and the selection of
features from the files. Relaxing these biases would help
determine their affect on learning. This research should attempt to
reduce the average execution time and memory requirements.
•

Extracting Signatures. HEC does not attempt to find the minimal
number of hypotheses necessary to classify the examples, with
high power and purity. Determining the subset of hypotheses
needed to classify self and nonself is needed. In order to determine
this, a mapping between the examples and the classifying
hypotheses are needed. Additionally, analyses of the "outlier
hypotheses" could be conducted to determine if they possess
highly effective characteristics.

•

Testing the predictive capability. Several tests exist for validating
the machine learning process and determining the predictive
capability of the detectors. These tests should be used inside HEC
when evaluating candidates for signatures.

Future RSM applications. Regression analysis is one response surface
methodology (RSM) technique used to investigate the relationships
between process input parameters and process results. Additional
techniques could be used, such as steepest ascent, which allows the
experimenter to "scale" the heights of a response surface, in order to find
the optimal region. This "hill climbing" technique is especially useful
when there is more than one response variable which needs to be
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optimized, or there are additional constraints on the system. Design of
experiments can also be used on different system variables to improve the
application of the RSM techniques. Using differing levels of feature size,
file size, etc, can give more insight into which variables can be optimized.

7.5.3. Virus Detection

Different types of viral detection. This research explored the use of bytes
as features for a constructive induction based computer virus detector.
Other antiviral techniques use heuristics and system call analysis to
determine if a computer is infected. A study of MERCURY'S techniques
should be investigated to provide a multilayered defense for the computer
immune system, akin to the multilayered defense provided by the innate
and adaptive immune system of the human body.
Different types of viruses. MERCURY is designed to detect file infector
viruses. Boot sector, polymorphic, and stealth viruses should be
researched to determine methodologies to integrate detectors for these
viruses with MERCURY.
Dynamic virus scanning. MERCURY currently detects only when
invoked by the user. In order to detect viruses as they infect a file,
dynamic virus scanning is needed.
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This study began by building two models: a Computer Health System and an
individual computer immune system. Once the modeling for the two systems was
complete, the prototype of MERCURY was designed and developed to capture the
essence of the individual computer immune system. The overall results provided an
analysis of constructive induction approach applied to the virus detection domain, as well
as areas for optimizing this learning method and reducing its computational complexity.
This research recognized specific areas of improvement in machine learning that
could be applied to current methods of virus detection, in order to improve performance.
It also presented the incorporation of this constructive induction component into an
individual computer's immune system, and further incorporated this system into an
overall global picture of computer health.
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Appendix A -- Source Code

The source code for MERCURY is not included as part of this document. Those
interested in obtaining a copy of the source code should direct their requests to:

Dr. Gregg Gunsch
AFIT/ENG
2950 P Street
WPAFB, OH 45433-7765
gregg.gunsch @ afit.af.mil
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